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The road to success is not often a straight line. Unfortunately, no one is born with the precise knowledge how to 
have a comfortable ride to success. While some of us might be lucky and are successful as from their first trial, 
most learn it the hard way through a loop of multiple trials and errors. For most of us - including me - the 
pathway to success is hence a bumpy one, with several failures along the ride. No matter how painful and 
disappointing some professional failures may be, the most important objective is to keep learning from these 
pitfalls. Because, as long as you learn not to make the same errors again, failure is not equal to failing. Instead, it 
puts you back on track and one step closer to success. While I'm nowhere near the end of my journey, this PhD 
dissertation is the ultimate result of intense doctoral studies and represents the conclusion of a very challenging 
and enriching phase in my life but also the start of a hopefully as fulfilling new phase. Honestly, I wouldn’t have 
made it this far without the encouragement of people around me, who guided and supported me throughout the 
process. I would therefore, like to express my gratitude to my family, friends and colleagues who have helped 
and inspired me along the journey. 
First, I’m eternally grateful to my supervisor Sophie Manigart for her belief, motivation, support and guidance 
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ideas and critiques, you have brought me to a higher level. You always pushed me to the limit and inspired me 
to be critical and to think out of the box. It comes as no surprise that you were awarded the 2012 Academy of 
Management Mentor Award and I feel very privileged to have worked under you. Not only are you a top 
academic, but more importantly, you are an inspiration to your students. I really hope that somewhere down the 
road, I will have the honour of working with you again! 
Furthermore, I wish to thank the members of my doctoral and examination committee: Massimo Colombo, 
Mirjam Knockaert, Miguel Meuleman, Tereza Tykvová and Bruno van Pottelsberghe. They are all renowned 
scholars, which makes me feel honoured that they were willing to spend time and energy to guide me through 
this journey. Thank you for your constant support and constructive feedback! A Special thanks to Miguel and 
Massimo who were part of my doctoral committee and were deeply involved in developing the underlying 
research ideas. Your reflections, comments and suggestions have substantially improved the quality of this 
dissertation! I would also like to thank my co-authors Tom Vanacker, Ine Paeleman and Mike Wright for their 
valuable work. A special thanks to the VICO team, without whom this PhD would never have achieved the 
same level. 
I would also want to thank the Vlerick Business School for giving me the opportunity to work in a challenging 
and stimulating business environment. I definitely want to thank the Area Accounting and Finance, first guided 
by Filip Roodhooft and now by Regine Slagmulder. Thanks to both of you for making this a fun place to work! I 
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School. Some of you became very close friends! Sonia, Lize, Cloé and Anne, thank you for all the technical and 
administrative support, the relaxing phone calls and for making sure I met the deadlines. The department’s 
assistant professors: Kristof, Mathieu and Wouter, thank you for the constructive and relaxing chats at work. 
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trips. 
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This doctoral dissertation consists of several studies that discuss different aspects of the internationalization of 
the venture capital industry. I start this dissertation with an introductory chapter that introduces the research 
topic and provides an overview of the academic literature on international venture capital. Next, the VICO 
sample, which is used in the three empirical studies that are the core of the dissertation, is discussed in detail in 
chapter 2. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 present the three studies. The final chapter discusses the main findings and 








The first ‘true’ venture capital (VC) firm, American Research and Development (ARD), was established in the 
U.S. in 1946. In the following decades, VC became an important financing source for small, young, high risk 
unquoted companies (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Without VC funding, many companies such as Apple, 
Google, Skype, Microsoft, Ablynx, Spotify and Thrombogenics may not have existed, or may not have 
developed to the same level and size they have (Bruton et al., 2005). The importance of VC is not limited to the 
U.S. economy (Wright et al., 2002). Even though the internationalization of investments is an important 
development within the VC industry, this phenomenon has only recently been receiving attention in academic 
literature (Wright et al., 2005). The goal of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of international VC 
investments. We define international or foreign VC investments as investments made in other countries than the 
VC firm’s head office country. VC firms wishing to expand internationally may do so directly or through 
establishing a local subsidiary abroad. In this dissertation, cross-border VC investors are defined as investors 
that manage the investment from another country than the one in which the portfolio company (PC) started its 
operations (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005), while branch VC firms are defined as local subsidiaries of VC firms 
which are located in - and manage the investment from - the same country as the one in which the PC started its 
operations. The focus of this dissertation lies on the differences between cross-border, branch and domestic VC 
firms in three main aspects of the VC investment cycle: the initial matching with investment targets, the post-
investment development of PCs and the exit from PCs. In this introductory chapter, I will start with a 
description of the VC market, focusing on the development of international VC. A significant weight will be 
given to international VC investments as an interesting research setting and the state of the current literature in 
terms of its contributions and gaps. This is followed by a description of the research setting. Finally, a summary 
of the three studies included in this dissertation concludes this introduction. 
1.1. Setting the scene: VC investing 
Jointly with buyouts, VC is a subset of the overarching private equity industry (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998). While the strategy in VC is to finance young, entrepreneurial, high risk and high 
growth potential companies, buyouts aim to acquire and restructure established companies in close cooperation 
with their management (Wright and Robbie, 1998). This dissertation focuses on the VC subset of private equity 
and will hence not elaborate the buyouts subset.  
In the typical VC investment model, independent VC firms act as intermediaries between their own shareholders 
(limited partners) and the companies they invest in. VC firms are hence financial market intermediaries, 
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specializing in the management of information asymmetries
1
 and high levels of uncertainty (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). This enables them to provide capital to companies that might 
otherwise have severe difficulties to attract financing (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Wright and Robbie, 1998). 
The companies VC firms target are thereby typically small and young, possess low levels of collateral, often 
have negative cash flows and operate in new or volatile markets (Stuart et al. 1999). Despite the aforementioned 
issues, VC firms invest in these high-risk companies by purchasing equity or equity-linked minority stakes, 
aiming for significant capital gains (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Over time, the VC industry has introduced 
several mechanisms to overcome the problems that emerge at each step of the investment process.  
In a first step, VC firms carefully select potential investment targets based upon the future prospects (Casamatta 
and Harichabalet, 2007; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Their extensive due diligence process, together with their 
detailed contracts, helps to reduce information asymmetries and ensuing agency problems. Second, VC firms 
typically do not only provide financial resources but also engage in time consuming post-investment monitoring 
and value adding activities in order to (i) decrease moral hazard problems caused by information asymmetries 
(ii) create value in the PC (Macmillan et al., 1989; Sapienza; 1992, Sapienza et al., 1996). Finally, in contrast to 
other investors, VC firms are not interested in taking permanent equity positions in their PCs. Instead, they exit 
their investments after a five to seven year holding period (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Wright and Robbie, 
1998). Moreover, VC investors typically do not receive intermediary cash flows from their PCs and investment 
success hence relies solely on the exit performance (Cumming, 2008). The goal of VC firm’s investment model 
is hence to select the most promising targets, develop them to a level that is sufficiently profitable to attract 
permanent capital and ultimately to exit the PC at a significant capital gain (Ruhnka and Young, 1987). To 
summarize, VC investments are in essence long-term, illiquid, high-risk, hands-on, privately held, minority 
equity investments in high-growth-potential companies initiated and managed by professional investors (Wright 
and Robbie, 1998). 
Tables 1.1., 1.2. and 1.3. underline the importance of the VC industry in the contemporary economy (data from 
Thomson One, 2013). While Table 1.1. shows the annual evolution in the number of investments over the 
different regions, Table 1.2. details the evolution in the amounts of equity invested. Finally, Table 1.3. exhibits 
the relative importance of VC as percentage of GDP by PC region in the year 2010. The total investment 
volume of VC transactions worldwide between 2000 and 2010 is estimated at €622 billion which was invested 
in more than 51,000 companies over 130,000 investment rounds by almost 9,000 VC firms. Of all world 
regions, America has the largest VC industry in investment volume (€423 billion; 68% of global volume), which 
corresponds to 52% of all investment rounds and approximately half (56%) of the total number of VC backed 
PCs between 2000 and 2010. The European VC industry was the second largest, with a total equity amount of 
€79 billion (13% of the worldwide amount) invested in approximately 30,000 investment rounds (23% of all 
investment rounds) in 18,000 companies (35% of the global number) (Thomson One, 2013). Interestingly, this 
                                                          
1
 Information asymmetry emerges when one party has more or higher quality information than another party. In VC 
investments, this is often the case as entrepreneurs have more private information about the company than the (potential) 
VC investors. Information asymmetry may be damaging as the informed party can take advantage of his superior 
information as opposed to the other party. 
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implies that the amount invested in a European PC is, on average, lower compared to that invested in a U.S. PC. 
In terms of relative importance of VC as a percentage of GDP, both America (0.20%) and Asia (0.10%) precede 
Europe (0.05%) in 2010. 
Table 1.1. Number of VC investments  
 
* Excluding missing 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
America
Domestic investments 9,877 6,268 4,507 4,388 4,492 4,641 5,171 5,718 5,881 4,445 5,129 60,517
Foreign investments 1,590 992 511 452 403 465 609 758 679 508 616 7,583
Region total 11,467 7,260 5,018 4,840 4,895 5,106 5,780 6,476 6,560 4,953 5,745 68,100
% international investments in target region 13.9% 13.7% 10.2% 9.3% 8.2% 9.1% 10.5% 11.7% 10.4% 10.3% 10.7% 11.1%
% of total international investments 50.2% 47.3% 41.5% 37.1% 29.9% 36.8% 41.7% 43.9% 40.0% 44.1% 45.3% 42.8%
Europe
Domestic investments 2,721 2,318 1,352 2,788 2,977 2,616 2,719 1,651 1,664 1,261 1,724 23,791
Foreign investments 921 662 409 496 605 507 531 566 603 405 455 6,160
Region total 3,642 2,980 1,761 3,284 3,582 3,123 3,250 2,217 2,267 1,666 2,179 29,951
% international investments in target region 25.3% 22.2% 23.2% 15.1% 16.9% 16.2% 16.3% 25.5% 26.6% 24.3% 20.9% 20.6%
% of total international investments 29.1% 31.5% 33.2% 40.7% 44.9% 40.1% 36.3% 32.8% 35.5% 35.2% 33.5% 34.7%
Asia
Domestic investments 1,803 759 548 504 552 697 872 1,181 1,055 821 1,079 9,871
Foreign investments 577 375 261 221 294 243 256 309 321 161 197 3,215
Region total 2,380 1,134 809 725 846 940 1,128 1,490 1,376 982 1,276 13,086
% international investments in target region 24.2% 33.1% 32.3% 30.5% 34.8% 25.9% 22.7% 20.7% 23.3% 16.4% 15.4% 24.6%
% of total international investments 18.2% 17.9% 21.2% 18.1% 21.8% 19.2% 17.5% 17.9% 18.9% 14.0% 14.5% 18.1%
Pacific
Domestic investments 236 283 214 153 171 166 129 123 88 65 70 1,698
Foreign investments 59 57 36 40 40 42 51 64 68 48 52 557
Region total 295 340 250 193 211 208 180 187 156 113 122 2,255
% international investments in target region 20.0% 16.8% 14.4% 20.7% 19.0% 20.2% 28.3% 34.2% 43.6% 42.5% 42.6% 24.7%
% of total international investments 1.9% 2.7% 2.9% 3.3% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5% 3.7% 4.0% 4.2% 3.8% 3.1%
Africa
Domestic investments 16 17 15 40 66 32 11 21 31 7 13 269
Foreign investments 22 13 15 10 6 6 15 30 26 30 40 213
Region total 38 30 30 50 72 38 26 51 57 37 53 482
% international investments in target region 57.9% 43.3% 50.0% 20.0% 8.3% 15.8% 57.7% 58.8% 45.6% 81.1% 75.5% 44.2%
% of total international investments 0.7% 0.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 1.7% 1.5% 2.6% 2.9% 1.2%
Missing 3,214 2,104 1,458 1,228 1,059 1,035 1,244 1,136 1,194 981 1,226 15,879
Total domestic investments 14,653 9,645 6,636 7,873 8,258 8,152 8,902 8,694 8,719 6,599 8,015 96,146
Total foreign investments 3,169 2,099 1,232 1,219 1,348 1,263 1,462 1,727 1,697 1,152 1,360 17,728
% international investments* 17.8% 17.9% 15.7% 13.4% 14.0% 13.4% 14.1% 16.6% 16.3% 14.9% 14.5% 15.6%
Total 21,036 13,848 9,326 10,320 10,665 10,450 11,608 11,557 11,610 8,732 10,601 129,753
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Table 1.2. VC invested worldwide
 
* Excluding missing; All amounts are expressed in million € 
 
Table 1.3. Relative importance of VC as percentage of GDP by PC region in the year 2010* 
 
* All amounts are expressed in million € 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
America
Domestic investments 110,550 47,348 25,824 20,607 21,076 21,551 26,375 28,166 24,576 15,651 26,825 368,549
Foreign investments 13,044 7,175 3,087 2,547 2,545 3,971 4,920 5,914 4,039 2,920 4,457 54,619
Region total 123,594 54,524 28,911 23,153 23,621 25,522 31,295 34,081 28,615 18,571 31,282 423,168
% international investments in target region 10.6% 13.2% 10.7% 11.0% 10.8% 15.6% 15.7% 17.4% 14.1% 15.7% 14.2% 12.9%
% of total international investments 62.7% 62.6% 55.0% 56.8% 50.7% 60.1% 58.7% 61.9% 56.3% 41.9% 63.7% 58.2%
Europe
Domestic investments 9,875 6,831 4,128 3,591 3,647 4,014 6,372 4,797 4,681 4,070 4,908 56,915
Foreign investments 4,916 2,435 1,400 1,321 1,582 1,366 1,953 1,870 1,974 1,411 1,569 21,799
Region total 14,792 9,266 5,529 4,912 5,229 5,380 8,325 6,668 6,656 5,481 6,477 78,714
% international investments in target region 33.2% 26.3% 25.3% 26.9% 30.3% 25.4% 23.5% 28.1% 29.7% 25.7% 24.2% 27.7%
% of total international investments 23.7% 21.2% 24.9% 29.5% 31.5% 20.7% 23.3% 19.6% 27.5% 20.2% 22.4% 23.2%
Asia
Domestic investments 6,081 2,675 1,571 1,544 3,123 2,366 4,424 7,107 6,929 4,071 6,748 46,637
Foreign investments 2,691 1,789 1,077 582 834 696 1,058 1,562 1,003 1,600 902 13,793
Region total 8,772 4,464 2,648 2,126 3,957 3,062 5,482 8,669 7,932 5,670 7,650 60,430
% international investments in target region 30.7% 40.1% 40.7% 27.4% 21.1% 22.7% 19.3% 18.0% 12.6% 28.2% 11.8% 22.8%
% of total international investments 12.9% 15.6% 19.2% 13.0% 16.6% 10.5% 12.6% 16.4% 14.0% 22.9% 12.9% 14.7%
Pacific
Domestic investments 519 709 330 195 212 317 265 228 177 67 96 3,113
Foreign investments 137 64 49 31 60 578 452 202 155 1,040 71 2,839
Region total 655 773 379 226 272 895 716 430 332 1,107 167 5,952
% international investments in target region 20.8% 8.3% 12.9% 13.8% 22.1% 64.6% 63.1% 47.0% 46.8% 94.0% 42.5% 47.7%
% of total international investments 0.7% 0.6% 0.9% 0.7% 1.2% 8.7% 5.4% 2.1% 2.2% 14.9% 1.0% 3.0%
Africa
Domestic investments 10 15 2 46 93 27 7 126 14 15 219 573
Foreign investments 56 165 22 45 39 7 49 99 108 51 80 722
Region total 66 180 24 91 132 34 56 226 122 65 299 1,295
% international investments in target region 84.8% 91.9% 91.2% 49.8% 29.8% 20.6% 87.7% 44.0% 88.5% 77.7% 26.8% 55.7%
% of total international investments 0.3% 1.4% 0.4% 1.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.6% 1.0% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 0.8%
Missing 15,520 7,239 4,061 2,204 1,835 2,200 4,476 6,241 3,502 2,531 2,641 52,449
Total domestic investments 127,036 57,577 31,855 25,981 28,151 28,275 37,443 40,425 36,377 23,873 38,796 475,787
Total foreign investments 20,787 11,464 5,613 4,481 5,021 6,611 8,383 9,549 7,171 6,970 6,999 93,772
% international investments* 14.1% 16.6% 15.0% 14.7% 15.1% 19.0% 18.3% 19.1% 16.5% 22.6% 15.3% 16.5%
Total 163,399 76,445 41,551 32,712 35,046 37,093 50,351 56,314 47,158 33,425 48,516 622,009
VC GDP %
America 31,282 15,952,561 0.20
Europe 6,477 14,187,152 0.05
Asia 7,650 7,980,002 0.10
Pacific 167 805,084 0.02
Africa 299 1,203,483 0.02
Missing 2,641 NA NA
Total 48,516 40,128,281 0.12
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1.2. Internationalization of the VC industry 
Due to the need to reduce information asymmetries and manage agency risks, VC investing has long been a 
local industry (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Wright and Robbie, 1998). The geographical proximity to investment 
targets was deemed necessary to locate and evaluate these targets (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and to efficiently 
provide post-investment monitoring and value adding services (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). Investing in non-
domestic countries brings liabilities of foreignness (LOF) for VC investors (Wright et al., 2005), which are “all 
additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: 
343). Compared to domestic VC investments, international VC investments present additional risks and 
challenges, as geographical, cultural and institutional distance between PCs and VC investors are increased. As 
a result, international VC firms have access to lower amounts of high quality information, which is 
predominantly only locally available, and are less prone to take a board seat in the PC (Lerner, 1995; Sörenson 
and Stuart, 2001). This creates larger information asymmetries between PCs and VC investors, making selection 
and monitoring more important but also more difficult (Bell et al., 2012; Sörenson and Stuart, 2001). The 
increased distance also hinders efficient value adding by VC investors, as cultural and institutional barriers may 
make entrepreneurs less receptive to advice from foreign investors (Guiso et al., 2008; Sapienza et al., 1996).  
Due to the benefits of local presence, cross-border VC investments were a negligible fraction in the total VC 
investment activity prior to the early 1990s (Manigart et al., 2010). The enhanced domestic competition in 
maturing VC industries have increasingly driven VC firms to search for investment opportunities abroad 
(Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Alhorr et al., 2008; Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Tykvová and Schertler, 2010). 
Hence, the number of international transactions has become non-negligible (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Table 1.1. 
shows that international VC transactions represent between 13.4% and 17.9% of all VC transactions. Although 
America has the highest number of VC investments, the vast majority (89%) are domestic investments. While 
Europe has a lower absolute number of VC investments, the proportion of international investments is much 
higher in Europe (21%) and represents 35% of the worldwide number of international investments. Table 1.2. 
further shows that the total international VC investment volume has increased from about 14% in 2000 to more 
than 20% of the worldwide VC investment value. This indicates that the amounts invested in international VC 
deals are on average higher than in domestic VC deals. The relative percentage of international investments in 
Europe is higher in terms of value amount (28%) than in terms of number of deals (21%). This underlines the 
importance of international investments in the European VC market. 
The disadvantages of VC firms investing internationally raises the interesting question of how international VC 
firms manage the additional difficulties of investing internationally and what their impact is on PCs. 
Consequently, researchers have started to investigate this phenomenon more closely. Whereas this research 
question was ignored ten years ago, the number of publications on this topic has increased substantially since 
then. Early research on VC in an international context has focused on comparing domestic VC behaviour 
between different countries (Manigart et al., 2000, 2002). While this research stream enables to comprehend the 
differences between VC markets in different countries, it does not provide insights in the challenges faced by 
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foreign VC firms when entering and managing investments in international markets. The literature on cross-
country comparisons is hence not further discussed in this dissertation.  
1.3. Review of the academic literature on international VC 
Before digging into the specificities of the three empirical studies in this dissertation, a review of the literature is 
presented, focusing on three major research streams on international VC investments. The first research stream 
takes a meso-economic approach, assessing the determinants of international VC investments and favoured 
target countries. A second stream of research takes a VC firm level approach and focuses on strategies 
international VC investors follow in order to mitigate liabilities of foreignness. The final research stream 
examines the outcomes of international VC investments. A comprehensive review of each of these research 
streams is given below, focusing on contributions and gaps. 
By considering the questions of which VC firms invest across borders, what countries they target, how they 
compensate for non-domestic investing, what is the outcome of their investments and what are the drivers of this 
outcome, an overview of the literature on the relation between international VC firms and their PCs is provided 
and areas for further research are identified.  
1.3.1. Determinants of international VC investments 
Two broad categories of determinants of flows of international VC investments are identified: country level 
determinants and VC firm level determinants.  
1.3.1.1. Country level determinants
2
 
Extant literature has distinguished several country level determinants that impact the attractiveness of a country 
for foreign VC investors. In essence, these studies investigate which target firm country’s and VC firm 
country’s features influence VC firm's foreign market entry decisions (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Balcarcel 
et al., 2010; Guler and Guillén, 2010a; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011; Schertler and Tykvová, 2012). More, 
specifically these papers answer the question: Why do some countries attract more international VC than other 
countries?  
A first determinant driving international flows of VC is the institutional development of the target country. 
International VC investors preferably target institutionally developed countries as this creates a more investor-
friendly climate with more transparency and less information asymmetries between VC owners and their PCs 
(Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Balcarcel et al., 2010; Guler and Guillén, 2010a). VC firms hence invest in host 
countries characterized by technological, legal, financial, and political institutions that create innovative 
opportunities, protect investors' rights, facilitate exit, and guarantee regulatory stability. Further, the local 
presence of qualified human capital is an important factor to attract international VC (Aizenman and Kendall, 
2012). 
                                                          
2
 An overview of the papers discussed, is provided in Table 1.4. 
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Next to institutional and local human capital determinants, the number of deals financed by foreign investors 
increases when the expected GDP growth and the size of the stock market of the target countries increase 
(Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Similarly, a larger stock market in the VC firm’s 
home country leads to more domestic but also more international deals. The VC firm’s home country’s expected 
growth, however, strongly increases the number of its domestic deals, while it slightly discourages the number 
of its foreign deals. These findings suggest that the expected growth in the PC’s country is not the only driver 
for international VC activity. Rather, VC firms with more promising investment opportunities in their home 
country prefer to invest more intensively at home and less intensively abroad. In a subsequent study, Schertler 
and Tykvová (2012), show that the drivers of target countries’ gross and net inflows of international VC are 
broadly similar. For instance, higher expected economic growth of the target country leads to higher gross as 
well as net international VC inflows. However, while more developed capital markets and a more favourable 
VC environment result in higher gross inflows, these factors result in lower net inflows due to the gross 
outflows that outsize the gross inflows. These results suggest that international VC inflows may partly 
compensate for potential limits in domestic VC supply. The findings may also reflect that VC firms’ locational 
decisions depend on the viability of capital markets.  
Several studies investigate the impact of the differences between target and investor country characteristics on 
international VC flows. The expected growth differences between the PC’s and VC firm’s country are positively 
related to the number of international deals between the two countries (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Smaller 
distance, common language, colonial ties (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012) and between-country trust (Bottazzi et 
al., 2012) are significant determinants in directing the international VC flows. VC investors which overcome 
these hurdles tend to do well (Bottazzi et al., 2012). Moreover, when countries’ economies become more 
integrated, as in the European Union, an increase in the amount of international VC investment is likely to 
follow (Alhorr et al., 2008). Institutional environments hence play an important role on international VC 
markets.  
Finally, the presence of strong industry networks between the VC firm’s home country and its target country 
enhance international VC flows (Hochberg et al., 2010; Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009). Target countries with 
more densely networked VC markets – i.e. markets where network ties among incumbents are strong - 
experience less foreign VC entry (Hochberg et al., 2010). These authors argue that domestic VC firms benefit 
from reduced foreign VC entry as this improves their bargaining power and results in lower investment prices of 
their investments. Foreign VC investors with established ties to the domestic VC firms are, however, able to 
overcome this barrier to entry, but other domestic VC firms may react strategically to increased threats of entry 
by freezing out domestic firms who facilitate entry. Further, “transnational technical communities” (TTCs), 
which are groups of immigrants active in both home- and host-country technical networks, positively affect 
international VC flows (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009). More specifically, higher professional and technical 
cumulative immigration levels from a given target nation to the U.S. predicts higher VC outflows from the U.S. 
to the target nation (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009). 
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Table 1.4. Country level determinants of international VC investments 
 
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2008 - Alhorr, 

















24 countries (from 
the European 









When countries’ economies become more integrated (i.e. 
adoption of a common market and a common currency), an 
increase in the amount of international VC investment made 
into other member countries is likely to follow.
(1) Institutional environments play an important role on international VC 
markets. (2) National leaders, particularly of smaller, less developed nation-
states, should note the potential benefit of economic integration policies, 
especially the adoption of common currencies, on VC investment flows.
2009 - Madhavan 




global flows of 
venture capital: 
Human networks as 






Yearbook of the 
Immigration and 
Naturalization
Service of the U.S. 
Department of 
Justice
VC flows from 
1982 to 2002 for 
all nations that have 
hosted VC flow 










reputations for local 
boundedness, such 
as VC?
The formation of “transnational technical communities” 
(TTCs), groups of immigrants active in both the home- and 
host-country technical networks, significantly affects 
international VC flows. Professional and technical cumulative 
immigration levels from a given nation to the U.S. predicts 
VC outflows from the U.S. to that nation.
Implicitly accept the critical role of interfirm syndication (Sorenson and 
Stuart 2001), the authors asked, ‘‘Where do such ties as interfirm 
syndications come from?’’ The tentative answer is that such syndication ties 
come from prior human networks.
2010 - Balcarcel, 














2004 by 806 U.S. 
VC firms in 2052 
companies located 




What is the effect 
of a country’s legal 
environment on the 
extent and nature of 
cross-border 
investment? 
Frictions related to weak contract enforcements are a limiting 
factor in VC flows. The inability to enforce complex 
contracting in the target country hinders optimal venture 
investing abroad, with implications for aggregate cross-
border VC flows. 
While there is evidence that private contracting mechanisms can mitigate 
shortcomings in a country’s initial legal endowment, reliability of 
enforcement remains a limiting factor.
2010 - Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist & Lu - 
Journal of Finance
Networking as a 
barrier to entry and 
the competitive 





2004 by 806 U.S. 
VC firms in 2052 
companies located 
in 57 countries in 
total  
All investments in 
U.S. companies 
made by U.S. 
based VC funds 




Do strong networks 
among incumbent 
VC firms in local 
markets help 
restrict entry by 
outside VC firms, 




(1) Countries with more densely networked VC markets – 
i.e. markets where network ties among incumbents are strong 
- experience less foreign VC entry. (2) Foreign VC investors 
with established ties to the domestic VC firms are able to 
overcome this barrier to entry, but the other domestic VC 
firms react strategically to increased threats of entry by 
freezing out domestic firms who facilitate entry. One possible 
inducement an entrant can offer in return for cooperation in 
the target market is access to its home market. Reciprocity 
benefits the cooperating incumbent but must be balanced 
against any negative reaction likely to arise from the other 
incumbents. The resulting Nash equilibrium is a function of the 
expected severity of punishment. (3) The domestic VC firms 
benefit from reduced foreign VC entry as this improves their 
bargaining power and results in lower investment prices of 
their investments.
(1)  Networking can have the effect of reducing entry in the VC market. 
This result may generalize to other heavily networked industries, such as 
investment banking. (2)  Results help explain prior evidence that better-
networked VC firms enjoy better performance. Part of the explanation for 
this may be due to the lower prices VC firms pay for investments in more 
densely networked markets. (3) Provide insights on the process of entry in 
the VC industry. Successful entry appears to involve “joining the club” by 
offering the incumbents syndication opportunities in one’s home market. 
10 | 
 




Year - Authors - 
Journal






2010a - Guler & 
Guillén - Journal of 
International 
Business Studies
Institutions and the 
internationalization 





216 U.S. VC firms 
potentially investing 





What features of 
the institutional 
environment 
influence VC firm's 
foreign market 
entry decisions? 
Why do VC firms 
decide to invest in 
some foreign 
countries but not in 
others?
(1) VC firms invest in host countries characterized by 
technological, legal, financial, and political institutions that 
create innovative opportunities, protect investors' rights, 
facilitate exit, and guarantee regulatory stability, respectively. 
(2) As VC firms gain more international experience, they are 
more likely to overcome constraints related to these 
institutions.
(2) International VC investors preferably target more institutionally 
developed countries as this creates a more investor-friendly climate with 
more transparency and less information asymmetries between VC owners 
and their PCs. (2) The best way for a government to encourage foreign 
entry in general, and VC investment from abroad in particular, is to 
introduce ‘‘horizontal’’ improvements in the scientific, financial, and political 
institutional infrastructures, that is, reforms that benefit all firms and 
entrepreneurs as opposed to just a chosen few.




Venture capital and 
internationalization
Zephyr database World wide sample 














(1) In the country-pair perspective, expected growth 
differences between the PC’s and VC firm’s country are 
strongly positively related to the number of international deals 
between the two countries. (2) In the perspective of the VC 
firm, expected growth in his home country strongly increases 
the number of its domestic deals, while it slightly discourages 
the number of its international deals. (3) A higher market 
capitalization in the VC firm’s home countries leads to more 
domestic as well as foreign deals. (4) In the perspective of 
the PC, the number of deals financed by foreign investors 
increases when the expected growth and the market 
capitalization of the PCs’ countries increase.
(1) Not only the expected growth in the PCs’ countries is responsible for 
foreign VC activity. VC firms with more promising investment opportunities 
in their home country prefer to invest more at home and less abroad.VC 
firms are hence constrained in raising additional funds when investment 
opportunities improve. (2) Market capitalization does not only capture 
investment opportunities, but it also captures VC firms’ fundraising 
conditions. (3) VC firms and PCs should take macroeconomic factors into 
account when considering internationalization, i.e., when VC firms decide 
whether to invest in a domestic or a foreign PC, or when the companies 
choose between a local and a foreign VC. (3) Formulate and test 
hypotheses on how macroeconomic factors in the PC as well as VC 
countries affect international investments worldwide. 
2012 - Aizenman 









Data on VC 




/ What are the 
factors in directing 
the international VC 
flows?
Distance, common language, and colonial ties are significant 
determinants in directing the international VC and VC flows. 
Moreover, local high end human capital, better business 
environments, higher levels of military expenditure, and larger 
financial markets are important factors that attract 
international VC. 
2012 - Schertler & 






Zephyr database Domestic and 
international VC 
investments in 15 
European
countries, the U.S, 







factors drive gross 
and net international 
VC inflows 
differently?
Most economic factors shape gross and net inflows in a 
similar way. Two target country economic factors drive gross 
and net international VC inflow differently. Higher expected 
economic growth leads to higher gross as well as net 
international VC inflows, while more developed capital 
markets and more favourable VC environment results in 
higher gross inflows, but lower net inflows. 
First paper that investigates net flows taking into account that countries 
originate and receive foreign VC finance at the same time. The findings may 
suggest that international VC inflows partly compensate for potential limits 
in domestic VC supply. However, the findings may also reflect that VC 
firms’ locational decisions depend on the viability of capital markets. The 




Table 1.4. (Continued) 
 
 
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2012 - Bottazzi, Da 
Rin & Hellmann - 
NBER working 
paper
The importance of 





685 VC firms in 15 
European countries







What is the impact 
of trust among 
nations on 
investment by 
foreign VC firms? 
(1) Impact on 
probability to 
invest? (2) Impact 
on contracting?
(1) Trust has a significant effect on the investment decisions 
of VC firms and on how they structure the financial contracts. 
(2) Trust among nations significantly affects investment 
decisions. (3) The authors conclude that lack of trust is a 
hurdle to making VC investments, but that investors who 
overcome this hurdle tend to do well.
(1) First paper to examine the effect of generalized trust in a corporate 
finance setting. (2) Identify an effect of trust on investments in a micro-
economic environment where alternative explanations can be controlled, 
most notably with powerful combination of investor and company fixed 
effects. (3) New insights into how the effect of trust varies across different 
types of investors. (4) Evidence suggests that lack of trust imposes a hurdle 
for investments. Importantly, it is a hurdle but not a barrier, so that some 
key comparative statics on when investors are more or less able to 
overcome these trust hurdles can be derived. (5) Generalized trust is a 
force that cannot be ignored in the analysis of VC investment. (6) Policy 
implications: Governments across the globe are seeking to attract VC firms 
to invest in their countries. Results suggest that investments will be more 
forthcoming from countries where there is higher generalized trust. This 
provides some guidance as to what countries might be the most promising 
targets for government that want to attract foreign VC investments.
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Besides country determinants, several VC firm level determinants impact a single VC firm’s probability to 
invest in foreign countries. Structural and strategic features of VC firms – such as their investment focus, type of 
VC investor and reputation – impact their probability to invest internationally (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Fritsch 
and Schilder, 2008; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). VC firms specializing in early stage, in technology industries, 
using more staging and investing as lead prefer narrower geographic scope. Corporate VC firms, VC firms 
where investment managers can spend more time on a single PC, and more reputable VC firms – i.e. older, 
larger, more experienced and with stronger IPO track record – exhibit a broader geographic scope (Cumming 
and Dai, 2010; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). VC firms are hence not homogeneous in 
their portfolio's product-market scope. Moreover, more reputable and corporate VC firms seem better able to 
reduce information asymmetries associated with distance.  
Next to the VC firms’ structural and strategic features, a VC firms’ network has a major impact on its 
probability to make foreign investments (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Iriyama et al., 2010; Sorenson and Stuart, 
2001). Social networks in the VC industry - built up through syndication – diffuse information about potential 
investment opportunities across boundaries expanding the spatial investment radius of VC investors (Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001). Better networked VC firms hence exhibit less local bias (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001). These results show that despite communication technology advances, inherent boundaries 
around the flow of timely, reliable, fine grained and high-quality information produce localized patterns of 
exchange. Better networked VC firms are however able to reduce these information asymmetries associated 
with distance trough interpersonal social relations with local investors. 
Finally, the investment experience of both a VC firm and its investment managers impact the VC firm’s 
geographical scope (De Prijcker et al., 2012; Patzelt et al., 2009; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011, 2012). VC firms 
with more foreign experience invest more intensively abroad (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011, 2012) since they 
are more familiar with the institutional and legal environment in foreign countries and have a better access to 
international networks. VC firms with extensive domestic experience, on the other hand, also invest more often 
internationally since they more easily implement a geographical diversification of their portfolios (Schertler and 
Tykvová, 2011). VC firms with higher proportions of investment managers having international or 
entrepreneurial experience, have a broader geographic investment scope (De Prijcker et al., 2012; Patzelt et al., 
2009). Inherited knowledge through the prior foreign work experience of its management also has a positive 
effect on internationalization, but external knowledge through its foreign network partners only has limited 
impact. Intense international contacts even decrease future international activities (De Prijcker et al., 2012). 
Together, these results highlight the importance of VC firm’s and VC manager’s experience and inherited 
knowledge to overcome information asymmetries inherent in the internationalization of VC firms. 
                                                          
3
 An overview of the papers discussed, is provided in Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5. VC firm level determinants of international VC investments 
 
Year - Authors - 
Journal






1992 - Gupta & 









scope of their 
investments
Pratt's guide to 
venture capital 
sources
Random sample of 





represented  27% 
of all U.S.- based 




What are the 







(1) VC firms specializing in early stage financing and who 
provide small business investment companies (SBIC) 
financing prefer narrower geographic scope. (2) Corporate 
VC firms and larger VC firms prefer broader geographic 
scope.
U.S. VC firms are not homogeneous in their portfolio's intended product-
market scope. This has implications, not only for VC firms, but also for 
their suppliers (limited partners), buyers (entrepreneurs), and policy-
makers. VC firms can not rely on random investment schemes: they need to 
attract investor managers considering the benefits offered by their portfolio 
strategy, and to attract superior investments by offering value added 
services and know-how.
2001 - Sorenson & 




networks and the 
spatial distribution 





Create the potential 
but unrealized dyad 
between all PCs 
and VC firms that 




1,025 VC firms 
and 7,590 target 
companies. 








How do interfirm 
networks in the 




Social networks in the VC industry - built up through 
syndication – diffuse information about potential investment 
opportunities across boundaries expanding the spatial 
investment radius of VC investors. 
(1) Despite communication advances, inherent boundaries around the flow 
of timely, reliable, and high-quality information produce localized patterns of 
exchange. These boundaries exist because interpersonal social relations 
concentrate within industries and regions more often than they bridge 
industrial and regional boundaries. This observation reflects the simple fact 
that people converge in space and time more frequently when they live near 
one another and have occasion to meet in the course of work and play. (2) 
Albeit only U.S. data is included in this study, it is interesting, because it 
provides the cross-border VC field with interesting insights from economic 
sociology.

















carried out between 
2004 -2005
75 VC firms in 









The probability to make distant investments increases with 
the time that investment managers can spend on a single 
investment.
Absence of VC firms in a region is not likely to be a hindrance to innovative 
entrepreneurs in Germany. From the perspective of the VC managers, the 
main hindrance is the low numbers of promising investment opportunities. 
The authors can, however, not completely preclude the existence of 
informational bottlenecks which prevent a match between entrepreneurs 
and VC suppliers. 
2009 - Patzelt, zu 
Knyphausen-
Aufseß & Fischer - 




strategies of venture 
capital firms
EVCA yearbook of 
year 2005
TMTs and portfolio 




How does the 
composition of the 
top management 
team influences the 
portfolio strategy 
choice in VC firms?
VC firms with higher proportions of TMT members with 
international or entrepreneurial experience have a broader 
geographic investment scope.  
(1) TMTs in VC firms can better understand how their education and 
experiences impact their collective decision policies with respect to 
preference of geographic scope which may help them to draw more 
accurate and better decisions. (2) Entrepreneurs will find different types of 
expertise in VC firms depending on the portfolio strategy of the firm 
suggesting that they should consider this strategy when seeking VC funding.
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Table 1.5. (Continued) 
 
  
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2010 - Iriyama, Li 





of venture capital 
investments: The 







(i.e. 51 U.S. states, 
90 foreign nations 




Is the globalization 
of VC investments
spiky; and what is 
the mechanism that 
underlies such spiky 
globalization?
The spread of U.S. international VC investments has a spiky 
geographical pattern as - driven by the spiky international 
pattern of human networks - the linkages between certain 
regions in the U.S. and some foreign countries is 
exceptionally intense.  
Contributes to international entrepreneurship: (1) Introduce the spiky 
globalization perspective, offering a better understanding of the geographic 
pattern of international VC and international entrepreneurship. The bilateral 
intensity index empirically demonstrates the spiky globalization pattern. (2) 
A theoretical argument, drawn from economic sociology, is offered to 
explain the spiky globalization of VC investments: cross-border human 
networks tend to follow a spiky globalization pattern which, in turn, drives 
the spiky globalization pattern of VC.
2010 - Cumming & 
Dai - Journal of 
Empirical Finance













invested by 1,908 




How does local 
bias depend on VC 
firms' 
characteristics and 
how does local bias 
impact 
performance?
(1) More reputable VC firms (older, larger, more 
experienced, and with stronger IPO track record) and VC 
firms with broader networks prefer a broader geographic 
scope. (2) VC firm specializing in technology industries and 
using more staging prefer a narrower geographic scope. (3) 
VC firms prefer a narrower geographic scope when they are 
the lead VC and when investing alone.
(1) More reputable VC firms are better in reducing information asymmetry 
associated with distance. (2) Regional development policies implications: to 
stimulate the development of the new ventures the presence of local VC 
firms should be stimulated given the existence of local bias in VC 
investments. This can be achieved either by direct investment in the local 
new ventures or by forming syndicates with VC firms in other areas.




Venture capital and 
internationalization
Zephyr database World wide sample 













(1) VC firms with more foreign and domestic experience 
invest more intensely abroad since they are more familiar with 
the institutional and legal environment in foreign countries and 
have a better access to international networks. (2) VC firms 
with extensive domestic experience invest internationally 
more often since they more easily implement a geographical 
diversification of their portfolios.
(1) Examine whether the benefits and costs of international investing vary 
with VC firms’ foreign and domestic experience. (2) Investigate whether 
larger deals are responsible for VC firms’ internationalization. They posit 
that foreign VC firms are more likely to participate in large deals either 
because the degree of information asymmetries is lower and management 
support is less needed or because large deals have a higher diversification 
necessity.
2012 - Schertler & 






Zephyr database Domestic and 
international VC 
investments in 15 
European
countries, the U.S., 







factors drive gross 
and net international 
VC inflows 
differently?
VC firms with  more domestic and foreign experience invest 
more intensively abroad.
First paper that investigates net flows taking into account that countries 
originate and receive international VC finance at the same time. The findings 
may suggest that international VC inflows partly compensate for potential 
limits in domestic VC supply. However, the findings may also reflect that 
VC firms’ locational decisions depend on the viability of capital markets. 










Year - Authors - 
Journal






2012 - De Prijcker, 
Manigart, Wright & 
De Maeseneire - 
International 
Business Review































(1) International human capital of VC firms increases the 
likelihood to operate internationally. (2) VC manager's 
experience and inherited knowledge have a positive effect on 
internationalization, but external knowledge has limited 
impact. (3) Intense international contacts even decrease 
international activities. (4) Together, these results highlight the 
importance of VC manager's experience and inherited 
knowledge to overcome information asymmetries inherent in 
the internationalization of professional service firms, and of 
VC firms in particular.
(1) Different types of foreign knowledge accumulation differentially 
compensate for international investing problems. (2) Highlight the 
complementarities between early internationalization theorists (focus on 
internal knowledge development) and the findings from ‘‘new venture 
internationalization’’ studies (stress the impact of inherited knowledge). 
Show that, under conditions of severe information asymmetries, both 
sources of knowledge accumulation are important. (3) Stress the 
multidimensionality of network relationships through the different effects of 
foreign network range and foreign network intensity. (4) Explain the effect 
of resources on the investment strategy through a focus on international 
investment activities. Add to the knowledge on international VC 
transactions by focusing on the determinants of the international investment 
strategy. (5) Professional service firms with international aspirations should 
focus on several sources of foreign knowledge accumulation as each of 
these sources may influence international development. (6) Professional 
service firms should pro-actively develop a human resource management 
that specializes in the search and retention of international management 
talent. (7) VC firms with international aspirations have to reflect on their 
cooperation with non-domestic syndication partners, as it may prove a 
suboptimal strategy. Knowledge-intensive firms should, in contrast, actively 
build a broad social network fostering international development.
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1.3.2. Strategies to compensate for liabilities of foreignness
4
  
In line with the understanding that local knowledge and networks are key in a VC setting, multiple papers show 
that domestic and non-domestic PCs differ in the way they are sourced, funded, syndicated, monitored and 
receive value adding (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). The increased geographical, cultural and institutional distance 
foreign VC firms face severely limits the use of domestically used investment strategies to mitigate information 
asymmetries. In a local context, VC firms manage uncertainty by sourcing favourable investment targets 
through their entrusted local networks and intensive screening involving face to face meetings (Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2001). Moreover, VC firms provide their PCs more than blunt capital. Instead they provide value adding 
services (Hsu, 2004). These value adding are however also hindered for cross-border VC investors, as they often 
require proximity. Additionally, telecommunication cannot be regarded as a means of overcoming the problems 
of geographical distance, telecommunication is hence no full substitute for face-to-face contact (Fritsch and 
Schilder, 2008). As a result, when VC firms invest internationally, they will have to adapt their investment 
strategy rather than to merely implement the “recipes” from their domestic markets. For instance, foreign VC 
firms in India place significantly greater emphasis on product market factors and accountants’ reports that 
domestic VC firms when selecting investment targets in India (Wright et al., 2002). In contrast they put less 
emphasis on financial contributions of the PC’s management, their own due diligence and information from 
entrepreneurs in assessing risk than they do in their respective domestic markets. Moreover, foreign VC firms 
investing in India prefer strategic monitoring and advice than monitoring of the operational activities, as the 
former is easier to provide across distance (Pruthi et al., 2003).  
A first strategy which cross-border VC investors may employ to compensate for the increased information 
asymmetries, is the use of legal contracts (Balcarcel et al., 2010; Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009; Bottazzi et al., 
2009). Using a sample of European VC deals, Bottazzi and colleagues (2009) find that better legal systems in a 
VC firm’s home country are associated with more VC involvement and the VC investor’s legal system is more 
important than the PC’s in determining investor behaviour even when investing abroad. More specifically, the 
adoption of certain contracting practices, for instance downside protection, is affected by the VC firm’s 
domestic legal system. As a result, VC firms from common law countries are more prone to use such contracts, 
not only in their domestic investments but also when investing across borders. Balcarel et al. (2010) further 
demonstrate that cross-border VC investors invest larger amounts in PCs in countries with worse legal 
protection. This suggests cross-border VC firms mitigate contracting problems in countries with weak legal 
environments by taking larger equity stakes, which enables to enforce control rights which courts may not be 
able to adequately enforce with smaller stakes. Finally, contracts give more high powered incentives to the 
entrepreneurs, such as cash flow contingencies, when the geographical distance between a VC firm and its PC 
increases (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009). This supports the view that geographical distance makes monitoring 
more difficult and that VC investors try to mitigate these drawback through contracting. 
                                                          
4
 An overview of the papers discussed, is provided in Table 1.6. 
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Deal flow generation also experiences liabilities of foreignness, as foreign VC firms originate fewer unsolicited 
deals from their networks compared to domestic VC firms (Lu and Hwang, 2010). In response, international VC 
firms mainly draw upon their home country advantages by originating more solicited deals from their networks. 
Moreover, some VC firms’ domestic network advantages, such as their social status advantages, are transferable 
from the VC firms’ home country to the target company’s country (Guler and Guillén, 2010b).  
Geographical distance reduces the efficiency of information transmission (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Cross-
border VC firms entering less institutionally developed countries alleviate higher levels of information 
asymmetries through syndication with local VC investors (Chemmanur et al., 2012; Dai et al., 2012; Guler and 
Guillén, 2010b; Meuleman and Wright 2011; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Based upon cases of nine Finnish VC 
backed PCs, Mäkelä and Maula (2008) show how local VC firms actively help their PCs in attracting cross-
border VC investors. Local syndication mitigates information and value adding problems as it allows to 
outsource the monitoring and value adding functions to local co-investors (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; 
Chemmanur et al., 2012), which are not hindered by geographical, cultural or institutional distance. 
Additionally, by co-investing with local partners, international VC firms may generate additional value through 
the combination of skill sets, experience and networks of a diversity of VC firms (Schertler and Tykvová, 2012). 
VC firms can, however, reduce institutional environment barriers and the negative effects of information 
asymmetries through organizational learning (Meuleman and Wright, 2011). Both a VC firm’s focal country-
level experience and its multinational experience reduce its need to rely on local partners through cross-border 
syndication. Further, VC firms with more investment executives per PC learn faster and hence have a lower 
probability to engage in cross-border syndication (Meuleman and Wright, 2011). 
A different strategy used by cross-border VC firms to overcome liabilities of foreignness is to select PCs with 
lower ex-ante information asymmetries which decreases information costs and thereby compensates their 
deficiencies related to the lack of knowledge of local markets and higher monitoring costs. Foreign VC firms are 
more likely to invest in more information-transparent PCs (i.e. in a later stage or a later round) and in larger 
deals (Chemmanur et al., 2012; Dai et al., 2012; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011).  
Finally, the internationalization literature suggests yet another strategy to compensate for non-domestic 
investing, which is to set up a local branch office. This ensures proximity to entrepreneurs and thereby reduces 
asymmetric information problems (Pruthi et al., 2009). When employing local investment professionals in the 
branches, cultural and institutional differences disappear, thereby further facilitating transfer of knowledge and 
advice to the PC (De Prijcker et al., 2012; Pruthi et al., 2009). The foreign head office will typically be 
represented in the branches’ investment committee that typically decides on investments. This allows the 
foreign head office to manage challenges that otherwise would require deployment of expatriates (Pruthi et al., 
2009). VC firms’ decision to open a branch in a foreign region is strongly driven by the success rate of VC 
investments in that region (Chen et al., 2010). 
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Table 1.6. Strategies to compensate for liabilities of foreignness 
 
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2001 - Sorenson & 




networks and the 
spatial distribution 





Create the potential 
but unrealized dyad 
between all PCs 
and VC firms that 




1,025 VC firms 
and 7,590 target 
companies. 








How do interfirm 
networks in the 




Syndication enables the distribution of information across 
geographical boundaries and VC firms in central network 
positions have better access to information from distant 
sources and thus a larger investment radius. They further 
argue that geographical distance reduces the efficiency of 
information transmission. 
(1) Despite communication advances, inherent boundaries around the flow 
of timely, reliable, and high-quality information produce localized patterns of 
exchange. These boundaries exist because interpersonal social relations 
concentrate within industries and regions more often than they bridge 
industrial and regional boundaries. This observation reflects the simple fact 
that people converge in space and time more frequently when they live near 
one another and have occasion to meet in the course of work and play. (2) 
Albeit only U.S. data is included in this study, it is interesting, because it 
provides the cross-border VC field with interesting insights from economic 
sociology.
2002 - Wright, 








and information in 
India
Interviews with VC 
executives 





Do managers in 
foreign VC firms 
adapt to local 
market conditions 
and do they use the 
same approaches 
to assess the risk 
and sourcing 
information as in 
domestic markets?
(1) Foreign (mainly U.S.) VC firms in India place significantly 
greater emphasis on product market factors and accountants’ 
reports than domestic firms in India. (2) They place 
significantly less emphasis on financial contributions of the 
PC’s management in assessing risk and own due diligence 
and information from entrepreneurs than do U.S. firms in their 
domestic market. (3) High levels of employment of Indian 
nationals affords access to local information networks but 
foreign firms were also more likely to seek other independent 
info.   
Implications both for the development of internationalization strategies by 
VC firms and for the development of emerging VC markets. Evidence that 
VC firms adapt to local market conditions rather than implementing the 
“recipes” from their domestic markets. 
2003 - Pruthi, 
Wright & Lockett - 
Asia Pacific Journal 
of Management
Do foreign and 
domestic venture 
capital firms differ 
in their monitoring 
of investees?
Asia Pacific Private 




31 interviews (84% 
of active VC firms 





Do foreign and 
domestic VC firms 
differ in their PC 
monitoring?
(1) Cross-border VC firms are more involved on the 
strategic level and domestic ones on the operational level of 
steering PCs. (2) Cross-border VC firms prefer strategic 
monitoring and advice which is easier to guarantee across 
distance than monitoring of the operational activities.
(1) First detailed analysis of the monitoring activity of VC firms in India. (2) 
Foreign VC firms have significantly less operational and informal level 
involvement in some areas than domestic firms. This finding is interesting as 
foreign VC firms employ a high level of local nationals as investment 
executives. This might be expected to contribute to overcoming local 
cultural differences. (3) Foreign VC firm parents tend to set policy after 
discussion with the local subsidiary. Therefore, the foreign parent firms may 
attempt to institutionalize local executives into their way of conducting 
business. (4) Different approaches to involvement and monitoring 
mechanisms may be appropriate in the different markets in which VC firms 
seek to operate. (5) Further evidence on differences between VC markets 
and highlight the dangers of over-generalization both from one market to 
another and within markets. These differences apply not just to 
comparisons between developed and undeveloped economies, but also 
within broader geographical areas. 
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Year - Authors - 
Journal























carried out between 
2004 -2005
75 VC firms in 









Telecommunication cannot be regarded as a means of 
overcoming the problems of geographical distance, 
telecommunication is hence no valid substitute for face-to-
face contact.
(1) Absence of VC firms in a region is not likely to be a hindrance to 
innovative entrepreneurs in Germany. (2) From the perspective of the VC 
managers, the main hindrance is the low numbers of promising investment 
opportunities. The authors can, however, not completely exclude the 
existence of informational bottlenecks which prevent a match between 
entrepreneurs and VC suppliers. 



















9 PCs from Finland 
who have their 
primary market in 
foreign nations and 









What is the role of 




Cross-border VC investors preferably invest in companies to 
which local VC firms have provided operational management 
advice, introduced local contacts and local market 
knowledge. The importance of this preparation by local VC 
firms is mitigated when the entrepreneurs are highly 
experienced or when the home market is not important for 
the PC. The domestic VC firms hence have an important 
signalling value which facilitates cross-border investment and 
syndication.
Overall, the model developed in the paper contributes to a better 
understanding of cross-border VC and in particular to the division of labour 
between domestic and foreign VC firms in international VC syndicates. The 
paper also contributes to the emerging literature on international social 
capital.
2009 - Bottazzi, Da 
Rin & Hellmann - 
Journal of Financial 
Intermediation
What is the role of 













from 124 VC firms 
in 17 European 






How do optimal 
contracts and 
investor actions 
depend on the 
quality of the legal 
system?
The VC firm’s home country legal system plays a critical role 
in their behaviour when investing abroad. Better legal systems 
are associated with more VC involvement and the VC 
investor’s legal system is more important than the PC’s in 
determining investor behaviour even when investing abroad. 
More specifically, the adoption of certain contracting 
practices, for instance downside protection, is affected by the 
VC’s domestic legal system. As a result, VC firms from 
common law countries are more prone to use such contracts 
not only in domestic investments but also when investing 
across borders.
The  main theoretical contribution is to introduce legal systems issue into a 
double moral hazard model.
20 | 
 
Table 1.6. (Continued) 
 
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2009 - Pruthi, 
Wright & Meyer - 
International 











37 International VC 
firms; 31 non-
international VC 






RQ1: What is the 
composition of VC 
firms’ international 
staffing pool?
RQ2: Why do VC 
firms deploy 
expatriates?




(1) When foreign VC firms establish a local branch, the 
recruitment of local executives is more important than the 
deployment of expatriates. (2) From all suggested motives in 
literature, the most important reason for expatriation is to 
transfer knowledge. (3) Investment committees play a key 
role in the international decision-making process, it allows 
international VC firms to manage challenges faced by local 
branches that otherwise would require deployment of 
expatriates. 
(1) Even though VC firms can transfer their general human capital across 
markets, they need to acquire context-specific knowledge and experience 
in the local markets they enter. VC firms manage the integration of global 
and local knowledge primarily through decision-making in investment 
committees that bring together key executives from the home country with 
local executives. In this way, they overcome the conventional ‘parent-
subsidiary’ hierarchy typical of manufacturing firms. (2) The article adds to 
understanding of the heterogeneity of service industries and their 
implications for international staffing. (3) This paper fills a gap in the 
international human resource management literature by focusing on an 
industry that is very knowledge-intensive and thus allows the application of 
the knowledge based view (KBV) of the firm, a relatively under-explored 
framework for understanding internationalization strategies.
2009 - Bengtsson 
& Ravid - SSRN 
working paper
The geography of 
venture capital 
contracts
VCExperts 1,800 investment 
rounds in 1,500 











When the geographical distance between a VC and a PC 
increases, contracts give more high powered incentives to the 
entrepreneurs such as cash flow contingencies. This supports 
the view that geographical distance makes monitoring more 
difficult and that VC investors try to mitigate these 
drawbacks. 
(1) Unlike studies of international differences in VC contracts and VC 
investment decisions, this paper is the first to study the role of geography 
within a country. The results can hence not be explained by differences in 
the legal system, rule-of-law, accounting transparency, bankruptcy 
procedures, taxation, etc. Interviews with lawyers and legal scholars have 
confirmed that there are no institutional reasons why U.S. VC contracts 
should vary by company or VC location. (2) Because geographical factors 
have real-world relevance for how VC contracts are designed, they should 
be included as controls in any empirical analysis of cash flow and control 
rights. 
2010 - Balcarcel, 














2004 by 806 U.S. 
VC firms in 2,052 
companies located 




What is the effect 
of a country’s legal 
environment on the 
extent and nature of 
cross-border 
investment? 
U.S. VC firms make larger investments (in fewer rounds) in 
companies located in countries with worse legal protection. 
In particular, both average round sizes and the fraction of 
financing raised in the first round are larger for companies in 
countries with poorer legal enforcement. This result is in line 
with the third-best contracting hypothesis: VC firms take a 
larger stakes because courts may not be able to adequately 
enforce control rights with smaller ownership stakes.
While there is evidence that private contracting mechanisms can mitigate 
shortcomings in a country’s initial legal endowment, reliability of 
enforcement remains a limiting factor.
2010 - Lu & 
Hwang - Asia 
Pacific Journal of 
Management























What is the impact 
of liabilities of 
foreignness on the 
deal sourcing of 
international VC 
firms in Singapore?
Due to liabilities of foreignness, foreign VC firms investing in 
Singapore originate fewer unsolicited deals from their 
networks compared to domestic VC firms. In response to 
this drawback, international VC firms mainly draw upon their 
home country advantages by attempting to originate more 
solicited deals from networks.
(1) Contribute to VC investment decision process literature by taking a 
knowledge perspective which links VC deal origination and VC evaluation 
to VC knowledge differences. (2) While prior research found VC 
investment behavioural differences across markets in various development 
stages, this study found such differences exist in one market. (3) Contribute 
to the less explored field of the investment decision process of international 
VC firms in overseas markets. (4) International VC firms need help to 
accumulate their local knowledge and build networks. Policy makers could 
formulate relevant policies to help them. For example, incentives for 
domestic VC firms, particularly government-linked VC firms, to co-invest 
with international VC firms.
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Year - Authors - 
Journal






2010b - Guler & 






















All actual and 
potential 
investments of 
1,010 U.S. based 
VC firms active 
between 1990-











Home-country network advantages of U.S. VC firms such as 
social status advantages are transferable from the home 
country to the target country. 
(1) Add to transferability of network-based advantages literature by 
examining the impact of home-country network advantages on firms’ 
propensity to expand abroad and on the choice of foreign markets to enter. 
(2) Examine how focal firms with various levels of social status and 
brokerage advantages react to the entry of home country partners into 
foreign markets, thus providing a dynamic perspective that takes into 
account how networks and the advantages associated with them change 
over time. (3) Integrate theories of international business with those from 
the field of social network analysis. (3) Extend prior work on foreign 
market entry by emphasizing firm-specific advantages that originate from 
network structure as opposed to advantages that firms develop within their 
boundaries. (4) Contributes to the research on interfirm networks by 
examining the portability of advantages originating from a given network 
outside the boundaries of the network. (5) Complement prior research by 
highlighting how the impact of network advantages on foreign market entry 
changes as a network evolves.




Venture capital and 
internationalization
Zephyr database World wide sample 














As costs of investing abroad vary with deal size, large deals 
have a higher probability that foreign VC firm participates 
and this effect is more pronounced when a large deal takes 
place in a small country, indicating that international VC 
investment is partly due to limitations in the availability of local 
VC firms. 
Deal size influences the participation of a foreign VC which is consistent 
with the view that the costs and/or benefits of investing in non-domestic 
countries depend on the degree of information asymmetries between the 
VC and the portfolio company and the VC’s diversification needs.
2011 - Meuleman 






















investments by 69 











Why do foreign PE 





(1) Institutional differences induce PE firms to rely on local 
partners through cross-border syndication. The likelihood 
that a cross-border deal will be syndicated with local 
partners decreases when the number of investment banks in 
the host country is higher. Moreover, there is an inverted U-
shape relationship between the likelihood that a cross-border 
deal will be syndicated with local partners and the number of 
local investors. (2) PE firms reduce institutional environment 
barriers through learning. Country-level experience and 
multinational experience reduce the need to rely on local 
partners through cross-border syndication. (3) The more 
investment executives that are available at the PE firm to 
manage the investments, the faster PE firms learn and hence 
the lower the probability to use cross-border syndication. (4) 
Presence of a local office is not significantly related to the 
reduced likelihood of syndicating with local partners.
(1) PE literature has mainly focused on the early stage VC market. 
Informational asymmetries may however be less problematical in the later 
stage market, which has implications for the need to syndicate. (2) PE firms 
are different from other service firms as they invest in a foreign venture with 
the aim of making a financial return when they divest. At the same time, PE 
firms assume an active role by monitoring and adding value to their PC. (3) 
Examine whether cross-border syndication decisions are shaped by the PE 
firm's capacities as an adaptive learning organization. Extend the notion of 
experience by incorporating the concepts of direct experiential knowledge 
from doing deals either in the host country or multinationally and the 
intensity of that experience, and the indirect experience from having a local 
office which may not involve deal doing but which may add to knowledge 
of the local institutional context. (4) Provide insights to practitioners into the 
complementarities involved in syndication and recruitment strategies when 
PE firms internationalize. PE firms that internationalize may explicitly pursue 
an initial strategy of syndicating with local partners since expertise gained in 
the domestic market may not easily transfer to a foreign context. Once they 












Year - Authors - 
Journal








& Krishnan - 
SSRN working 
paper
Do local and 
international venture 
capitalists play well 







30,071 VC backed 
companies invested 
from 1989-2008 







VC firms add value 
to entrepreneurial 
companies, and 
how do they 
interact with 
domestic VC firms?
(1) More distant international VC firms are more (marginally) 
likely to syndicate with local VC firms and stage their 
investments over more rounds, and are less likely to invest in 
early stage entrepreneurial firms, potentially to mitigate their 
deficiencies related to the lack of knowledge of local markets 
and higher monitoring costs. (2) Results are stronger for VC 
investments in emerging nations than for those in developed 
nations, which is consistent with the notion that the difficulties 
in monitoring and the deficiencies in local knowledge faced 
by international VC firms are more important in emerging 
markets.
(1) Both expertise in VC and knowledge of local firms and markets are 
important in enabling VC to add value to the entrepreneurial firm they invest 
in. (2) Syndicates consisting of different kinds of VC firms allow an 
exchange of information across VC firms and also enable the syndicate to 
overcome deficiencies of individual VC firms. (3) Greater distance between 
VC and PC increases monitoring costs. (4) Staging is a way to mitigate the 
effects of the larger monitoring costs faced by international VC firms. (5) 
Younger and early stage entrepreneurial firms require a locally available VC 
industry, since farther away VC firms are less likely to invest in such firms. 
(6) The fact that results are stronger for emerging markets indicates that the 
deficiencies of international VC firms may be overcome by the better 
infrastructure of, and the VC's greater investment experience in, developed 
markets.
2012 - Dai, Jo & 





investments in Asia: 






Global New Issues 
Database
2,860 PCs  
receiving 4,254 
rounds of VC 
financing by 468 











(selection) and the 
exit performance of 
foreign VC firms 
investing in Asia?
In the Asian VC markets, when investing alone, foreign VC 
firms are more likely to invest in more information-transparent 
(later stage, later round) PCs. Partnership with domestic VC 
firms helps alleviate information asymmetry and monitoring 
problem and has positive implication for the exit performance 
of local entrepreneurial firms.
Sheds additional light on the investment selection behaviour of foreign VC 
firms when they invest in Asia. The evidences suggests that the geographical 
and cultural distances faced when investing in Asia has a negative impact on 
the formation of partnership between foreign and local VC firms. The study 
extends the syndication literature by showing that partnerships when 
investing in Asia produces synergy in cross-border VC investments by 
reducing frictions associated with both geographical and cultural distance. 




1.3.3. Outcomes of international VC investments 
Ultimately, what matters for both the entrepreneurs and the VC investors is the outcome of the PC. The exit 
from PCs is the last and perhaps most important step in the VC cycle (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Wright and 
Robbie, 1998), as several stakeholders have a particular interest in the exit outcome. First, the exit route 
determines the VC firms’ returns (Ruhnka and Young, 1987). Second, entrepreneurs are highly involved as the 
exit route not only impacts their financial return but also their future role within the company. When analysing 
the exit from PCs it is thus important to note that this phenomenon can be viewed from these different 
perspectives. A successful outcome for the VC firm is not by definition a successful outcome for the 
entrepreneur. I will hence discuss the outcomes of international VC investments from both perspectives. 
1.3.3.1. Investment outcome from the perspective of the PC
5
 
International VC investors impact their PCs’ development differently compared to domestic VC investors. 
Mäkelä and Maula (2006) develop a theoretical model which proposes that changes in a PC’s prospects 
influence the cross-border VC firm’s commitment more strongly compared to domestic VC investors. This 
relationship is magnified with greater geographical distance but mitigated by the relative investment size and the 
investor’s embeddedness in local syndication networks. Next, foreign VC investors may help their PCs to 
implement an internationalization strategy. Specifically, foreign VC firms located in a PC’s target market of 
internationalization can be valuable for the PC by legitimizing the unknown new company in that market 
(Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Mäkelä and Maula, 2006) or can even help to relocate the company into that market 
(Cumming et al., 2009). However, the remoteness of a cross-border VC investor and its more limited local 
experience could potentially be harmful as well (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). Further, 
cross-border investors tend to drive their PCs towards their home markets, and the benefits may turn into 
disadvantages if the target market differs from the home markets of the cross-border VC investors (Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2005).  
                                                          
5
 An overview of the papers discussed, is provided in Table 1.7. 
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Table 1.7. Investment outcome of international VC investments from the PC’s perspective 
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2005 - Mäkelä & 






















9 PCs from Finland 
who have their 
primary market in 
foreign nations and 









What is the role of 
cross-border VC 
firms in the 
internationalization 
of their PCs?
Foreign VC firms located in a PC’s target market of 
internationalization can be valuable for the venture by 
legitimizing the unknown new PC  in that market. However, 
foreign investors tend to drive PC towards their home 
markets, and the benefits may turn into disadvantages if the 
target market differs from the home markets of the foreign 
investors. 
(1) Prior to agreeing on cross-border investment rounds, entrepreneurial 
teams and local investors should carefully examine the internationalization 
objectives of the company, especially in terms of the target locations of 
internationalization and whether their new candidates for investors are both 
willing and able to help them there. In addition to financial capital, new 
investors should be able to provide endorsement, international social 
capital, and knowledge. (2) Investors, for their part, should search for PCs 
whose business objectives can be reconciled to be reasonable by both the 
investor and the investee.




















8 PCs from Finland 
who were invested 
by at least one 









What are the 





Changes in a PC’s prospects influence the VC firm’s 
commitment. This relationship magnified by the VC firm’s 
geographical distance and mitigated by the relative investment 
size and the investor’s embeddedness in local syndication 
networks.
(1) Once an international interorganizational network has been assembled, 
commitment is needed to hold it together. (2) Results may be generalizable 
to areas such as the management of international joint ventures and alliances 
and decision making concerning subsidiaries in multinational corporations. 
(3) Distant actors that are not well embedded in social action in the vicinity 
of the focal actor are more likely to relinquish commitment as a response to 
decreased expectations. To take a reverse angle, proximate actors with a 
high degree of network embeddedness may exhibit a higher escalation of 
commitment, i.e., a non-rational degree of continuing commitment.











dataset from VC 
firms operating in 
the Asia-Pacific 











53 VC funds 
involving 468 PCs 





Why and when do 
VC firms relocate 
PCs?
(1) Relocations to the U.S. are motivated by economic 
conditions as well as an improvement in the laws of the 
country in which the entrepreneurial company is based. (2) 
Relocations to the U.S. yield much greater returns to Asia-
Pacific VC firms than investing in companies already based in 
the U.S. at the time of VC investment. (3) More experienced 
Asia-Pacific VC firms have greater success with their PC 
relocations to the U.S., and these relocations yield higher 
returns relative to staying in their country of origin.
(1) Legal conditions are important for VC-backed companies and to the 
growth of a VC market. With the help of VC firms, entrepreneurs are more 
likely to move promising companies to markets with a stronger legal 
environment in order to facilitate the successful exit of investors. (2) 
International relocations facilitate locational advantages for PCs in terms of 
being closer to consumers. (3) PCs backed by more experienced VC firms 
are more likely to experience greater success with their international 
relocations. Entrepreneurs in emerging countries therefore have a 
pronounced incentive to be backed by an experienced VC. (4) PC 
characteristics are important for driving the need for and success of the 
relocation. Early stage and high-tech PCs are more feasibly relocated and 
more likely to benefit from international relocation. (5) Relocation may 
generate costs as it requires greater flexibility from entrepreneurs and 
working in foreign jurisdictions that may be substantially different from their 
home country. (6) Entrepreneurs may favour investors who can facilitate a 
transnational approach, but this is sometimes at the expense of other 
investors that may bring other benefits. More specifically, these investors 
may be needed in specific stages of development, making otherwise cross-
border relocation more difficult in follow-up stages.
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1.3.3.2. Investment outcome from the perspective of the VC firm
6
  
Compared to cross-border VC firms, local VC firms are more likely to have successful exits controlling for PC 
quality and VC firm reputation (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Humphrey-Jenner and Shard 2013). Surprisingly, 
Knill (2009) shows that compared to industry, stage diversification and domestic geographical diversification, 
international geographical diversification is the only diversification strategy which has no negative effect on the 
PC exit performance. As such, it is possible that VC firms can use this form of diversification to reduce risk and 
potentially grow their firm without impacting the PC exit performance.  
Recent studies stress the benefits of local syndication and greater staging for exit success of cross-border VC 
investments, particularly for early stage investments and for investments in emerging countries (Chemmanur et 
al., 2012; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dai et al. 2012; Hazarika et al., 2013; Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013; 
Wang and Wang, 2012). Specifically, PCs with both cross-border and local VC partnership are about 5% more 
likely to successfully exit (Dai et al., 2012). Further, greater distance between the country of the VC firm and 
that of the PC is associated with a lower probability of a successful exit (Chemmanur et al., 2012). The 
probability of foreign VC firms enabling successful exits is higher when they invest in later stage companies 
and when they are diversified across industries (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013).  
The effect of foreign VC firms’ human capital on the exit success of their PCs is not well understood yet. Hursti 
and Maula (2007) find that the international experience of the management team and pre-IPO ownership by 
cross-border VC investors are positively related to foreign IPOs in developed markets. In contrast, Wang and 
Wang (2011) show that there is little correlation between a foreign VC firms' human capital, such as its 
experience, networks and reputation, and PCs’ exit performance in emerging markets. Instead, the domestic 
entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to exit performance (Wang and Wang, 2011).  
Next to local syndication and experience, the target country and PC characteristics impact the international VC 
firm’s exit performance. In more economically free countries, foreign VC-backed PCs are more likely to 
successfully exit through an IPO or an M&A, and investment durations are shorter (Wang and Wang, 2012). 
The legal protection rights of VC firms’ country of origin within the VC syndicate of an IPO firm negatively 
impacts the underprizing of IPOs, and this negative association is stronger for IPOs involving foreign VC firms 
(Chahine and Saade, 2011). This expands prior research on VC syndication by showing that in addition to VC 
monitoring, the shareholders’ protection rights of the country of origin of foreign VC syndicate members signals 
the quality of PCs at IPO. There is also evidence of a positive but marginally significant effect of the legal 
protection rights of VC firms’ country of origin on the long-term performance of their PCs. Superior legal rights 
(and enforcement) and better-developed stock markets significantly enhance PC long term performance 
(Hazarika et al., 2013). Remarkably, cultural distance between countries of the PC and its lead investor 
positively affects VC success: it creates incentives for rigorous ex-ante screening, improving VC performance, 
particularly in emerging economies. Moreover, Bottazzi and colleagues (2012) find a negative relationship 
between trust in a country and exit performance, especially for IPOs. They further show that more sophisticated 
                                                          
6
 An overview of the papers discussed, is provided in Table 1.8. 
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investors are more likely to make low trust investments, and doing so they achieve superior performance. Lack 
of trust in a country is hence a hurdle to making VC investments, but cross-border investors who overcome this 
hurdle tend to do well. To the best of my knowledge, no studies have examined the effect of investing from a 
local branch on PC exit.  
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Table 1.8. Investment outcome of international VC investments from the VC firm’s perspective 
 
  
Year - Authors - 
Journal






2007 - Hursti & 





capital markets: An 
examination of 
factors influencing 
foreign initial public 
offerings




database of perfect 
information Ltd.), 
Datastream
2,862 IPOs made 
by EU VC firms 
between 1991 -




What are the 
determinants of a 
foreign IPO?
Pre-IPO ownership by cross-border VC investors is 
positively related to foreign IPOs. While cross-border VC 
investors may help their investments to implement an 
internationalization strategy, the remoteness of an international 
investor and his limited local experience could potentially be 
harmful. 
(1) Examine the role of PC's characteristics; high-tech focus; size in 
increasing the need for foreign IPOs; international entry capability related to 
effects of international management experience; international operations; 
and foreign pre-IPO ownership in facilitating foreign IPOs. (2) Companies 
can circumvent some limitations of their domestic stock markets by an IPO 
abroad. Foreign VC ownership can support this strategy. (3) The demise of 
both EASDAQ and Neuer Markt show that investors' interest in single 
European economies is insufficient to support market liquidity in volatile, 
high-risk industries. European PCs must be willing and able to find capital 
abroad. Public policy must support this activity but without favouring large 
blue chip companies or endangering local exchanges. (4) VC, needs a well-
functioning local exchange. (5) For entrepreneurs and VC firms, the results 
show that European exit markets have developed in a positive way and 
cross-border exit markets are available in different European countries. (6) 
Foreign VC investors and corporate investors may help lower the boundary 
for going public abroad, further enhancing the globalization strategy. (7) 
However, entrepreneurs planning to reside in their home country need to 
consider the costs and benefits of foreign ownership from the outset. 




capitalists put all 














preferences of the 
500 largest U.S. 
VC and PE firms + 






Should VC firms 
diversify or use 
pure-play 
strategies?
Compared to industry, stage and domestic geographical 
diversification, international geographical diversification is the 
only diversification strategy which has no negative impact on 
the PC's exit performance. As such, it is possible that VC 
firms can use this form of diversification to reduce risk and 
potentially grow their VC firm without impacting the PC exit 
performance.
To the extent that PCs are able to shop around for VC funding, and that 
their ultimate goal is to obtain access to public markets quickly, they may 
want to seek out a VC who is either a pure-play or is diversified across 
geographic locations only. VC firms that diversify across industry or stage 
should be avoided if delay of exit is of prime importance.
2010 - Cumming & 
Dai - Journal of 
Empirical Finance













invested by 1,908 




How does local 
bias depend on VC 
firms' 
characteristics and 
how does local bias 
impact 
performance?
Compared to more distant VC firms, local VC firms are 
more likely to have successful exits controlling for PC quality 
and VC reputation.
(1) More reputable VC firms are better in reducing information asymmetry 
associated with distance. (2) Policy implications: to stimulate the 
development of the new companies the presence of local VC firms should 
be stimulated given the existence of local bias in VC investments. This can 
be achieved either by direct investment in the local new ventures or by 
forming syndicates with VC firms in other areas.
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Year - Authors - 
Journal






2011 - Chahine & 





and the effect of the 
origin of venture 







selected U.S. VC 
backed IPOs from 
1997-2007 
(represents 30.5% 





Is PC performance 
at IPO affected by 
the VC firm's 
country of origin's 
shareholders' 
protection rights ?
(1) U.S. IPOs' underpricing is negatively related to the 
weighted average legal protection rights’ index of VC firms’ 
country of origin within the VC syndicate of an IPO firm. This 
negative association is stronger for IPOs involving foreign VC 
firms. (2) Legal protection rights of foreign VC firms and 
board independence of IPO firms play a complementary role 
in reducing underpricing. This suggests that foreign VC firms 
from countries with a higher legal protection rights are likely 
to invest in PCs with better governance, and this reduces 
underpricing. (3) Results are robust when controlling for 
selection bias of IPO firms by foreign VC firms, and using the 
effect of the protection rights of the country of origin of the 
lead, largest, board member, or oldest, i.e., most 
experienced, VC firm. (4) Evidence of a positive effect of the 
legal protection rights of VC firms on the long-term 
performance of their PCs.
(1) Institutional framework and national legal differences matter in 
considering the effect of VC firms on IPO performance. (2) Expand prior 
research on VC syndication by showing that in addition to VC monitoring, 
the shareholders’ protection rights of the country of origin of foreign VC 
syndicate members signals the quality of PCs at IPO. (3) Complementary 
role between the legal protection rights of the country of origin of foreign 
VC firms and board independence indicates that PC performance is the 
outcome of complex mechanisms involving both PC and country-level 
settings. (4) Policy-makers and practitioners should view legal protection of 
shareholders’ rights as a global issue. (5) Results contribute to the 
understanding of cross-border partnering and the quality of partners within 
the VC industry.















between 1999 and 
2006 by 84 foreign 





What is the impact 
of foreign VC firms' 





performance in the 
Chinese VC 
market?
(1) Foreign VC firms' human capital (experience, networks 
and reputation) is not correlated with VC performance. (2) 
Domestic entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to VC 
performance. In particular, if an entrepreneur has more 
general experience in terms of the number of companies 
previously worked for or more specific experience in terms 
of the number of companies previously served as a CEO or 
top manager, successful exit (IPO or M&A) and shorter 
investment duration in the PC are more likely.
(1) Analysis helps clarify the factors underlying cross-border VC 
performance in emerging markets (China). (2) The roles of both VC firms 
and entrepreneurs on VC performance are studied. The literature on VC 
performance generally focuses on the role of VC firms but pays little 
attention to the role of entrepreneurs.
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Table 1.8. (Continued) 
 
  
Year - Authors - 
Journal








& Krishnan - 
SSRN working 
paper
Do local and 
international venture 
capitalists play well 







30,071 VC backed 
companies invested 
from 1989-2008 







VC firms add value 
to entrepreneurial 
companies, and 
how do they 
interact with 
domestic VC firms?
(1) VC investments by syndicates composed of international 
and local VC firms are more successful (more IPO exits) 
than VC investments by syndicates composed of purely 
international or purely local VC firms. (2) Greater distance 
between the country of the VC and that of the entrepreneurial 
firm is associated with a lower probability of success. (3) 
Syndication with local VC firms and greater staging by 
international VC firms mitigates the negative association 
between the distance from the international VC to the 
entrepreneurial firm and the successful outcome of the VC 
investment. (4) Investment in early stage entrepreneurial firms 
exacerbates this negative association. (5) Results are stronger 
for VC investments in emerging nations than for those in 
developed nations, which is consistent with the notion that the 
difficulties in monitoring and the deficiencies in local 
knowledge faced by international VC firms are more 
important in emerging markets.
(1) Greater expertise of international VC firms and the superior local 
knowledge and lower monitoring costs of local VC firms are both important 
in obtaining successful outcomes and backing by syndicates consisting of 
the two kinds of VC firms enable entrepreneurial firms to benefit from their 
strengths. (2) Syndicates consisting of different kinds of VC firms allow an 
exchange of information across VC firms and also enable the syndicate to 
overcome deficiencies of individual VC firms. (3) The fact that results are 
stronger for emerging markets indicates that the deficiencies of international 
VC firms may be overcome by the better infrastructure of, and the VC's 
greater investment experience in, developed markets.
2012 - Wang & 












1,906 foreign VC 
firms in 6,535 PCs 












(1) PC country's economic freedom plays a crucial role in 
determining cross-border VC performance. In more 
economically free countries, foreign VC-backed PCs are 
more likely to be successfully exited (IPO or an M&A), and 
investment durations are shorter. (2) Cross-border VC 
performance is also strongly associated to other PC country 
characteristics. The GDP per capita is negatively correlated 
to the probability and hazard of a successful exit, legality is 
positively related to cross-border VC performance and the 
PC country's entrepreneurial activity is positively related to 
the probability of a successful exit. (3) PC quality and local 
VC firms' participation have a positive impact, while early 
stage investments and VC firms' portfolio size have a negative 
impact, on the likelihood of a successful exit. 
(1) Investigate the impact of an important country-level factor, namely a 
domestic country's economic freedom, on cross-border VC performance. 
(2) Enrich the literature by exploring the determinants of cross-border VC 
performance. (3) Contribute to the literature on the influence of many other 
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Year - Authors - 
Journal






2012 - Bottazzi, Da 
Rin & Hellmann - 
NBER working 
paper
The importance of 





685 VC firms in 15 
European countries







What is the impact 
of trust among 
nations on 
investment by 
foreign VC firms? 
(1) Impact on 
probability to 
invest? (2) Impact 
on contracting?
(1) Negative relationship between trust and exit performance, 
especially for IPOs. (2) More sophisticated investors are 
more likely to make low trust investments, and doing so they 
achieve superior performance. (3) Lack of trust is a hurdle to 
making VC investments, but that investors who overcome 
this hurdle tend to do well.
(1) First paper to examine the effect of generalized trust in a corporate 
finance setting. (2) Identify an effect of trust on investments in a micro-
economic environment where alternative explanations can be controlled, 
most notably with powerful combination of investor and company fixed 
effects. (3) New insights into how the effect of trust varies across different 
types of investors. (4) Evidence suggests that lack of trust imposes a hurdle 
for investments. Importantly, it is a hurdle but not a barrier, so that some 
key comparative statics on when investors are more or less able to 
overcome these trust hurdles can be derived. (5) Generalized trust is a 
force that cannot be ignored in the analysis of VC investment. (6) Policy 
implications: Governments across the globe are seeking to attract VC firms 
to invest in their countries. Results suggest that investments will be more 
forthcoming from countries where there is higher generalized trust. This 
provides some guidance as to what countries might be the most promising 
targets for government that want to attract foreign VC investments.
2012 - Dai, Jo & 





investments in Asia: 






Global New Issues 
Database
2,860 PCs  
receiving 4,254 
rounds of VC 
financing by 468 











(selection) and the 
exit performance of 
foreign VC firms 
investing in Asia?
Partnership with domestic VC firms has positive implication 
for the exit performance of local PCs. Specifically, PCs with 
both foreign and local VC partnership are about 5% more 
likely to successfully exit.
(1) Sheds additional light on the exit performance of foreign VC firms when 
they invest in Asia. (2) Evidences suggest that the geographical and cultural 
distances faced when investing in Asia has a negative impact on the exit 
performance of PCs. (3) Study extends the syndication literature by 
showing that partnerships when investing in Asia produces synergy in cross-
border VC investments by reducing frictions associated with both 
geographical and cultural distance. (4) The study also has implications for 
practitioners interested in investing in the Asian VC market.
2013 - Humphery-
Jenner & Suchard - 
Journal of 
Corporate Finance




ChinaVenture 4,753 Chinese / 
Hong Kong 
portfolio companies 








Do foreign VC 
firms increase the 
likelihood of a 
successful exit in 
emerging markets?
(1) In emerging markets, the presence of a foreign VC firm 
by itself does not per se significantly increase the probability 
of a successful exit. (2) Syndication with local VC firms 
increases the probability of a successful exit for foreign VC 
firms. (3) If a foreign VC successfully exits an investment, 
then, compared with a domestic-VC, it prefers to exit via a 
M&A or a secondary-buyout as opposed to through an IPO. 
This reflects the significant lock-up periods associated with 
VC-backed IPOs in China, the difficulty of achieving a 
foreign listing, and the difficulty listing a start-up on Chinese 
stock markets. (4) The impact of foreign VC firms on 
performance depends both on the characteristics of the 
investment as of the VC firm, it is higher when  investing in 
later stage PCs and when the VC is diversified across 
industries.  
Foreign investment does not per se increase the likelihood of investment 
success, although this depends on the nature of the VC firm. Moreover, the 
exit-preferences of foreign investors reflects changing market conditions 
and regulations. The results are consistent with the idea that foreign VC 
firms' main contributions come from providing capital and expertise to 
relatively large companies than from nurturing start-ups. Collaborating with 








Year - Authors - 
Journal






2013 - Hazarika, 
Rajrishi & Kishore - 
Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative 
Analysis










Global New Issues 
Database








What is the impact 
of institutional and 
cultural differences 
on success in global 
VC investing.
(1) Superior legal rights (and enforcement) and better-
developed stock markets significantly enhance VC 
performance. (2) Remarkably, cultural distance between 
countries of the PC and its lead investor positively affects VC 
success. (3) Further analysis reveals that cultural differences 
create incentives for rigorous ex-ante screening, improving 
VC performance, particularly in emerging economies. (4) 
Local VC participation enhances success and mitigates 
foreign VC firms’ ― liability of foreignness, albeit only in 
developed economies. 
(1) Country’s institutional framework – legal system and capital markets – 
is important in contributing to success of VC investments. The presence of 
better developed legal institutions and capital markets hence represents a 
source of comparative advantage for countries trying to promote 
entrepreneurship and the venture capital industry. (2) Cultural differences 
and local investor participation have an influence on VC success. This 
emphasises the importance of both VC screening (due-diligence) and 
monitoring for VC success. (3) Separate analysis of the sub-samples of 
developed and emerging economies provides evidence regarding the 
determinants of VC success in both types of markets.
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1.3.4. Suggested avenues for further research 
Taken together, while the academic literature has provided interesting insights in challenges, drivers, strategies 
and outcomes of international VC investments, significant research gaps remain. Given the increasing 
importance of the foreign investments in the VC industry, more in depth academic attention is called for.  
1.3.4.1. In general  
Multiple studies call for additional research on VC firms' modes of internationalization, which has been largely 
neglected in the academic literature so far. The drivers and impact of the internationalization mode (i.e. setting 
up a local branch versus investing from headquarters) should hence be thoroughly examined (Guler and Guillén, 
2010a; Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2002). An interesting research question is whether there is a life-cycle 
to these different entry modes (Wright et al, 2002). The relatively high presence of local executives in VC firms’ 
staffing pool, for example, suggests an underlying multi-domestic strategy (Pruthi et al., 2009). The role of the 
investment committee in international investment decision-making, the implications of investment committee's 
structure and composition for international staffing are still not fully understood (Pruthi et al., 2009). It would 
also be relevant to develop a longitudinal approach in order to examine in more detail the process of 
international staffing, especially from the perspective of local offices (Pruthi et al., 2009). 
Another field which would benefit from further research is analysing the behavioural differences of the different 
types of VC firms with the foreign and domestic players within a particular country (Pruthi et al., 2003; Pruthi et 
al., 2009). Consequently, it would be relevant to distinguish between the internationalization activities of early-
stage versus late-stage (i.e. buy-out) investors, which require different types of expertise and thus, presumably, 
different needs to transfer executives from one context to another (Pruthi et al., 2009). Moreover, what are the 
differences among VC firms regarding their capabilities to exploit network advantages in their investment 
decisions (Guler and Guillén, 2010b)? 
Finally, as multiple studies find important differences between developed and emerging markets (e.g. 
Chemmanur et al., 2012; Dai et al., 2012), a further analysis of the differences between developing and 
developed markets provides an interesting area of future research (Pruthi et al., 2003). 
1.3.4.2. Determinants of international VC investments 
Extant research provides some areas of future research on country level determinants of international VC flows. 
Some of the unresolved questions are: Are there temporal variations in the internationalization of the VC 
industry? E.g., the VC industry is cyclical, and prone to periodic booms and busts. Could there be differences in 
global outflow patterns depending on these cyclic stages (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009)? Do international VC 
firms find foreign countries more attractive based on the characteristics of the available co-investors to 
syndicate or on the presence of other home-country VC firms (Guler and Guillén, 2010a)? What is the impact of 
technical immigration as opposed to overall professional immigration on international VC flows? Such 
refinements would allow the analyst to get closer to the drivers of international entrepreneurship in high-
technology domains (Iriyama et al. 2010). 
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Next to country determinants, the literature also provides some areas of future research on VC firm 
determinants. Does the VC firm type impact geographical scope and performance (Cumming and Dai, 2010)? 
Moreover, what are the implications of VC organization's actual investment behaviour? Do different VC firms 
demonstrate different levels of tolerance for taking on the risks of a global investment strategy? What are the 
determinants of such differences, as well as their consequences (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009)? How do 
contextual factors moderate the relationship between the composition of top management teams and portfolio 
strategy choice in VC organizations (Patzelt et al., 2009)? 
1.3.4.3. Strategies to compensate for liabilities of foreignness  
Although several studies have started to investigate how international VC investors cope with liabilities of 
foreignness, there remain unanswered research questions. First, analysing companies that have tried but failed to 
raise foreign VC would help to analyse more accurately the role of local investors in raising foreign VC (Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2008). Further, an important question is whether there are differences between emerging VC 
markets compared to developed markets in structuring and monitoring investments (Wright et al., 2002)? Next, 
are there differences between domestic and international VC firms in screening and valuing potential PCs? 
More specifically, to what extent do foreign VC firms adapt their approaches to local market conditions? If so, 
how do they adapt their approaches to deal with different asymmetric information problems (Pruthi et al., 
2003)? Do VC firms, for instance, replicate the network connections present in their home countries in the new 
markets they enter (Guler and Guillén, 2010b)? Foreign VC firms may also gain external knowledge through 
domestic syndication partners that have relevant international investment experience or through other network 
partners, for example international shareholders or service providers such as lawyers or consultants. To what 
extent are these other partners substitutes for foreign syndication partners, or do they complement them in 
different ways (De Prijcker et al., 2012)? Do the technology level of potential investments, the background and 
experience levels of the VC firm’s general partners, and the market for IPOs or other forms of exit available to 
VC firms impact the investment preferences of VC firms (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992)?  
How can mechanisms, such as expatriating staff and hiring local talents effectively overcome hurdles related to 
information friction and cultural differences in international VC investments (Dai et al., 2012)? Do local 
executives effectively substitute for local co-investors for internationalizing firms seeking to invest in foreign 
markets (Pruthi et al., 2009)? Is it possible to make the expertise of key people in the home country available 
through investment committees (Pruthi et al., 2009)? How can VC firms use a mix of strategies – attracting local 
partners, working with local VC firms or setting up local branches – in order to deal with the peculiarities of the 
local environment (Meuleman and Wright, 2011)?  
1.3.4.4. Outcomes of international investments 
Important questions on the outcome of international VC investments are: What is the relation between distance 
and probability of non-rational continuation of commitment to a PC that does not meet the initial prospects (i.e. 
escalation of commitment) (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006)? Is international VC firm’s commitment influenced by 
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country-specific factors other than distance (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006)? Foreign VC firms may help 
professionalize the local entrepreneurial firms given their experience of advising and nurturing PCs in their 
home countries. Do these local entrepreneurial companies have spill over effects on their fellow companies 
which are currently not financed by foreign VC firms (Dai et al., 2012)? In the same vein, how does the 
presence of foreign VC firms and their partnership with local VC firms help professionalize the local VC firms 
(Dai et al., 2012)?  
Additional outcomes such as the number of countries in which the VC firm has international investments or its 
mode of entry in international markets should be considered (De Prijcker et al., 2012). Can foreign VC firms 
provide other value-added benefits, such as increased internationalization, even if they are not per se associated 
with PC success (Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013)? What is the role played by foreign VC firms in PCs 
after the IPO? Foreign VC firms might provide a better contact with international investors; facilitate the 
presence of PCs in foreign markets; and they might also provide valuable help in PCs’ internationalization 
process (Chahine and Saade, 2011). Finally, there may be unobserved determinants associated with relocation of 
PCs such as tax strategies, the size of VC markets, branch offices in different countries (Cumming et al., 2009).  
1.4. Empirical setting: The European VC market 
This dissertation focuses on international VC transactions in Europe, more particularly in seven Western 
European countries. Europe is the second largest VC market worldwide, after the U.S., and follows the 
development of the U.S. VC market closely with an increasing number of large and experienced investors and a 
mature fund raising market (Alhorr et al., 2008; Manigart et al., 2010; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). The 
European VC market is a particularly interesting research scene to study international VC transactions due to the 
availability of detailed data and its international focus (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Moreover, the Europe 
union represents a unique group of countries in terms of size and proximity to each other (Alhorr et al., 2008), 
which are economically strongly integrated.  
Throughout the 1990's, the European Union has taken an active role in removing barriers to investment in 
growth firms within the European region through various political actions (Hursti and Maula, 2007). Two 
examples of such actions are “The Investment Services Directive” and the obligation for consistent accounting 
principles. These regulatory adjustments contributed to the formation of European stock market alternatives to 
NASDAQ. Moreover, enabling free capital flows across borders, a common currency, and consistent regulations 
could potentially alleviate the constraints of available equity capital across Europe (Hursti and Maula, 2007). 
These developments are important for the international development of the European VC industry. They may 
not only increase the amount of foreign capital mature European companies can attract, but also reduce the 
inconsistencies across Europe in the availability of VC and other forms of financing for small firms.  
Bottazzi and colleagues (2004) indeed show that the integration of the European VC industry is stronger than 
previously believed: 27% of all VC firms have a branch office in a foreign country; 25% have investment 
partners that come from another country; 24% of all investments are made in foreign countries. Nevertheless, 
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country barriers still matter (Hursti and Maula, 2007). Bottazzi et al. (2004) additionally demonstrate that the 
European VC industry has important links to the U.S., and is progressively applying U.S. investment practices. 
Nonetheless, the importance of banks and corporations as VC investors, next to independent VC firms, remains 
a specific characteristic. 
In conclusion, the European context is a particularly interesting research context as it is has a developed VC 
market and the removal of multiple barriers makes it a relatively homogeneous setting. Therefore, in contrast to 
heterogeneous and/or emerging research settings, any result which shows differences between international and 
domestic VC firms in Europe carries greater importance as the occurrence of it is less likely.  
Although data on European VC investments and private companies is much more abundant in Europe as 
opposed to the U.S., one of the main issues VC researchers face is the access to relevant information on large 
enough sample sizes. Thanks to the joint effort of all participants in the European FP7 VICO research project 
entitled “Financing entrepreneurial ventures in Europe”, a consistent, large and detailed cross-European 
database of VC backed companies was built. This database is used in the three empirical studies in this 
dissertation, and will be further described in Chapter 2. 
1.5. A summary of the three dissertation studies  
This section presents a brief summary of the three empirical papers based upon the VICO database that are 
presented in this doctoral dissertation. All studies have been prepared to meet the requirements of the specific 
publications and conferences for which they were intended. Moreover, all three empirical essays relate to the 
field of international VC and study the relation between VC investors and PCs. The three studies of this essay 
aim to crack some of the various understudied aspects of international VC investing. These papers are organized 
around three core questions discussed above: “How do the VC investor’s origin and the PC’s characteristics 
impact their mutual matching process?”; “What is the role of domestic and cross-border VC investors in the 
growth of European PCs?” and “How do cross-border, branch and domestic VC firms behave when PCs do not 
meet initial expectations?”. 
1.5.1. Study 1: Matching of supply and demand: The impact of VC investor’s origin and portfolio company’s 
characteristics 
1.5.1.1. Research question 
How do the VC investor’s origin and the PC’s characteristics impact their mutual matching process? 
1.5.1.2. Unit of analysis 
Each unique VC-PC pair at the time of the focal VC’s first investment in the PC. 
1.5.1.3. Method 
We use data from 7 European countries (U.K., Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Spain and Italy). The 
dataset covers 1770 first investments of 840 VC firms in 679 companies of which 1241 are made by domestic 
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VC firms, 356 by cross-border VC firms and 126 by branch VC firms. The proprietary dataset includes 
companies that eventually fail and hence results are not subject to survivorship bias. 
The first investments of VC firms in the sample companies take place between 1994 and 2011. The PCs are a 
maximum 10 years old at the time of initial investment and are active in medium and high-tech industries. 
The differences in the probability of a match between companies and respectively cross-border, branch and 
domestic VC firms are tested with multinomial logistic models, an extension of the binary logistic model, as our 
dependent variable can take more than two discrete outcomes (see e.g. Cooper et al., 1994). Next to the 
estimated coefficients, the average marginal effects are reported as it is useful to highlight economic 
significance alongside statistical significance - i.e. how much a change in a variable changes the probability of 
the focal outcome (Hoetker, 2007). 
1.5.1.4. Principal topic  
A VC investment in a company is a mutual decision, requiring the consent of both the investor and the 
company. Investors (i.e. the supply side) have preferences over investments in portfolios of companies, and 
entrepreneurs (i.e. the demand side) have preferences over matches with specific investors (Fried and Hisrich, 
1994; Sorenson, 2007). While the VC industry used to be spatially constrained, VC investors increasingly invest 
across borders (Alhorr et al., 2008; Meuleman and Wright, 2011) which may impact the matching process both 
from the supply side as from the demand side. The goal of this study is hence to investigate the differences in 
the drivers of the mutual matching process between companies and respectively domestic, cross-border and 
branch VC firms. 
From a demand perspective, we draw upon the resource-based view of the firm to build a life cycle model on the 
association between PC’s resource needs and the VC investor’s geographic origin. Obtaining cross-border VC 
has both advantages and disadvantages compared to domestic VC (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). For instance, 
cross-border VC investors legitimate companies and provide access to international networks of customers, 
suppliers, financiers or potential acquirers (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005), leading to higher growth (Devigne et al., 
2013). However, higher transaction costs lead to less time devoted to PCs (Sapienza et al. 1996) and lower 
commitment (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). There is hence heterogeneity in the demand for such association 
because entrepreneurs have both different endowments of resources and reputation (Hsu, 2004), as well as 
access to different resource bases of partner organizations. More specifically, we expect later stage PCs’ 
international focus will increase their probability to engage with cross-border and branch VC firms. In contrast, 
early stage PCs’ need for hands-on guidance is expected to increase their probability to ally with domestic and 
branch VC firms. Finally, the advantages linked to a broad resource base are expected to increase the probability 
of PCs backed only by domestic VC firms to engage with cross-border and branch VC firms. 
From a supply perspective, the spatial and cultural distance cross-border investors face brings liabilities 
foreignness (LOF) (Wright et al., 2005). LOF are “all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas 
incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: 343). We argue that cross-border VC investors use 
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several strategies to alleviate these LOF (Bell et al., 2012). A first structural strategy is to set up a local branch 
office, thereby mitigating the frictions associated with geographic and cultural distance (Pruthi et al., 2009). 
Second, cross-border VC investors may focus on projects with lower ex-ante information asymmetries or PCs 
that need less advice which both will decrease information costs (Dai et al, 2012). A third strategy to mitigate 
information and value adding problems is to leverage syndicate partners (Meuleman et al., 2010). Syndicating 
with local partners lowers information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and cross-border investors due to the 
increased information production by the local investor. Prior studies indeed show that while the probability of a 
successful exit is lower when VC investors invest across borders, it increases when cross-border VC investors 
syndicate with domestic VC firms (Chemmanur et al., 2012; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Moser, 2010; Dai et al., 
2012). Next, LOF may be reduced through certification. A final strategy we will hence consider is cross-border 
VC targeting PCs backed by more and more experienced co-investors as these will alleviate issues related to 
institutional and cultural distance.  
1.5.1.5. Findings 
From a supply perspective, we confirm that cross-border VC firms preferably match with lower information 
asymmetry companies. This effect disappears when controlling for co-investor characteristics. Cross-border VC 
firms have a higher probability to invest with local investors, with larger investment syndicates and with more 
experienced investors. We further demonstrate that investing through a local branch as opposed to form a 
foreign head office allows foreign VC firms to exhibit the same investment behaviour as domestic VC firms. 
We thereby exhibit that local and more resourceful co-investors or establishing a local presence mitigate LOF 
and enable cross-border investors to invest in the same companies as domestic VC firms. From the demand 
perspective, we show that less developed companies have a higher probability to match with domestic VC firms 
as opposed to cross-border VC firms. Moreover, seed stage companies in which only cross-border VC firms co-
invest have a higher probability to attract a local VC firm as opposed to other cross-border VC firms. Our results 
hence display that entrepreneurs dynamically assess their companies’ resource gaps and consequently target VC 
investors with specific geographic origins based upon the required resources. 
1.5.2. Study 2: The role of domestic and cross-border VC investors in the growth of PCs 
1.5.2.1. Research question 
What is the role of domestic and cross-border VC investors in the growth of European PCs? 
7
 
1.5.2.2. Unit of analysis 




                                                          
7
 Unfortunately at the time this paper was written, we did not have the knowledge on branch VC firms yet. Therefore, 




We use data from 7 European countries (U.K., Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Spain and Italy). The 
dataset covers 761 companies that received initial VC between 1994 and 2004. The PCs are a maximum 10 
years old at the time of initial investment and are active in medium and high-tech industries. 
The data include, but are not limited to, yearly data on sales, total assets and payroll expenses (our growth 
measures) of the respective PCs and this for up to 7 years after the initial VC investment.  
Random Coefficient Modelling (RCM), also referred to as growth modelling, is used as an appropriate 
longitudinal technique to study growth within PCs across time. The RCM framework has less restrictive data 
requirements and much flexibility in the type of models that may be specified compared to traditional methods 
for analysing longitudinal data. For instance, companies may be measured at different points in time, can have a 
different number of time points, and can have a different (non-linear) growth trajectory (Fitzmaurice et al., 
2004). 
1.5.2.4. Principal topic  
Cross-border VC, defined as investments made by VC investors in PCs located in countries other than the 
country in which investments are managed, is an increasingly important phenomenon (Wright et al., 2005). 
Prior research focused on the macro issues driving the international development of VC markets (Guler and 
Guillén, 2010a; Maula and Mäkelä, 2003), the advantages and disadvantages for the companies that receive 
cross-border investments (Hursti and Maula, 2007; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) and the adjustments in investment 
behaviour of VC firms when investing abroad (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003; Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 
2002). Yet, the literature falls short in explaining the differential impact of cross-border VC, as compared to 
domestic VC, on the performance and growth of PCs across time.  
Nevertheless, prior research provides both advantages and disadvantages of obtaining cross-border VC. For 
instance, foreign VC investors legitimate companies in foreign markets (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). This is 
expected to benefit the international sales of PCs and may benefit resource accumulation in foreign markets. 
However, the commitment of cross-border investors is expected to be lower compared to domestic investors, 
especially when performance falls short of early expectations. (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). This may reduce the 
amount of knowledge-based resources provided by cross-border investors to their PCs, which may hamper the 
development of companies. The goal of this study is to empirically investigate the economic consequences of 
getting cross-border VC compared to domestic VC. 
Contrary to most prior research, we do not treat cross-border VC investors as a homogenous group. Rather, we 
distinguish between cross-border investors investing in a syndicate with domestic and without domestic VC 
investors. Syndication of cross-border investors with domestic VC investors may have a distinct impact on PC 
growth through their differential ability to select the companies with high growth potential pre-investment and 





Findings demonstrate how companies initially backed by domestic VC investors exhibit higher growth in the 
short term compared to companies backed by cross-border investors. In the medium term, companies initially 
backed by cross-border VC investors exhibit higher growth compared to companies backed by domestic 
investors. Finally, companies that are initially funded by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border 
VC investors exhibit the highest growth. Overall, this study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the 
role that domestic and cross-border VC investors can play as their PCs grow and thereby require different 
resources or capabilities over time. 
1.5.3. Study 3: Distressed portfolio company exit and cross-border VC investors 
1.5.3.1. Research question 
How do cross-border, branch and domestic VC firms behave when PCs do not meet initial expectations? 
1.5.3.2. Unit of analysis 
Individual VC investment round. 
1.5.3.3. Method 
We use longitudinal data on 684 PCs in 7 European countries that received initial VC between 1994 and 2004. 
We track the identity and characteristics of their VC investors over investment rounds and collect detailed 
information on the PCs including exit type and timing exit outcome of 1060 VC investments. Escalation of 
commitment is analysed focusing on the hazard rate of successful or unsuccessful exits following an investment 
round (Guler, 2007).  
Event-history analysis is used to dynamically estimate the investment process through the distributions of the 
hazards of successful and unsuccessful exits (Guler, 2007). The hazards of successful and unsuccessful exits are 
estimated using the semi-parametric competing risks Cox proportional hazard model, which does not require the 
distribution of time dependence of the hazard to be specified (Guler, 2007). Coefficients are estimated using 
partial likelihood estimation. 
1.5.3.4. Principal topic  
Drawing upon an escalation of commitment framework, this study investigates how differences between 
domestic, cross-border and branch VC investors in access to information, social and structural factors affect 
their decision to terminate an unsuccessful investment.  
VC investors face a liquidation dilemma when PCs underperform: they may either further finance the PC to 
keep the option of improvement or terminate it, which entails certain losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Prior research has shown that VC firms escalate their commitment to a failing course of action (Guler, 2007). 
We argue that escalation of commitment is more prevalent when domestic VC firms invest, compared to cross-
border and branch VC firms. The smaller geographical and cultural distances domestic VC firms face, result in 
lower transaction costs and higher emotional attachment (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Guiso et al., 2008; Bottazzi 
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et al., 2012). Moreover, lower costs and difficulties to acquire and process reliable soft information on PCs and 
local market conditions increase the domestic VC firms’ probability to escalate commitment as they will focus 
more on soft information, use less high-powered contracts and apply lower hurdle rates compared to cross-
border VC firms (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009; Chen et al., 2010). The goal of this study is to empirically 
investigate the probability of escalation of commitment by domestic VC firms as compared to cross-border and 
branch VC firms. 
1.5.3.5. Findings 
Results show that domestic investors have a high tendency to escalate their commitment to a failing course of 
action. In contrast, cross-border investors terminate their investments efficiently, even when investing through a 
local branch. This is explained by cross-border investors having more limited access to soft information, a lower 
social involvement with the project and a lower embeddedness in the local economic and social environment, 
which are all factors that contribute to lower escalation of commitment. Local branches of cross-border 
investors are further shielded from escalation of commitment through structural safeguards. Domestic investors 
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Chapter 2  
 
Sample & data 
 
The VICO data set is the backbone of the datasets used in the three empirical papers. This data set was 
established thanks to the joint effort of all participants in the VICO project
8
. Within the VICO project I was 
responsible for the data collection in Belgium. In order to investigate the specific research questions of the 
studies in this dissertation some additional data were collected.  
In the following section an overview is provided on the sampling process, data sources and sample composition 
of the VICO dataset. This overview is largely based on a paper written by Fabio Bertoni and José Martí Pellón, 
both member of the VICO project. Next I will provide an overview of the additional data which I collected.  
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 This data set is part of the EU 7
th
 Framework Programme 'Financing Entrepreneurial Ventures in Europe: Impact on 
innovation, employment growth, and competitiveness - VICO (Contract 217485). The data collection effort has been 
conducted thanks to the joint effort of all participants in the project. Project scientific coordinator of the project: Massimo 
G. Colombo. WP leaders: Bart Clarysse, Anna Gervasoni, Terttu Luukkonen, Sophie Manigart, Tomasz Marek 
Mickiewicz, José Marti Pellon, Philippe Mustar, Tereza Tykvová, and Mike Wright. Local data collection teams: Fabio 
Bertoni, Francesco Bollazzi, Annalisa Croce, Diego D’Adda, Itxaso del Palacio, David Devigne, Giancarlo Giudici, Luca 








The VICO project collected a database on young high-tech entrepreneurial companies operating in seven 
European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom). The objective 
of the data collection process was to build a data infrastructure to conduct an extensive study about the VC 
activity in high-tech sectors in Europe. The dataset includes two strata of companies: the first is a sample of 
VC-backed companies and the second a control group of non-VC backed (but potentially investable) companies 
(not included in this description)
10
. Data were collected by local teams from each country (using a variety of 
commercial and proprietary sources) and checked for reliability and consistency by a centralized data 
collection unit. The dataset consists of 8370 companies, 759
11
 of which VC-backed, and 1125 VC investors. 
Detailed information was collected for each firm, investor, and investment, including accounting data, patenting 
data, and investor type and experience. 
2.1.1. The VICO project 
VICO is a research project, funded by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission (theme 
SSH-2007-1.2.3 – Grant Agreement 217485) aiming to assess the impact of VC investments on the economic 
performance of entrepreneurial firms in Europe as reflected by their innovation rates, employment creation, 
growth, investments and efficiency, and the role which VC investors play in helping these firms bridge their 
resource and competence gaps. The project involved 9 research centers from 7 European countries: Armines – 
Ecole des Mines de Paris (France), Politecnico di Milano (Italy), Università Carlo Cattaneo (Italy), Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy (Finland), Centre for European Economic Research (Germany), Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid (Spain), University College London (United Kingdom), Vlerick Business School 
(Belgium) and Ghent University (Belgium). 
Data at micro-level included: the characteristic of companies (age, industry, and independence), the typology of 
investments to be studied in order to fully capture the heterogeneity of the phenomenon (i.e. considering not 
only “Silicon Valley-style” Independent VC funds), the target number of VC-backed companies per country and 
time period, the type of accounting information needed for the econometric analyses, the information needed 
about each round of investment (e.g. amount invested, equity stake, identity of the investor...) and the 
information needed about each investor (e.g. country, foundation year, typology...). The information collected 
by public sources has been supplemented by an extensive web based survey addressed to both companies and 
VC investors. This adds non-publicly available information such as the value added by VC to investee 
                                                          
9
 This overview is largely based on a paper written by Fabio Bertoni and José Martí Pellón, both member of the VICO 
project. The description refers to version 2.1 of the VICO dataset released on September 30, 2011. The full version of the 
paper can be downloaded from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904297 
10
 As I did not use the control group sample in the empirical papers, this part was left out of this overview. 
11
 The initial database VICO 1.0 (used in the second empirical study (chapter 4)) contained 761 VC backed companies. 
Two companies have been dropped because they were found not to be independent at foundation. 
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companies (according to the perception of both companies and investors). More information about the project 
can be found at the following link: www.vicoproject.org. 
2.1.2. The sampling process 
2.1.2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of the micro-level data collection effort was to allow econometric analysis on the impact of VC on 
several dimensions of firm performance. The extent to which the analyses would have been effective in 
controlling for firm observable and unobservable heterogeneity and survivorship were crucially dependent on 
the characteristics of the data collection process. 
 Data on VC-backed companies were collected in time-series, creating a panel dataset, which allows the 
use of advanced and effective econometric techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 In order to control for survivorship the VC-backed sample includes both surviving and non-surviving 
companies (i.e. companies that ceased operations or were acquired, losing their independence).  
2.1.2.2. Data collection process 
VICO partners agreed that the use of local sources of information was crucial in the data collection process, and 
that an in-depth country-specific knowledge was essential for the quality of the outcome. The geographic scope 
of the dataset was then restricted to companies established in the 7 European countries represented by partners 
in the project: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Data were collected by local teams for each country. Information was collected at local level using different 
sources of information. Data were first checked for reliability and internal consistency by each local team. Then 
data were regularly sent to a central data collection unit which ensured that information across countries was 
consistent and comparable and its availability balanced. This two-tier structure allowed the early recognition 
and solution of problems. For instance, particular importance was given in the early stage of the data collection 
to the consistency in the definitions of accounting variables across countries. Moreover, in some countries some 
fine-grained accounting variables turned out to be rarely available (e.g. the distinction between depreciation of 
tangible assets and depreciation intangible assets) which prompted the collection of second-best variables which 
were instead more often available (e.g. total depreciation). 
2.1.2.3. Scope of the sample 
To identify young high-tech enterprises we followed the definition commonly adopted in the literature for new 
technology-based firms which specifies that they should: 
 Be younger than 10 years 
 Operate in high-tech sectors 
 Be independent from other corporations 
The sectors included in the analysis, as well as their NACE code (when available) are reported in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1..: Sectors included in the sample and NACE codes 
Sector NACE rev.1 NACE rev.2 
Pharmaceutical 24.4 21 
ICT manufacturing 30.02 + 32 + 33 26 
Robotics 29.5 28.99.20 
Aerospace 35.5 30.30 
TLC services 64.2 61 




Web Publishing 5.2 
Biotechnology 73.1 72.11 
 
Since the interest of the project was in early stage investments, the population of VC-backed companies was 
restricted to those that received their first round of investment less than 10 years after foundation. Limits were 
also put on the period in which the first investment had occurred. Due to data limitations in years before the 
early 1990s, we only considered VC-backed companies invested after 1994. Moreover, since a minimum 
number of post-investment observations should be present to evaluate the impact of VC on firm performance, 
we considered only VC-backed firms which received their first round of VC before 2004. 
2.1.2.4.Target size of the sample 
Based on their research experience, the partners of the project decided that in order to make the econometric 
analyses meaningful the dataset should include a minimum of 700 VC-backed companies. This would allow a 
sufficient size of the sample even when analysing sub-groups of companies in some specific sectors, countries 
or periods, even in presence of a non-negligible amount of missing data. 
The overall target of VC-backed companies is then broken down at country level. The number of VC-backed 
companies per country was set to meet two criteria. First, countries in which the VC industry is larger should be 
more represented in the sample. Second, a minimum number of VC-backed companies should be present in each 
country to allow the estimation of country-level studies. Table 2.2. shows the target composition of the sample. 
Table 2.2.: Target composition of the sample 
Country Number Percentage  
Belgium 80 11.43  
Finland 50 7.14  
France 120 17.14  
Germany 120 17.14  
Italy 100 14.29  
Spain 80 11.43  
U.K. 150 21.43  
Total 700 100.00  
 
2.1.3. Data collected and sources 
The first step of the data collection process was the identification of sample companies. Once sample companies 
were identified, information was gathered using several sources based on a list of variables identified by each 
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WP to satisfy its research objectives. Data can be broadly classified as firm data, accounting data, investment 
data and are explained in the remainder of this Section. 
2.1.3.1. Identification of sample companies 
In order to identify sample companies several sources were combined. Investment and investor level data was 
first obtained from VentureXpert. VentureXpert data however are known to under-represent investments made 
by smaller and informal VC investors which are instead allegedly very important for young high-tech 
entrepreneurial companies. Accordingly additional information was collected using country specific sources, as 
shown in Table 2.3..  
Table 2.3.: Sources used to identify the population of VC-backed companies 
Country Source 
Belgium  
VentureXpert, Investor annual reports, Investor websites, Press releases, Press 
clippings, Belgium VC Association yearbooks. 
Finland VentureXpert, Finnish VC Association yearbooks. 
France VentureXpert, Investor websites, Press releases. 
Germany 
VentureXpert, ZEW Foundation Panel, VC Pro-Database, BVK Directory, Zephyr, 
Investor websites. 
Italy 
VentureXpert, RITA directory, Private Equity Monitor, Italian Private Equity and 
VC Association. 
Spain 
VentureXpert, José Martí Pellón Database, Spanish VC Association, 
WebCapitalRiesgo.com. 
U.K. VentureXpert, Library House (now: Venture Source), Investor websites. 
 
Once VC-backed companies were identified combining all sources in Table 2.3., a random sample was drawn in 
each country to reach the target set in Table 2.2.. Criteria for inclusion were then cross-checked at both local and 
central level. 
2.1.3.2. Firm data 
The data collected about each firm in the sample were: 
 Company id (Name, VAT Code or equivalent, BvD code) 
 Address (Country, NUTS 2 code, City, Street, Zip Code) 
 Industry classification (including NACE rev1 and rev2 codes) 
 Contacts (Telephone, Fax, Website, Generic email) 
 Contact person (Name, Email) 
 Listed status (including year of IPO) 
 Status (Active, Acquired, Bankrupt, Other inactive; Including year in which exit occurred) 
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The main source for firm-level data was Amadeus (and its local equivalent) but some further sources of 
information were used by each team to improve data availability and reliability. More specifically Table 2.4. 
reports the sources used by each country for this category of data. 
Table 2.4.: Data sources for firm-level information 
Country Source 
Belgium  Belfirst, Belgian law gazette, Company websites, Press releases, Press clippings. 
Finland Amadeus, Company websites. 
France Amadeus, Company websites, Press releases. 
Germany ZEW Foundation Panel, Zephyr, German Stock Exchange, Firm websites. 
Italy RITA, Company websites, Telemaco, Press releases. 
Spain Amadeus, José Martí Pellón Database, WebCapitalRiesgo.com, Press releases. 
U.K. Amadeus, Library House, Company websites. 
 
2.1.3.3. Accounting data 
Several accounting variables were collected for each company of the sample in each available year.  
 Income statement figures: 
o Sales 
o Payroll expenses 
o Value added 
o Depreciation of tangible assets 
o Depreciation of intangible assets 
o Total depreciation 
o EBITDA 
o EBIT 
o Net profit 
o Cash flows (Net profit + Depreciation) 
 Assets: 
o Tangible assets 
o Intangible assets 
o Cash & cash equivalents 
o Inventory 
o Total assets 
 Liabilities: 
o Long term financial debt 
o Short term financial debt 





The main source of accounting data was Amadeus (and its local equivalent) but some further sources of 
information were used by each team to improve data availability and reliability. More specifically Table 2.5. 
reports the sources used by each country for this category of data. 
Table 2.5. : Data sources for accounting information 
Country Source 








2.1.3.4. Investment data 
A specific set of additional data was collected for each round of investment by each investor. Data include the 
following: 
 Investor-level information: 
o VC identity (Name of the management company and, if applicable, of the VC fund) 
o Year of foundation of the management company 
o Type of management company (Independent VC, Corporate VC, Bank-affiliated VC, 
Governmental VC, University seed fund) 
 Deal-specific information for each investment round: 
o Date of the investment 
o Amount invested 
o Equity interest acquired 
o Stage of development of the company (EVCA classification) 
o If syndicated deal: who retains leadership 
o Exit (if the investor/fund exited the investment, when and how) 
o Contact person for the investment (Name, Phone, Email, Mail address) 
The main source of investment and investor level data was VentureXpert but substantial information was 
collected using country specific sources. More specifically Table 2.6. reports the sources used by each country 




Table 2.6. Data sources of investment data by country 
Country Source 
Belgium  
VentureXpert, Annual reports, Investor websites, Press releases, Press clippings, 
IPO Prospectuses, European VC and Private Equity Association yearbooks. 
Finland 
VentureXpert, Finnish VC Association, European VC and Private Equity 
Association yearbooks. 
France 
VentureXpert, Investor websites, Press releases, European VC and Private Equity 
Association yearbooks. 
Germany 
ZEW Foundation Panel, VentureXpert, VC Pro-Database, BVK Directory, Zephyr, 
German Stock Exchange, Investor websites, European VC and Private Equity 
Association yearbooks. 
Italy 
VentureXpert, RITA directory, Private Equity Monitor, European VC and Private 
Equity Association yearbooks. 
Spain 
José Martí Pellón Database, Local VC Association (ASCRI), 
WebCapitalRiesgo.com, VentureXpert, European VC and Private Equity 
Association yearbooks. 
U.K. 
Library House (now: Venture Source), VentureXpert, Investor websites, European 
VC and Private Equity Association yearbooks. 
 
2.1.3.5. Patent data 
The collection process for patent data required a specific process. Most of the data collection effort was 
centralized to ensure harmonization in the patenting data and achieve economies of scale in the process. The 
main source of information was the European Patent Office’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT), which provides detailed information of patent applications and grants (records over 60 million 
patent applications and 30 million granted patents) in more than 100 countries worldwide. PATSTAT is a 
snapshot of the master documentation database DOCDB maintained by the European Patent Office and 
designed to be used for statistical research. For Europe only EPO patents are taken into account as these are of 
higher quality and hence have a higher signalling value. First, based on company name and address, we 
searched for potential matches among patent assignees in PATSTAT. An automated algorithm was used to 
ensure that firms could be recognized even when some of the characteristics (e.g. the name) was spelled slightly 
differently (much like the algorithms used by modern internet search engines to recognize misspells in the 
search).  
Potential matches have then been dispatched to local teams for individual cross-checking their correctness. For 
each of the correct matches information was obtained from PATSTAT about all patent applications including: 
 Patent id codes 
 Complete history of the application process (Including, when applicable, grant date, oppositions, 
suspension…) 
 List of countries of patent validity 
 Patent references to journal articles (including journal type) 
 IPC codes 
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For each company we computed the patent stock at the year of first investment. Moreover, patent stock is 
computed, as customary, with a 15% decay rate. There are three versions of the patent stock variable: the first is 
computed including only patents after they have been granted, the second including only patents eventually 
granted but considering them at application date, the third including all applications at time of application 
regardless of the outcome of the valuation process. 
2.1.4. General descriptive statistics 
2.1.4.1. Breakdown by country 
Each country extracted an initial number of VC backed companies which oversampled between 10% and 25% 
the target level, such that, once all inclusion criteria had been controlled for, the final number of companies 
included in the sample would meet the requirements. As a result of this iterative data collection process, the 
final number of companies in the sample deviated marginally from the target level. The distribution of the 
sample is reported in Table 2.7.. 
Table 2.7.: Distribution of the VICO and EVCA dataset by country 
  VICO Sample EVCA Sample
12
   
Country Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Belgium 89 11.73 649 0.14 
Finland 68 8.96 602 0.11 
France 112 14.76 2553 0.04 
Germany 134 17.65 3188 0.04 
Italy 98 12.91 458 0.21 
Spain 82 10.8 486 0.17 
U.K. 176 23.19 2685 0.07 
Total 759 100.00 10621 0.07 
 
Overall the number of VC-backed companies in the sample is consistent with target levels. Comparing the 
VICO sample with the EVCA data shows that while a large number of the Belgian, Finnish, Italian and Spanish 
investments are included in the sample, relatively fewer deals of the larger European countries France, Germany 
and U. K. are included. 
2.1.4.2. Breakdown by industry 
Each firm is classified along a standard industry classification which incorporates that presented in Table 2.1.. 







                                                          
12
 Data provided by EVCA. Only high-tech initial VC investments are included. 
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Table 2.8.: Distribution of the VC-backed sample by industry 
Sector Number Percentage   
Biotech & Pharmaceutical 159 20.95   
ICT manufacturing 124 16.34   
Internet 134 17.65   
Software 256 33.73   
TLC services 44 5.80   
Other high-tech manufacturing
a
 23 3.03   
R&D services 19 2.50   
Total 759 100.00   
a. Includes: aerospace, robotics, nanotech and cleantech 
2.1.4.3. Breakdown by foundation period 
Table 2.9.: Distribution of the VC-backed sample by foundation period 
Foundation period Number Percentage  
1984-1989 22 2.90  
1990-1994 92 12.12  
1995-1999 339 44.66  
2000-2004 306 40.32  
Total 759 100.00  
 
2.1.4.4. Availability of accounting data 
Table 2.10.: Financial statements available for sample firms 
Firm-year observation VC-backed   
Mean 8.98   
Median 9.00   
Total 6819   
 
2.1.4.5. Patent applications 
Table 2.11.: Patent applications for sample firms 
Patent application VC-backed   
Mean 2.20   
Total 1672   
 
2.1.4.6. Investments 
Table 2.12.: Descriptive statistics on investments before the update 
VC-backed firms 759 
Investors 1125 
Investors per company (mean) 2.77 
Investments per company (mean) 4.58 
Total investments 3475 
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2.2. Additional data collection  
A specific set of additional data was hand collected or updated in order to investigate the specific research 
questions of the studies in this dissertation.  
 Investor-level information: 
o Country of origin  
 Deal-specific information for each investment round: 
o Date of the investment rounds 
o Identity of the investors in each round 
o Experience of the VC at time of the investment 
 Previous experience: number of deals by sector, geographic area and investment stage 
 Previous exit experience: number of IPOs 
o Exit: which VC firms exited, how and when 
o Geographical distance between each specific investor and their PC 
o Origin of each VC compared to each of their PCs: domestic, cross-border or branch 
The main source for the update of the data was VentureXpert and Zephyr but substantial information was also 
collected using VC or PC websites and press clippings. The sector, geographic and investment stage experience 
variables are measured by the cumulative number of previous initial investments a VC firm in respectively a 
certain sector, country and investment stage. In the same vein, exit experience is measured by a VC firm’s 
cumulative number of IPO exits. 
2.2.1. General descriptive statistics 
2.2.1.1. Investments 
Table 2.13.: Descriptive statistics on investments after the update 
VC-backed firms 759 
Investors 1087 
Investors per company (mean) 2.94 
Investments per company (mean) 8.28 
Total investments 6281 
 
2.1.4.2. Breakdown by VC origin 
Table 2.14.: Descriptive statistics on VC origin after the update 
Domestic VC 4369 
Cross-border VC 1020 
Branch VC 442 
Missing origin 450 
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Analysing 1770 venture capital (VC) investments in young technology based companies, of which 20% by cross-
border VC firms and 7% by local branches, we show that VC firm’s geographic heterogeneity impacts the 
matching with companies both from the supply side (i.e. the VC investors) as from the demand side (i.e. the 
companies). From a supply perspective, we argue that foreign VC firms use several strategies to mitigate 
liabilities of foreignness (LOF). We confirm that cross-border VC firms preferably match with lower 
information asymmetry companies. This effect disappears when controlling for co-investor characteristics. 
Cross-border VC firms have a higher probability to invest with local investors, with larger investment 
syndicates and with more experienced co-investors. We further demonstrate that investing through a local 
branch as opposed to from a foreign head office allows foreign VC firms to exhibit the same investment 
behaviour as domestic VC firms. We thereby exhibit that local and more resourceful co-investors or establishing 
a local presence mitigate LOF and enable cross-border investors to invest in the same companies as domestic 
VC firms. From the demand perspective, we show that less developed companies have a higher probability to 
match with domestic VC firms as opposed to cross-border VC firms. Moreover, seed stage companies in which 
only cross-border VC firms co-invest have a higher probability to attract a local VC firm as opposed to other 
cross-border VC firms. Our results hence display that entrepreneurs adopt a life cycle approach, at each 
development stage of their companies they assess their companies’ resource gaps and consequently target VC 
investors with specific geographic origins based upon the required resources.  
3.1. Introduction 
A venture capital (VC) investment in a company is a mutual decision, requiring the consent of both the investor 
and the company. Investors have preferences over specific investments depending on their investment strategies, 
and entrepreneurs have preferences over matches with specific investors depending on the investors’ resources 
(Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sorenson, 2007). From these preferences a mutual sorting process arises to match the 
requirements of both VC firms (i.e. the supply side) and companies (i.e. the demand side). Sorting implies that a 
given investor is pushed down in the relative ranking of an entrepreneurial company if its resources do not fully 
fit the company’s needs. In the same vein, VC investors may use different investment strategies to minimize 
their specific investment risks (Elango et al, 1995). As a result, companies that do not fit the VC investor’s 
investment strategy are in turn pushed down in the relative ranking of the VC. 
It is widely accepted that entrepreneurs care about the identity of VC investors: “It is far more important whose 
money you get [as an entrepreneur] than how much you get or how much you pay for it” (Bygrave and 
Timmons, 1992: p. 208). Consequently, when faced with multiple offers, entrepreneurs may turn down the 
investor with the best financial offer in favour of an investor that is expected to add more value in other ways 
(Hsu, 2004). Since entrepreneurs more willingly accept financing from VC firms that add more value, these 
investors have more feasible investments to choose from.  
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Accordingly, we take investor’s and company’s diversity into account by investigating the role of VC investor’s 
origin and portfolio company’s (PC’s) characteristics on their mutual investment decision. More specifically, we 
differentiate between three origins of VC firms: domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms investing from 
headquarters (hereafter: cross-border VC firms) and cross-border VC firms investing from a branch located in 
the same country as the target PC (hereafter: branch VC firms). Heterogeneity in VC firm’s geographic origin is 
expected to impact both the supply and the demand side of the sorting mechanism. Our goal is hence to 
investigate the differences in the drivers of the mutual matching process between companies and respectively 
domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms. We hereby address the call to examine how international VC firms 
use a mix of strategies – for instance by working with local VC firms or setting up local branches – in order to 
deal with information asymmetry problems linked to foreign investing (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2008; Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Pruthi et al., 2003). Moreover, by considering the demand 
perspective we also address the call by Pruthi and colleagues (2003) to investigate what factors influence the 
PCs decision to obtain finance from an international rather than from a domestic VC firm. 
The liabilities of foreignness (LOF) theory is used to explain different investment strategies used by the 
different type of suppliers of finance (Wright et al., 2005). LOF are “all additional costs a firm operating in a 
market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: 343). LOF are particularly severe when 
investing in non-domestic entrepreneurial high-tech companies as these are characterized by short operating and 
financial histories, and are based upon company specific proprietary technological know-how which is 
especially difficult to assess for distant “outside investors”. LOF may hence force VC investors to employ 
different investment strategies when investing across borders compared to when investing domestically (Bell et 
al., 2012; Dai et al., 2012). More specifically, setting up a local branch office enables to mitigate the frictions 
associated with geographic and cultural distance and hence mitigates LOF (Dai et al., 2012). Next, cross-border 
VC firms may select PCs with lower ex-ante information asymmetries or PCs that need less advice; both 
strategies will decrease information costs and asymmetric information problems (Dai et al, 2012; Pruthi et al., 
2009). Third, network theory suggests that cross-border VC firms may outsource their deal flow generation, 
monitoring and value adding functions to branch or domestic co-investors (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; 
Chemmanur et al., 2012; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), thereby allowing to leverage resources of syndicate 
partners (Meuleman et al., 2010). Finally, cross-border VC firms may target PCs backed by more and more 
experienced co-investors as these will certify PCs and thereby alleviate issues related to institutional and 
cultural distance. 
From a demand perspective, we draw upon the resource-based view of the firm to build a life cycle model on the 
association between a PC’s changing resource needs and a VC investor’s geographic origin. There is 
heterogeneity in the demand for such association because entrepreneurs have both different endowments of 
resources and reputation (Hsu, 2004), as well as access to different resource bases of partner organizations. 
More specifically, we expect later stage PCs’ international focus will increase their demand for the skills of 
cross-border and branch VC firms as opposed to domestic VC firms. In contrast, early stage PCs’ need for 
hands-on guidance will increase their demand for local VC investors. Finally, PCs backed only by domestic VC 
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firms are expected to have a higher demand for cross-border and branch VC firms in order to broaden and 
diversify their partners’ resource base. 
The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 1770 VC investments in young technology-based companies in seven 
European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.), of which 20% by cross-
border VC firms and 7% by branch VC firms. Europe offers an interesting environment for our research 
questions for three reasons. First, European VC investments have more international VC participation than U.S. 
VC investments (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Second, Europe is the second largest VC market worldwide, 
after the U.S., and follows the development of the U.S. VC market closely with an increasing number of large 
and experienced investors and a mature fund raising market (Alhorr et al., 2008; Manigart et al., 2010; Schertler 
and Tykvová, 2011). Third, the Europe union represents a unique group of countries in terms of size and 
proximity to each other (Alhorr et al., 2008), which are economically strongly integrated. Europe therefore 
provides a particularly attractive context to examine the drivers of the matching process between companies and 
their VC investors. Moreover, if significant differences are found between the VC origins, despite the fact that 
the European economies are more integrated than emerging economies and hence lower LOF are expected, this 
provides a very strong test of our hypotheses. 
Our study suggests that heterogeneity in VC firm’s geographic origin impacts both the supply and the demand 
side of the sorting mechanism. From the supply perspective, VC firms use different strategies to mitigate LOF. 
First, we confirm earlier findings that cross-border VC firms target companies with lower information 
asymmetries (Dai et al., 2012; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), thereby limiting the scope of investment 
opportunities considered. More specifically, compared to domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms have a 
lower probability to match with seed stage and first VC investment round PCs, but a higher probability to match 
with companies with more patents. However, when also accounting for co-investor presence and characteristics, 
PC characteristics do not impact the probability of raising money from a cross-border rather than a domestic VC 
firm. Instead, compared to domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms have a higher probability to co-invest 
with a local VC firm (either a domestic or a branch VC firm), with larger investment syndicates and with a VC 
firm that can bring additional experience beyond that of the focal VC firm. Co-investors thus allow expanding 
the range of investment opportunities for cross-border VC firms. Interestingly, there are no differences between 
the investment strategies of domestic and branch VC firms. Branch VC firms invest in the same PCs and with 
comparable syndicate partners.  
From the demand perspective, we first show that less developed PCs have a higher probability to match with 
domestic VC firms as opposed to cross-border VC firms. Second, seed stage companies in which only cross-
border VC firms co-invest have a higher probability to match with a domestic or a branch VC firm. Refining the 
opportunity and building the early resource base is important in this phase, and local VC investors (either 
domestic or branch VC firms) are better equipped to provide support in these matters. 
Our research contributes to the VC and entrepreneurship literature. The realization of an investment deal is a 
mutual decision of both VC firms and PCs, and we argue that therefore both the investor’s origin and PC’s 
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characteristics impact this outcome through a sorting mechanism. From the demand perspective, we argue that 
the resource needs of entrepreneurial companies change over time, and show that different types of VC 
investors may address different resource needs. From the supply perspective, we show that - when investing 
internationally - VC firms may target companies with specific characteristics to mitigate LOF. Hence, we 
provide a two-sided perspective on the drivers of the matching process between VC investors from different 
origins with companies having distinct characteristics. We further contribute by showing that investing through 
a local branch combines the benefits of both domestic and cross-border VC firms. While from a supply point of 
view investing through a local branch efficiently lowers LOF, from a demand point of view, branches are able to 
provide both local resources through their proximity and employment of local investment managers and 
international resources by leveraging their head office resource base. Setting up a local branch hence allows VC 
firms to expand internationally while limiting LOF. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Given the limited attention given to branch VC firms, we first 
discuss the benefits of branch VC firms compared to domestic and cross-border VC firms. Thereafter, we 
develop the hypotheses on the impact which VC investor’s origin and PC’s characteristics have on investment 
deal realization. Next, we outline our research method, including the sample, variables and method of analysis. 
This is followed by a presentation of the main findings, including robustness tests. Finally, a discussion of the 
results from both a theoretical and a practical perspective concludes this paper. 
3.2. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
3.2.1. VC internationalization mode 
VC firms wishing to expand internationally may do so through direct cross-border investments or through 
establishing a local branch. The establishment of a local branch is a frequently used internationalization mode to 
mitigate LOF, thereby sharing characteristics of both domestic and cross-border VC investors.  
On the one hand, investing through a local branch rather than through foreign headquarters allows international 
VC firms to mimic domestic VC firms (Miller and Eden, 2006; Pruthi et al., 2009; Zaheer, 1995). Operating 
from a local branch ensures proximity to entrepreneurs which makes it easier to add value, to monitor 
companies closely and to reduce information asymmetries. Proximity also provides legitimacy, as branches are 
strongly embedded in the local cultural and institutional environment (Pruthi et al., 2009). Next, sunk costs are 
different when investing from a branch compared to when investing from headquarters. Setting up a local 
branch necessitates predominantly a large financial investment, while investing across borders from 
headquarters requires higher temporal investments. Temporal investments have, however, a much smaller 
mental impact than financial investments, leading to lower sunk cost effects (Soman, 2001). The large sunk cost 
associated with the establishment of a branch makes it the most far-reaching form of local embeddedness a 
foreign VC firm can display and signals that the focal country is a part of the VC firm’s long term strategy. 
This, in turn, may result in an increased trust from the local entrepreneurs. Additionally, VC branches typically 
employ local investment professionals who have a fine-grained understanding of the local institutions. As a 
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result, cultural and institutional differences disappear, thereby further facilitating transfer of knowledge and 
advice to the PC (De Prijcker et al., 2012; Pruthi et al., 2009). The quality and number of interactions of branch 
VC investors with their PCs are therefore expected to be similar to those of domestic VC investors. Branch VC 
firms thereby exhibit lower LOF and are able to interact and monitor companies more closely compared to 
cross-border VC firms.  
On the other hand, local branches of foreign VC firms differ from domestic VC firms as they share 
characteristics of cross-border VC firms through their access to head office’s resources. Cross-border and 
branch VC firms can influence and add value to companies in different ways than domestic VC firms as they 
have access to different international networks and may signal unobserved qualities of the company to different 
markets. More specifically, they may contribute to the internationalization of their PCs by sharing their 
knowledge pertaining to internationalization and international markets (Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin, 2009; 
Lutz and George, 2012) and by legitimizing the unknown company in their home market (Hursti and Maula, 
2007; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). Consequently, as branch VC firms share characteristics of both cross-border 
and domestic VC firms, it is important to treat them as a separate category of VC firms. 
3.2.2. Supply perspective: liabilities of foreignness in VC markets  
Despite technological advances, financial investors like VC firms are still prone to a “home bias”, implying that 
they prefer to invest close to home compared to what would be optimal from a diversification perspective 
(French and Poterba, 1991; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). A VC firm’s reluctance to invest across borders is 
explained by LOF in capital markets, originating from difficulties in information gathering increasing 
information asymmetries and agency risk, and institutional and cultural distances between the investor’s and the 
target company’s country of origin (Bell et al., 2012). Additionally, VC investors differ from “traditional” 
financial investors in that they provide value-enhancing services to their PCs and monitor the PCs closely after 
the investment (Sapienza et al., 1996). This creates a supplementary LOF, as geographical and cultural distance 
hinders the efficient transfer of services (Ambos and Ambos, 2009). We expand on these antecedents of LOF 
hereafter. 
A first antecedent of LOF in capital markets relates to increased information costs. As there is greater potential 
for an unequal distribution of information between national and cross-border investors, information flows are an 
important determinant of cross-border equity transactions (Portes and Rey, 2005). Unawareness about the 
customary rules regulating the behaviour and activities of managers in foreign markets, different business 
practices and standards, national and corporate cultures all increase information (Bell et al., 2012). Compared 
with domestic and branch VC firms, cross-border VC firms hence face higher barriers to access and interpret 
information when attempting to evaluate and monitor PCs (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). In the VC market, 
Cumming and Dai (2010) showed that geographic proximity leads to information advantages and reduces 
monitoring costs, leading to a higher successful exit probability for PCs that are close to their VC investors. 
Branch VC firms are expected to have access to similar amounts and types of information as domestic VC firms 
and are thus presumed to rely more on soft information compared to cross-border VC firms investing from head 
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office (Berger and Udell, 2002). Hence, cross-border VC firms have a strong information disadvantage 
compared to both domestic and branch VC firms.  
A second antecedent of LOF is the institutional distance, or the extent to which institutions differ between the 
country of origin of the cross-border VC firm and that of the PC. Although formal institutional barriers in 
capital markets have been lowered in recent years, differences that are relevant for financial markets still persist 
in national institutions (Chan et al., 2005). This increases the risk and uncertainty of investing across borders 
(Bell et al., 2012). At the macro-economic level, it has been shown that well-developed legal frameworks 
including investor protection rights and well-developed stock markets increase the flow of cross-border VC 
(Cumming et al., 2010). In contrast, thanks to the geographic proximity and the employment of local investment 
managers, branch VC investors are not expected to face institutional LOF. Hence, cross-border VC firms are 
projected to have a higher institutional disadvantage compared to both domestic and branch VC firms. 
Third, cultural distance has an effect on VC investor behaviour (Bruton et al., 2005; Dai et al., 2012; Wright et 
al., 2005). Culture are the shared values, beliefs and attitudes that influence individual perceptions and 
behaviours (Bell et al., 2012). Cultural distance impacts VC investment practices, which tend to differ across 
countries (Bruton et al., 2005). As a result, cross-border VC firms behave differently compared to domestic VC 
firms (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006; Pruthi et al., 2003). These differences hamper cross-border VC firms in 
achieving legitimacy in the target country, reducing their deal flow and hindering syndication with local VC 
investors. It also makes it more challenging to adhere to the local way of doing business. This may impact the 
effectiveness of cross-border VC firms, as the internationalization literature has shown that cross-border firms 
suffer lower returns until they become accustomed to the local culture and networks (Contractor et al., 2003). 
Again, branch VC investors are expected to face no cultural LOF thanks to their geographic proximity and the 
employment of local investment managers which helps them to be fully accustomed to the local culture. Hence, 
cross-border VC firms are expected to have a larger cultural disadvantage compared to domestic and branch VC 
firms. 
Finally, VC investors differ from “traditional” forms of financial intermediation in that they provide their PCs 
more than blunt capital. Instead they are actively involved after the investment in the governance of the PCs and 
provide value-enhancing services to the PCs through participation in the board of directors (see e.g. Hsu, 2004; 
Sapienza et al., 1996). Value adding and monitoring is however more challenging for cross-border VC 
investors, as both are hampered by distance. This creates an additional LOF for cross-border VC firms, as their 
ability to monitor and add value to the PC, to coach the management team, and to provide introductions depends 
upon the ability to interact frequently with the PC. For example, VC firms are less likely to serve on the boards 
of geographically distant companies (Lerner, 1995). Additionally, telecommunication cannot be regarded as a 
means of overcoming all problems of geographical distance and is hence no full substitute for face-to-face 
contact (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). Efficient value adding by VC investors is also hindered, as cultural and 
institutional barriers may make entrepreneurs less receptive to advice from foreign investors (Guiso et al., 
2008). This creates a supplementary LOF for cross-border VC firms hindering the efficient transfer of services 
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(Ambos and Ambos, 2009). In contrast to cross-border VC investors, branch VC firm’s geographic proximity to 
PCs and employment of local investment managers enables them to provide similar levels of value adding as 
domestic VC firms. Therefore, cross-border VC firms are expected to have a larger value adding disadvantage 
compared to domestic and branch VC firms. 
Once a VC investment is made, it is illiquid and its success is highly dependent on a small group of 
entrepreneurs, making it all the more important that the initial decision to invest be a good one (Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994). As argued, the selection of PCs is even more important for cross-border VC firms as opposed to 
both domestic and branch VC firms due to the LOF they face. As a result, when VC firms invest across borders, 
we expect them to adapt their investment strategy rather than merely implementing the “recipes” from their 
domestic markets.  
3.2.2.1. Impact of PC’s development stage on matching: Supply viewpoint 
A first strategy which cross-border VC firms may use to overcome LOF is to select PCs with lower ex-ante 
information asymmetries or PCs that need less advice. Both strategies decrease information costs (Dai et al, 
2012). More specifically, the difficulty of opportunity appraisal and the importance of monitoring vary with the 
target company’s development stage (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Early stage companies do not only face 
liabilities of newness and smallness, but they also often operate under unproven business models and in 
immature markets. Evaluating these early-stage companies proves difficult because they lack performance 
history for making informed quality assessments. In turn, the lack of a performance history upon which to base 
quality assessments tremendously increases the importance of trust — which is built through repeated 
interaction — in the VC investment relation (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Both information and trust require 
social interaction, yet the likelihood of this interaction diminishes with geographic distance. Additionally, less 
developed PCs produce less and lower quality financial information increasing information asymmetry (Hand, 
2005). In contrast, in later stage companies, VC firms can more easily evaluate the quality of the management 
team in light of its performance on a number of key performance indicators.  
VC firms therefore devote more time and interact more frequently with early stage PCs (Gupta and Sapienza, 
1992). Consequently, extant research has shown that VC firms specializing in early stage prefer narrower 
geographic scope (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). Next, 
cross-border VC firms will prefer to invest in a subsequent VC investment round, as information asymmetries 
decrease after a first VC investment. The initial VC firm will install stronger management control techniques in 
the PCs (Silvola, 2008), leading to more and higher quality subsequent information production (Beuselinck et 
al., 2009). Hence, cross-border VC firms will have a lower probability to invest in a first VC investment round. 
Finally, cross-border VC firms will select PCs which credibly signal their quality through salient organizational 
attributes which are indicators of their value, for example their patents (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2007). 
Entrepreneurial companies with patents have a higher probability of receiving VC and receive VC earlier 
(Haeussler et al., 2009). As cross-border VC firms face relative informational disadvantages compared to 
domestic and branch VC firms, patents will be a more important signal for cross-border VC firms than for 
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domestic and branch VC firms. Hence, we expect that cross-border VC firms will have a higher tendency to 
invest in PCs with more patents. Foregoing arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Compared to domestic or branch VC investors, cross-border VC investors have a lower relative probability 
to match with high information asymmetry companies. 
3.2.2.2. Impact of syndicate composition on matching: Supply viewpoint 
Next to applying more restrictive selection criteria and thereby limiting their range of investment opportunities 
they are willing to consider, cross-border VC firms may mitigate information problems and value adding 
through syndicate partners (Meuleman et al., 2010). Cross-border VC firms may outsource their deal flow 
generation, monitoring and value adding functions to branch or domestic co-investors, which are not hindered 
by geographical, cultural or institutional distance (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Chemmanur et al., 2012; Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001). 
In the absence of public information about companies, personal and professional relationships provide one of 
the primary vehicles for disseminating timely and reliable information about promising new investments 
especially over large spatial distances (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Thin markets for information arise both 
because high-tech companies are secretive in order to protect their competitive position, and because there may 
be few alternate channels outside of a trusted third party for information dissemination (Hsu, 2004). Moreover, 
the unavailability of clear information is especially problematic for cross-border VC firms who have more 
limited access to soft information compared to domestic and branch VC firms. As a result, when the quality of a 
start-up cannot be directly observed, external investors rely on the characteristics of the start-up’s affiliates 
(Hsu, 2004). Deal flow generation may also experience LOF, as foreign VC firms originate fewer unsolicited 
deals compared to domestic VC firms (Lu and Hwang, 2010). Based upon cases of nine Finnish VC backed 
PCs, Mäkelä and Maula (2008) indeed show the importance of domestic VC firms in attracting cross-border VC 
firms. Domestic and branch VC firms can thus play a particularly important brokerage role to cross-border VC 
firms and have a major impact on its probability to make foreign investments, thereby expanding its spatial 
investment radius (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Iriyama et al., 2010; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).  
Next to reducing information asymmetries, syndication partners can play an important role in adding value to 
PCs (Manigart et al., 2006). By nature, domestic and branch VC firms have a higher possibility of adding value 
to their PCs (Hochberg et al., 2010; Sapienza and De Clercq, 2000). Geographical and cultural proximity 
benefits frequent and open communication with entrepreneurs and allows obtaining a good fit, which is essential 
to build trust in the VC firm-entrepreneur relationship (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). This, in turn, positively 
impacts a VC firm’s value-added contribution and subsequent PC performance (De Clercq and Fried, 2005). In 
emerging countries, it has been shown that farther away cross-border VC firms are (marginally significantly) 
more likely to syndicate with domestic VC firms (Chemmanur et al., 2012) and when they syndicate with 
domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms invest in more informationally opaque PCs (Dai et al, 2012). In view 
of domestic and branch VC firms’ ability to reduce information asymmetries and enhance value creation, we 
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expect that especially cross-border VC firms will benefit from having a domestic or branch VC firm as 
syndicate partner. We hence hypothesize:  
H2a Compared to domestic or branch VC investors, cross-border VC investors have a higher relative 
probability to match with companies if domestic or branch VC investors are already part of the company’s 
investment syndicate. 
Another way in which syndicate partners may reduce LOF is through certification. Endorsement of a PC by a 
third party such as another VC firm enables the PC to build a reputation (Rao, 1994; Sahlman, 1990), thereby 
reducing uncertainty surrounding the PC. The signalling value of third-party endorsements in reducing the 
degree of uncertainty depends upon the number of certifying organizations and the status of the certifying 
organization (Bell et al., 2012; Nahata, 2008). Therefore, a PC backed by a larger investment syndicate or by a 
highly experienced VC firm has a more powerful endorsement, whereby the VC firm act as a reputational 
source of legitimacy. Cross-border VC firms - in contrast to domestic and branch VC firms - face LOF making 
endorsement from co-investors’ more valuable compared to domestic and branch VC firms and as a result 
increasing their relative probability to invest. 
A second benefit of larger investment syndicates or highly experienced syndicate partners is that they bring 
more valuable resources and capabilities to the PCs, further enhancing value creation. As VC firms gain more 
experience, they are more likely to secure the expertise required to facilitate their start-up PCs in acquiring 
resources for successful development (Hsu, 2004). Moreover, VC firm’s information network extends with each 
additional investment made, either by gaining important social contacts or by securing experience in effective 
structuring deals or monitoring entrepreneurs (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). For example, highly experienced VC 
firms are more adept to help find key management team members and to shape strategy (Timmons and Bygrave, 
1986). As a result, PCs backed by larger investment syndicates or more experienced VC firms are more 
successful (Cumming and Waltz, 2010; Fitza et al., 2009; Sorenson, 2007; Nahata, 2008).  
Cross-border VC firms have higher needs for more syndicate partners or more experienced syndicate partners in 
order to mitigate LOF. Endorsement by more co-investors and more experienced co-investors will alleviate 
issues related to institutional and cultural distance. Foregoing leads to following hypothesis: 
H2b: Compared to domestic or branch VC investors, cross-border VC investors have a higher relative 
probability to match with companies if more resourceful VC investors are already part of the company’s 
investment syndicate. 
3.2.3. Demand perspective: the resource-based view 
The resource-based view (RBV) defines a company as a collection of resources and states that the 
characteristics of the available resources affect the competitive advantage and thereby the growth of a company 
(Barney, 1986, 1991; Penrose, 1958; Wernerfelt, 1984). Companies that possess more valuable, scarce, unique 
and imperfectly mobile resources are expected to outperform their resource-constrained peers (Barney, 1991; 
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Chandler and Hanks, 1994; Cooper et al., 1994). While early resource-based scholars deemed it important to 
acquire or develop essential resources within the boundaries of an organization, later researchers have shown 
that companies may strongly benefit from the resource base of partner organizations (Bruneel et al., 2010; De 
Clercq and Dimov, 2008; Lee et al., 2001; Lockett et al., 2008). Given their experience and involvement in 
multiple companies, VC investors are instrumental in advancing their PCs by providing not only well-needed 
financial resources, but also intangible resources such as knowledge, access to networks and legitimacy (Arthurs 
and Busenitz, 2006; Hsu, 2004; Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin, 2009; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al. 1996). 
Companies can hence spur their development by accessing the valuable intangible resources and capabilities 
provided by their VC investors (Carpenter et al., 2003; Vanaelst et al., 2006). 
Not all VC investors provide similar resources, however. Companies should hence carefully assess which origin 
their VC investors should have and conscientiously time when to engage with them. More specifically, as PCs 
mature they face new challenges and require different capabilities and resources to cope with them. On the one 
hand, compared to domestic VC investors, cross-border and branch VC investors provide their PCs with more 
specific resources to grow internationally (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005, 2006). While on the other hand, proximity 
to their PCs enables branch and domestic VC firms to offer a more hands on approach, making them more 
valuable in the company’s early phase than cross-border VC investors (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). 
Consequently, PCs attracting VC should identify their resource needs and target VC firms who can provide 
access to the identified resource gaps.  
More specifically, having cross-border or branch VC investors as opposed to domestic VC investors might also 
constrain PC’s development. They may push PCs to pursue foreign markets which may be more difficult and 
slower to conquer or drive internationalization efforts of the company towards the investor’s home market, 
which is not always the company’s target market (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). PCs should hence only target 
cross-border VC investors as opposed to domestic VC investors when they need the cross-border VC firm’s 
specific resources. We hence take a life cycle perspective on the PCs’ resource needs conditional on their 
development stage (Lockett et al., 2008; Vohora et al., 2004; Zahra et al., 2006).  
3.2.3.1. Impact of PC’s development stage on matching: Demand viewpoint 
Early stage high-tech companies are often based upon proprietary technological know-how. They typically face 
liabilities of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Baum and Silverman, 2004) driven by an incomplete 
resource base, including a lack of organizational routines, networks, legitimacy in the local marketplace and 
managerial expertise (Stuart et al., 1999; Vohora et al., 2004). New opportunity identification and shaping, and 
subsequently investing in the resource base needed to pursue these opportunities are considered to be the 
“hallmark of entrepreneurial capabilities” (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006: 199) and essential for an early stage 
company’s future growth (Penrose, 1958).  
The challenges of early stage high-tech companies are further compounded by the fact that they often operate in 
complex and highly volatile environments (Stuart et al., 1999). This makes that the opportunities, initially 
identified in the prestart-up phase, have to be tested in the market and redefined depending on feedback received 
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from different parties including potential customers (Vohora et al., 2004; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Based on 
newly acquired knowledge, early stage high-tech companies thus have to continuously re-assess their key 
strategies (Vohora et al., 2004; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Consequently, companies in their early phase need 
continuous experimentation with the opportunity including product specification, market framing and defining 
marketing strategies. This entails a constant search for feedback, followed by a repackaging of opportunities, 
before attaining a sustainable return phase (Vohora et al., 2004).  
VC investors influence the opportunity shaping and resource acquisition processes by providing contacts to 
relevant external parties for soliciting feedback and by critically reassessing initial ideas based on this feedback 
(Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). We expect that domestic and branch VC investors are better positioned to assist 
their PCs in developing these early strategic processes than cross-border VC investors. Geographical distance 
and investing across boundaries creates an information disadvantage and makes it more difficult to add value 
and monitor companies closely (Dai et al., 2012). Moreover, telecommunication technology does not substitute 
yet for local presence and face-to-face contacts (Frisch and Schilder, 2008). Due to higher transaction costs, 
cross-border VC investors have additionally been found to devote less time to their PCs (Frisch and Schilder, 
2008) and stop investing more promptly if their PCs fail to meet expectations (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). 
Distance hence results in that cross-border VC investors are less closely involved with their PCs. This is 
especially detrimental in the early development stage where VC input is likely to be particularly beneficial to 
shape the opportunity, acquire early resources and develop organizational routines. Worst case, cross-border VC 
investors stop their financial support prematurely, which impacts technology-based companies’ growth 
significantly as they typically require high upfront investments to develop their technology and products prior to 
sales generation.  
Domestic and branch VC investors have a more fine-grained understanding of the legal and institutional 
environment in which the PC initially operates. As the interaction of new companies with the local environment 
is especially important to secure vital early resources, domestic and branch VC investors are expected to be able 
to provide more valuable and relevant advice to their PCs in the early development phase. Altogether, young 
early stage high-tech companies will initially benefit more from local VC investors compared to cross-border 
VC investors (Devigne et al., 2013). 
A young company in the early phase of its technical and organizational development is hence more likely to 
require a higher level of involvement by a VC investor than a company at a later stage (Gupta and Sapienza, 
1992). Consequently, domestic and branch VC investors will be more valuable in the company’s early phase 
than cross-border VC investors and, as a result, companies in their early phase will have a higher propensity to 
attract domestic or branch VC investors as opposed to cross-border VC investors. We hence hypothesize: 
H3a: Early stage companies have a higher probability to match with a domestic or branch VC investors as 
opposed to cross-border VC investors. 
69 | 
 
Once the entrepreneurial opportunity has been refined and initial resources have been put in place, high-tech 
companies enter a new stage in which they strive to attain sustainable returns through market development 
(Vohora et al., 2004). High-tech companies often have a narrow product scope based on a technology that may 
quickly become obsolete and for which the domestic market size is limited (Litvak, 1990; McDougall et al., 
1994; Coviello and Munro, 1995; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Sapienza et al., 2006; Lutz and George, 2012). 
This forces high-tech companies to internationalize, especially in the European context where domestic markets 
are typically too small to reach a minimum efficient scale (Bruneel et al., 2010). The use of resources and the 
sale of outputs in multiple countries is hence critical for their further development (Oviatt and McDougall, 
1994).  
Compared to operating in domestic markets, expanding internationally entails costs that result from 
unfamiliarity with the foreign markets and from political, cultural and economic differences between foreign 
markets and the home market costs (Zaheer, 1995; Dai et al., 2012). These costs are especially difficult to 
overcome for young technology-based companies, as they often miss the resources and capabilities to deal with 
international expansion (Clarysse et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2007). External board members, such as VC 
representatives, with varied skills and experiences in international markets may provide useful connections to 
existing institutions, companies and networks in target foreign markets (Fernhaber et al., 2009).  
The international knowledge, networks and reputation of cross-border and branch VC investors can assist their 
PCs’ internationalization, thereby facilitating the growth of more developed PCs (Dai et al., 2012; Lutz and 
George, 2012; Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013). First, cross-border and branch VC investors may provide 
access to complementary knowledge-based resources in their country of origin; these would typically be 
unavailable to companies that raise finance exclusively from domestic VC investors. For instance, cross-border 
and branch VC investors may be particularly able to provide their PCs with knowledge and information about 
foreign legal and business issues (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). Second, cross-border and branch VC investors may 
provide access to their international network, allowing companies to make contact with relevant foreign 
suppliers, customers, financiers, key executives and other potential stakeholders (Sapienza et al., 1996; Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2005). These relationships are likely to foster the growth of PCs (Yli-Renko et al., 2002). Networks 
in foreign markets may also increase the ability of PCs to identify new opportunities, which is expected to 
further enhance company growth (McDougall et al., 1994; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). Finally, the mere fact of 
having a cross-border or a branch VC investor may provide endorsement benefits (Stuart et al., 1999; Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2005). More specifically, cross-border and branch VC investors are likely to legitimate their PCs in 
foreign markets, which is expected to benefit them when they need to mobilize resources from these markets 
(Hursti and Maula, 2007). Foregoing leads to following hypothesis: 
H3b: Later stage companies have a higher probability to match with cross-border or branch VC investors as 




3.2.3.2. Impact of syndicate composition on matching: Demand viewpoint 
Syndication between cross-border or branch VC investors and domestic VC investors provides PCs access to a 
broader and complementary knowledge and resource base (Brander et al., 2002; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Dai 
et al., 2012). It provides access to an at least partially non overlapping combination of skill sets, experience and 
networks of a diversity of VC firms (Schertler and Tykvová, 2012).  
Domestic and branch VC investors have a better knowledge of local market conditions and provide better access 
to local resources. Compared to cross-border VC investors, they may also allocate more time to monitoring their 
local PCs as they are confronted with lower transaction costs (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). In contrast to 
domestic VC investors, cross-border and branch VC investors provide knowledge, networks and legitimacy that 
are particularly relevant in foreign markets. They may provide knowledge about foreign and legal issues (Dai et 
al. 2012), help in opening doors to foreign customers, suppliers, business partners and financiers (Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2005; Lutz and George, 2012) and endorse the PC in an international context (Stuart et al., 1999; Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2005). 
Mixed syndicates consisting of domestic VC investors and cross-border or branch VC investors; or branch and 
cross-border VC investors thus offer complementary resources, increasing the resources, skills and information 
available for the monitoring and decision making of the PCs (Jääskeläinen, 2012). PCs backed by such a mixed 
syndicate therefore outperform those in which only domestic or only cross-border venture capital investors 
invest (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Devigne et al., 2013; Hazarika et al., 
2013; Humphery-Jenner and Suchard, 2013; Wang and Wang, 2012). More specifically, PCs with mixed 
syndicates are about 5% more likely to successfully exit (Dai et al., 2012). Foregoing arguments lead to the final 
hypotheses: 
H4a: Companies in which only domestic VC investors are part of the investment syndicate have a higher 
relative probability to match with cross-border or branch VC investors compared to domestic VC investors. 
H4b: Companies in which only cross-border VC investors are part of the investment syndicate have a higher 
relative probability to match with domestic or branch VC investors compared to cross-border VC investors. 
3.3. Research method 
3.3.1. Sample and data 
The hypotheses are tested on a sample drawn from a novel dataset on European technology companies built by 
the pan-European VICO project (See chapter 2 for the description of the VICO sample).
13
 We focus on the first 
investment between the focal VC firm and a PC. We thereby exclude investments by the focal VC firm in 
subsequent investment rounds, as these may for instance be impacted by escalation of commitment (Guler, 
2007). The sample contains data on 1770 first investments between 840 VC firms and 679 VC-backed 
                                                          
13
 As government VC firms exhibit an investment pattern that differs from all other VC investor types, they are excluded 
from the sample we use in this study.  
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companies of which 1241 are made by domestic VC firms, 356 by cross-border VC firms and 126 by branch VC 
firms. The use of European data is particularly suited to test our hypotheses, as compared to the U.S. more 
European VC deals have international VC firm participation (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012). 
Table 3.1. (Panel A) provides an overview of the PCs by company industry, country, founding period and focal 
VC firm’s first investment year. The most important industry is the software industry (34%), followed by the 
biotech (21%) and the ICT industry (16%). Over 25% of the sample companies are located in the United 
Kingdom, 24% in France, 18% in Germany and 12% in Belgium. Italian companies represent 9% of the sample 
and Finnish and Spanish companies respectively 7 and 5%. The majority of PCs (48%) were founded between 
1998 and 2000, 32% were founded between 1986 and 1997 and 20% between 2001 and 2004. The first 
investments of VC firms in the sample companies take place between 1994 and 2011. The VC firms have been 
active over the entire time frame of our study, although most VC firm’s first investments in PCs are 
concentrated during the dot-com bubble and subsequent years. 
Table 3.1.: Portfolio companies by country, founding year and industry group 
  Panel A   Panel B     
  





Branch VC firm 
Sample size 1170   1241 356 126 
Industry Number %   Number % Number % Number % 
Software 598 33.8   441 35.5 108 30.3 35 27.8 
Biotech 367 20.7   249 20.1 90 25.3 18 14.3 
ICT 
manufacturing 287 16.2   211 17.0 57 16.0 14 11.1 
Internet 198 11.2   127 10.2 40 11.2 23 18.3 
TLC 101 5.7   60 4.8 26 7.3 10 7.9 
Pharmaceutical 79 4.5   51 4.1 16 4.5 9 7.1 
Web publishing 76 4.3   51 4.1 10 2.8 14 11.1 
Other R&D* 64 3.6   51 4.1 9 2.5 3 2.4 
Country                   
U.K. 456 25.8   297 23.9 96 27.0 60 47.6 
France 422 23.8   324 26.1 70 19.7 20 15.9 
Germany 314 17.7   211 17.0 71 19.9 5 4.0 
Belgium 216 12.2   156 12.6 55 15.4 5 4.0 
Italy 156 8.8   104 8.4 32 9.0 11 8.7 
Finland 116 6.6   78 6.3 26 7.3 12 9.5 
Spain 90 5.1   71 5.7 6 1.7 13 10.3 
Founding year                   
1986-1997 565 31.9   391 31.5 117 32.9 52 41.3 
1998-2000 853 48.2   589 47.5 174 48.9 56 44.4 
2001-2004 352 19.9   261 21.0 65 18.3 18 14.3 
Focal VC firm’s first investment year               
1994-1999 310 17.7   233 18.8 46 12.9 30 23.8 
2000-2005 1281 73.0   895 72.1 273 76.7 84 66.7 
2006-2011 164 9.3   113 9.1 37 10.4 12 9.5 
 
3.3.2. Variable definitions 
The dependent variables of interest are three mutually exclusive dummy variables: Domestic VC firm, Cross-
border VC firm and Branch VC firm. Domestic VC firm, Cross-border VC firm and Branch VC firm take the 
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value of 1 if the focal VC in a realized PC-VC match is respectively a domestic VC firm; a cross-border VC 
firm investing from head office and a cross-border VC firm investing through a local branch. 
The key independent variables measure PC and co-investor characteristics which may drive the matching 
between focal VC firms and PCs. First, in order to test hypotheses 1, 3a and 3b we include measures that 
capture the level of information asymmetry embedded in the PC at time of the focal VC firm’s first investment: 
(a) PC development stage (seed stage); (b) focal investor entry round (first investment round); and (c) PC 
technological transparency (patents). While seed stage and first investment round are dummy variables that are 
respectively equal to 1 if the PC is in the seed development stage and if the focal VC firm enters the PC in its 
first investment round, patents is the PC’s number of patent applications which were pending and granted. 
Second, to test hypotheses 2a and 4b we constructed three dummy variables that capture the focal VC firms’ co-
investors’ origin: (a) synd_Domestic; (b) synd_Branch; and (c) synd_Cross-Border. While synd_Domestic and 
synd_Branch equal 1 when there is at least one co-investor in the investment syndicate which is respectively a 
domestic VC firm or a branch VC firm; synd_Cross-Border_only equals 1 when there are only cross-border VC 
co-investors in the investment syndicate. Next, to test hypothesis 2b we constructed variables that measure the 
co-investors resources: (a) syndication size; and (b) experience spill overs supply. Syndication size takes into 
account the total amount of resources the co-investors may contribute to the focal VC and the PC, measured as 
the time varying cumulative count of VC investors that participated in prior financing rounds or in the focal 
round. Experience spill overs supply measures the potential experience flow from the co-investors to the focal 
VC firm and is computed by subtracting the focal VC firm’s experience (who is entering the investment 
syndicate), measured as the total number of VC investments made prior to the focal VC investment, from the 
highest co-investors’ experience. Prior to taking the natural logarithm, we truncate this variable at 0 as only 
positive differences denote a potential experience flow, i.e. from a more experienced co-investor to the focal VC 
entering the investment syndicate. Finally, to test hypothesis 4a we constructed one additional dummy variable 
synd_Domestic_only which equals 1 when there are only domestic VC co-investors in the investment syndicate. 
We control for focal VC firm characteristics, market conditions, industry, year and country effects. For focal VC 
firm characteristics, we include a control for the focal VC’s experience, since the probability to have positive 
experience flows from a co-investor depends on the focal VC firm’s own experience level. Focal VC’s 
experience is measured as the total number of VC investments made by the focal VC prior to the investment in 
the PC. To control for the general VC investment market conditions - which may affect a focal VC firm’s 
probability to invest, the yearly total number of VC investments worldwide is added. We control for potential 
effects of the timing of the focal VC firm’s first investment as both the timeframe of our study and the focus on 
high-tech sectors require us to control for the focal VC firm’s first investment year. Companies in different 
industries and countries may differ in the probability to be invested. To control for potential industry and 
country effects, industry and country dummies are added. Finally, in the demand perspective models, we isolate 
the PC’s quest for resources of a specific VC origin from the search for more experienced VC investors by 
including the control variable experience spill overs demand. Experience spill overs demand measures the 
experience flow from the focal VC firm to the PC and is computed by subtracting the highest experience of the 
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PC’s existing investors, measured as the total number of VC investments made prior to the focal VC investment, 
from the focal VC firm’s experience. Prior to taking the natural logarithm, we truncate this variable at 0 as only 
positive differences denote an experience flow, i.e. from a more experienced focal VC to the PC. 
3.3.3. Method of Analysis 
The differences in the probability of a match between companies and respectively cross-border, branch and 
domestic focal VC firms are tested with multinomial logistic models, an extension of the binary logistic model, 
as our dependent variable can take more than two discrete outcomes (see e.g. Cooper et al., 1994). For each 
unique VC-PC pair (n), the focal VC firm’s origin (Yn) is represented by a set of three mutually exclusive 
dummy variables that capture the origin of the focal VC. 
The probabilities for each respective outcome can be represented as: 
Pn Domestic VC firm = P [Yn Domestic VC firm = 1] 
Pn Cross-border VC firm = P [Yn Cross-border VC firm = 1] 
Pn Branch VC firm = P [Yn Branch VC firm = 1] 
The sum of these probabilities equals 1. The multinomial model determines these probabilities as a function of 
the observed independent variables and their estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficients represent the 
effect of the independent variables on the logarithm of the odds-ratio of the focal outcome (for instance a match 
with a focal cross-border VC firm or branch VC firm) compared to the normalized outcome (i.e. the reference 
category: in this case a match with a focal domestic VC firm). Consequently, the coefficients should be 
interpreted as the effect of the independent variables on the probability of a particular outcome (a match with a 
focal cross-border VC firm or branch VC firm) relative to the probability of the reference category (a match 
with a focal domestic VC firm).  
Additionally, as it is useful to discuss the variable’s marginal effects - i.e. how much a change in a variable 
changes the probability of the focal outcome - we report the average marginal effects next to the estimated 
coefficients (Hoetker, 2007). More specifically, we calculate the marginal effects by estimating the response for 
each observation and then average those responses as this is more informative than to set all variables at their 
mean (Hoetker, 2007). A marginal effect is hence computed for each case, and then all the computed effects are 
averaged. Finally, the average marginal effects are a zero-sum game: a specific focal VC firm origin's gain (or 
loss) in probability to match with a company, that has specific characteristics, is exactly balanced by the losses 
(or gains) of the probabilities of the other VC firm origins to match with that exact same kind of company. 
To summarize, the coefficients and average marginal effects test different hypotheses: while the coefficient in a 
multinomial logit model shows the effect of a variable on the latent propensity for the focal category compared 
to the reference category, the average marginal effect displays an effect on the probability of a focal category for 
a typical company. 
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Analyses are clustered on the PC level, as multiple observations for the same PC could lead to correlations 
between the error structure and the independent variables and thus lead to underestimation of the standard 
errors. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1. (Panel B) provides an overview of our sample, distinguishing between companies that raise financing 
from a domestic VC investor, a cross-border VC investor and a branch VC investor. Two particular observations 
are worth noting. First, the distributions of PC’s industry, founding year and year of the focal VC firm’s first 
investment are relatively similar for the different VC firm origins. Second, although the PC country distribution 
of the domestic VC firms’ investments and cross-border VC firms’ investments are similar, branch VC firms’ 
investments mainly take place in the U.K. (48%). The fact that more branch VC firms are set up in the U.K. is, 
however, not surprising as the U.K. is the largest and most developed VC market in Europe and therefore the 
most attractive country in Europe for foreign VC firms to set up a local branch (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002).  
Table 3.2. shows the description of the sample at time of first investment by the focal VC firm; Panel A records 
the PC information asymmetry variables. Domestic VC firms (23%) make approximately twice as much seed 
investments compared to cross-border (14%) and branch VC firms (14%). While domestic VC firms enter 
almost two thirds of their PCs in their first investment round (62%), cross-border VC firms and branch VC firms 
enter their PCs in the first investment round respectively in 40% and 53% of their investments. The mean PC 
holds 0.46 patents at time of entry of the focal VC firm. While domestic VC firm’s (0.34) and branch VC firm’s 
(0.31) PCs hold fewer patents, cross-border VC firm’s (0.87) PCs on average hold more patents. Table 3.2. 
Panel B displays the descriptive statistics of the co-investors’ origin. Compared to domestic and branch VC 
firms who co-invest with domestic VC firms in 66% of their investments, cross-border VC firms more 
frequently co-invest with domestic VC firms (86%). While domestic VC firms co-invest with branch VC firms 
in 11% of their investments, branch VC firms (24%) and cross-border VC firms (28%) co-invest with branch 
VC firms approximately twice as often. Moreover, branch VC firms (6%) co-invest exclusively with cross-
border VC firms in twice as many of their investments compared to domestic (3%) and cross-border VC firms 
(2%). Finally, compared to domestic VC firms who co-invest exclusively with domestic VC firms in 43% of 
their investments, cross-border (28%) and branch VC firms (26%) co-invest less frequently with only domestic 
VC firms. Table 3.2. Panel C records the co-investor resources. A median cross-border VC firm has twice as 
many co-investors (4) compared to a median domestic (2) and branch VC firm (2). While a median domestic 
and branch VC firm has no positive experience flow from their most experienced co-investor (mean respectively 
83.09 and 105.65 investments), a median cross-border VC firm’s most experienced co-investor has made 42 
(mean 245.18) investments more prior to the focal investment. Finally, Table 3.2. Panel D describes the control 
variables. While compared to its existing investors, a median PC has no positive experience flow from the new 
focal VC investor they attract (mean 40.77); a mean new focal domestic, cross-border and branch VC firm has 
made respectively 19.42 (median 0), 66.43 (median 0) and 159.81 (median 0) investments more than the PC’s 
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existing VC investors prior to the focal investment. Branch VC firms are the most experienced (median 77 
investments), followed by cross-border VC firms (17) and domestic VC firms (4). The mean total number of VC 
investments made in the focal investment year is relatively similar over the different VC origins. 
Table 3.2.: Descriptive statistics at first investment of the focal VC firm 
 








Sample size   1770 1241 356 126 
Panel A: PC information asymmetry         
     Seed stage (D) Mean 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.14 
            
     First investment round (D) Mean 0.57 0.62 0.40 0.53 
            
     Patents Mean 0.46 0.34 0.87 0.31 
  Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  S.D. 2.41 1.82 3.60 1.02 
Panel B: Co-investor origin         
     Synd_Domestic (D) Mean 0.71 0.66 0.86 0.66 
            
     Synd_Branch (D) Mean 0.15 0.11 0.28 0.24 
            
     Synd_Cross-Border_only (D) Mean 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 
            
     Synd_Domestic_only (D) Mean 0.38 0.43 0.28 0.26 
Panel C: Co-investor resources         
     Syndication size Mean 3.03 2.51 4.86 2.90 
  Median 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 
  S.D. 3.24 2.82 3.92 3.42 
            
     Experience spill overs supply Mean 117.41 83.09 245.18 105.65 
  Median 1.00 0.00 42.00 0.00 
  S.D. 252.33 206.10 355.01 218.20 
Panel D: Control variables         
     Experience spill overs demand Mean 40.77 19.42 66.43 159.81 
  Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  S.D. 144.20 91.87 187.75 267.85 
            
     Focal VC’s experience Mean 57.66 27.89 104.36 210.82 
  Median 6.00 4.00 17.00 77.00 
  S.D. 157.39 95.87 207.75 289.26 
            
     Number of VC investments (x 10^3) Mean 11.46 11.35 11.80 11.49 
  Median 7.17 7.17 7.17 9.04 
  S.D. 6.43 6.34 6.67 6.46 
 
3.4.2. Correlation matrix 
The pairwise correlation matrix is provided in Table 3.3. All variables have correlations below 0.60 and the 
maximum variance inflation factors is 4.30, which is well below the usual warning level of 10 (Rao et al., 2001). 




Table 3.3.: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
(D) marks the dummy variables; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
PC information asymmetry
1 Seed stage (D)
2 First investment round (D) 0.26 ***
3 Patents -0.09 *** -0.03
Co-investor origin
4 Synd_Domestic (D) -0.16 *** -0.48 *** 0.10 ***
5 Synd_Branch (D) -0.12 *** -0.27 *** 0.04 * 0.11 ***
6 Synd_Cross-Border_only (D) -0.01 0.07 *** -0.03 -0.26 *** -0.07 ***
7 Synd_Domestic_only (D) 0.00 -0.10 *** -0.06 ** 0.51 *** -0.33 *** -0.13 *** . 
Co-investor resources
8 Syndication size -0.21 *** -0.53 *** 0.15 *** 0.53 *** 0.34 *** -0.08 *** -0.11 ***
9 Experience spillovers supply -0.16 *** -0.41 *** 0.16 *** 0.43 *** 0.43 *** -0.01 -0.14 *** 0.59 ***
Control variables
10 Experience spillovers demand 0.00 0.16 *** -0.03 -0.16 *** -0.15 *** 0.03 0.02 -0.23 *** -0.53 ***
11 Focal VC’s experience -0.05 * 0.00 0.09 *** -0.04 0.03 0.08 *** -0.07 ** 0.00 -0.16 *** 0.69 ***
12 Number of VC investments (x10^3) 0.12 *** 0.25 *** -0.06 *** -0.05 ** 0.01 0.03 -0.08 *** -0.05 ** -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
77 | 
 
3.4.3. Multivariate analysis of PC-VC matches 
Table 3.4. and 3.5. present multinomial logit models of the likelihood of a match between a company - given its 
specific characteristics - and respectively a focal domestic, cross-border and branch VC firm. While Table 3.4. 
displays the focal VC firm’s probabilities relative to a specific reference category, Table 3.5. displays the 
average marginal effects. Models 1 and 5 include only the control variables; subsequently in Models 2 and 6 the 
PC information asymmetry variables are added; next in Models 3 and 7 the co-investor variables from the 
investor’s perspective are included; finally in Models 4 and 8 the co-investor variables from the company’s 
perspective are added. 
In line with the descriptive statistics, Model 1 shows that the cross-border and branch VC firms are significantly 
(p < .01) more experienced than domestic VC firms at time of the focal investment. Model 1 further shows that 
branch VC firms are significantly (p < .01) more experienced than cross-border VC firms. The total number of 
VC investments made worldwide has no significant impact on the relative probabilities of the VC firms to 
match. PC industry, PC country and focal VC firm’s first investment year dummies are significant in all models. 
Adding the information asymmetry variables in Models 2 and 6 allows assessing whether the likelihood of a 
match between companies and respectively focal domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms differs based 
upon the level of information asymmetry embedded in the companies.  
The negative coefficients of seed stage (p < .05) and first investment round (p < .01) in Model 2 show that, 
compared to focal domestic VC firms, focal cross-border VC firms have a lower probability to match with seed 
stage and first investment round companies. Model 6 displays the average marginal effects of seed stage (-7.0%; 
p < .05) and first investment round (-14.8%; p < .01) which indicate that focal cross-border VC firms have 
respectively a 7.0% and a 14.8% lower probability to match with a typical seed stage and a first investment 
round company. In contrast focal domestic VC firms have respectively a 8.3% (p < .05) and a 17.3% (p < .01) 
higher probability to match with a typical seed stage and a first investment round company. Moreover, the 
positive coefficient on patents (p < .05) in Model 2 implies that, compared to focal domestic VC firms, focal 
cross-border VC firms have a higher probability to invest in companies which hold more patents. The average 
marginal effect on patents (0.8%; p < .05) in Model 6 implies that adding one patent to a typical company 
increases its probability to match with a focal cross-border VC firm by 0.8%. Model 2 further shows there are 
no significant differences between focal branch VC and focal cross-border VC firms in the information 
asymmetry level of the companies with whom they match. Finally, while the coefficients on seed stage and 
patents in Model 2 are not significant, the negative coefficient of first investment round (p < .01) shows that 
compared to focal domestic VC firms, focal branch VC firms have a lower probability to match with first 
investment round companies. The average marginal effects in Model 6 however show that none of the 
information asymmetry level variables of a typical company significantly impacts its probability to match with a 
focal branch VC firm. These results are partially in line with our first and third hypothesis. Although we show 
that, compared to focal domestic VC firms, focal cross-border VC investors have a lower relative probability to 
match with high information asymmetry PC, we find no significant differences between focal cross-border and 
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focal branch VC firms in terms of PC information asymmetry or between focal branch and focal domestic VC 
firms in terms of PC stage.  
3.4.3.1. Supply perspective 
When we include co-investor’s origin and resource variables from the investor’s perspective in Models 3 and 7, 
the significant results on the company information asymmetry variables displayed in Models 2 and 6 disappear. 
Instead, Model 3 shows that, compared to focal domestic VC firms, the relative probability that focal cross-
border VC firms match with a company increases if at least one domestic VC (p < .01) or branch VC firm (p < 
.05) co-invests, but not when only cross-border VC firms co-invest. The average marginal effects on 
synd_Domestic (10.5%; p < .01) and synd_Branch (7.9%; p < .05) in Model 7 imply that the probability of focal 
cross-border VC firms to match with a typical company increases with 10.5% and 7.9% higher if respectively at 
least one domestic VC or branch VC firm co-invests. In contrast focal domestic VC firms have respectively an 
11.3% (p < .01) and a 7.5% (p < .05) lower probability to match with a typical company if at least one domestic 
VC or branch VC firm co-invests. The relative coefficients on synd_Domestic and synd_Branch of focal branch 
VC as opposed to focal domestic and focal cross-border VC firms in Model 3 are, together with the average 
marginal effects of focal branch VC firms in Model 7, however not significant. These results are hence only 
partially in line with our hypothesis 2a as we did not find a positive significant difference in the relative 
probability of focal cross-border VC firms, as opposed to focal branch VC firms, to match with companies who 
have at least one domestic or branch VC co-investing. Model 3 further shows that the relative probability of 
focal cross-border VC firms, compared to focal domestic VC firms, to match with a company increases when 
syndicates are larger (p < .01) or when more experienced co-investors (p < .01) co-invest. The average marginal 
effect on syndication size (1.3%; p < .01) and on experience spill overs supply (1.9%; p < .01) in Model 7 
indicates that focal cross-border VC firms have respectively a 1.3% and a 1.9% higher probability to match with 
a typical company if one co-investor is added to the syndicate or when the experience of more experienced co-
investors increases with one. In contrast focal domestic VC firms have respectively a 1.5% (p < .01) and a 2.2% 
(p < .01) lower probability to match with a typical company if one co-investor is added to the syndicate or when 
the potential experience flow from more experienced co-investors increases with one. The relative coefficients 
on syndicate size and experience spill overs supply of focal branch VC as opposed to focal domestic and focal 
cross-border VC firms in Model 3 are, together with the average marginal effects of focal branch VC firms in 
Model 7, however not significant. These results are partially in line with our hypothesis 2b.  
3.4.3.2. Demand perspective  
In contrast to the investor’s perspective, when we include the co-investor’s origin and resource variables from 
the company’s perspective in Models 4 and 8, the significant results on the company information asymmetry 
displayed in Models 2 and 6 do not fully disappear. Although the coefficient (Model 4) and the average 
marginal effect (Model 8) on seed stage of focal cross-border as opposed to focal domestic VC firms is no 
longer significant, the negative coefficient (p < .01) and average marginal effect (-7.8%; p < .01) on first 
investment round, and the positive coefficient (p < .10) and average marginal effect (0.5%; p < .05) on patents 
remain significant. Additionally, Model 4 demonstrates that, compared to focal domestic VC firms, the relative 
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probability that focal cross-border VC firms match with a company decreases if only domestic VC firms (p < 
.10) co-invest, but not when only branch VC firms co-invest. The average marginal effect on 
synd_Domestic_only (-5.0%; p < .10) in Model 8 implies that focal cross-border VC firms have a 5.0% lower 
probability to match with a typical company if only domestic VC firms co-invest. In contrast focal domestic VC 
firms have a 6.3% (p < .05) higher probability to match with a typical company if only domestic VC firms co-
invest. Moreover, Models 4 and 8 show that there is no significant impact on the probability of a match between 
companies and any focal VC firm origin if only cross-border VC firms are co-investing. We hence find no 





Table 3.4.: Results of multinomial models predicting the relative probability of companies to match with domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms or branch 
VC firms  
 





     Seed stage (D) -0.549 ** -0.166 -0.383 -0.341 -0.063 -0.279 -0.320 -0.085 -0.235
     First investment round (D) -1.158 *** -0.410 -0.748 *** -0.298 0.013 -0.311 -0.651 *** -0.102 -0.548 *
     Patents 0.061 ** 0.064 -0.003 0.010 0.051 -0.040 0.036 * 0.061 -0.025
Co-investor origin
     Synd_Domestic (D) 0.858 *** 0.479 0.379
     Synd_Branch (D) 0.625 ** 0.504 0.121
     Synd_Cross-Border_only (D) 0.531 -0.466 0.997 -0.148 -0.833 0.685
     Synd_Domestic_only (D) -0.420 * -0.096 -0.324
Co-investor resources
     Syndication size 0.110 *** 0.045 0.065 0.191 *** 0.082 0.110 *
     Experience spillovers supply 0.157 *** 0.066 0.091
Control variables
     Experience spillovers demand 0.045 -0.017 0.062
     Focal VC’s experience 0.004 *** -0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** -0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** -0.001 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** -0.002 ** 0.005 ***
     # of VC investments (x10^3) 0.009 0.019 -0.011 0.036 0.039 -0.003 0.030 0.041 -0.012 0.027 0.036 -0.009
     PC industry (D)
     First investment year (D)
     PC country (D)
Constant -1.608 *** 0.700 -2.308 *** -1.307 ** 0.564 -1.871 ** -3.185 *** -0.516 -2.669 *** -1.927 *** 0.228 -2.155 ***
Observations
Log likelihood
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.200.21 0.21






















Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC Domestic VC Branch VC
Included
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
1,360
-944.9 -944.9 -944.9 -897.4 -897.4 -897.4 -826.3 -826.3 -826.3 -845.0 -845.0 -845.0
1,436 1,436 1,436 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360
0.200.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21
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Table 3.5.: Results of multinomial models predicting the average marginal effects on the probability of companies to match with respectively cross-border VC 
firms, branch VC firms and domestic VC firms 
 
(D) marks the dummy variables; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
 
Average marginal effects (%)
PC information asymmetry
     Seed stage (D) 8.3 ** -7.0 ** -1.4 5.1 -3.9 -1.1 4.7 -3.8 -0.9
     First investment round (D) 17.3 *** -14.8 *** -2.5 4.7 -3.3 1.4 9.9 *** -7.8 *** -2.1
     Patents -0.7 0.8 ** -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 ** -0.2
Co-investor origin
     Synd_Domestic (D) -11.3 *** 10.5 *** 0.8
     Synd_Branch (D) -7.5 ** 7.9 ** -0.4
     Synd_Cross-Border_only (D) -10.4 5.1 5.3 -1.4 -3.2 4.6
     Synd_Domestic_only (D) 6.3 ** -5.0 * -1.3
Co-investor resources
     Syndication size -1.5 *** 1.3 *** 0.2 -2.7 *** 2.4 *** 0.3
     Experience spillovers supply -2.2 *** 1.9 *** 0.3
Control variables
     Experience spillovers demand -0.8 0.5 0.3
     Focal VC’s experience -0.1 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** -0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 ***
     # of VC investments (x10^3) -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 -0.1
     PC industry (D)
     First investment year (D)









0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20






















Branch VC Domestic VC
Included Included Included
Included IncludedIncluded Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
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3.4.3.3. Post hoc analyses 
In order to gain more fine-grained insights into the dynamics of the drivers of the mutual matching process, we 
reran models 3, 4, 7 and 8 on subsamples divided based upon the development stage of the companies in Tables 
3.6. and 3.7.: seed stage versus other investment stages. As a result, Models 9 (13) and 10 (14) are identical to 
Model 3 (7) except that Models 9 and 13 use a subsample consisting only of seed stage companies while Models 
10 and 14 a subsample of only non-seed stage companies. In the same vein, Models 11 (15) and 12 (16) are 
identical as Model 4 (8) except that Models 11 and 15 use a subsample consisting only of seed stage companies 
while Models 12 and 16 a subsample of only non-seed stage companies. 
While the results of the non-seed stage company subsample models (Models 10 and 14) are almost identical to 
the full sample models from the investor’s perspective (Model 3 and 7), the results of the seed company 
subsample models (Model 9 and 13) differ in several ways. In what follows, we will focus on these differences. 
First, the negative (p < .10) and positive (p < .05) coefficient on patents is significant in the models comparing 
respectively focal cross-border as opposed to focal branch VC firms and focal branch VC firms as opposed to 
focal domestic VC firms. Only the average marginal effect of focal branch VC firms on patents is, however 
significant (4.0%; p < .05). Model 9 further shows that while, compared to focal domestic VC firms, the relative 
probability that focal cross-border VC firms match with a seed stage company increases if at least one domestic 
VC (p < .01) or branch VC firm (p < .01) co-invests, it decreases for seed stage companies when only cross-
border VC firms (p < .01) co-invest. Moreover, compared to focal branch VC firms, the relative probability that 
focal cross-border VC firms match with a seed stage company also decreases (p < .01) if only cross-border VC 
firms co-invest. The average marginal effects in Model 13 imply that a typical seed stage company has a 17.8% 
(p < .05) lower and a 15.9% (p < .01) higher probability to match with respectively a focal domestic and a focal 
cross-border VC firm if at least one domestic VC firm co-invests. Similarly, a typical seed stage company has a 
22.5% (p < .01) lower and 18.1% (p < .01) higher probability to match with respectively a domestic and a cross-
border VC firm when at least one branch VC firm co-invests. Finally, while seed stage companies have a 
108.5% (p < .01) and 18.7% (p < .05) higher probability to match with respectively focal domestic and focal 
branch VC firms when only cross-border VC firms co-invest, they have a 127.2% (p < .01) lower probability to 
match with a cross-border VC firm. Compared to the full sample models, the syndication size is no longer 
significant in the seed stage Models 9 and 13. In contrast, the experience spill over supply variable stays positive 
and significant (p < .05) in the model comparing focal cross-border and focal domestic VC firms. The average 
marginal effect of experience spill overs supply in Model 13 is however no longer significant for focal domestic 
VC firms, but stays positive and significant (2.0%; p < .05) for focal cross-border VC firms. The models on the 
seed stage company sample provide evidence that the focal cross-border VC firms are more strict when 
evaluating seed stage companies compared to non-seed stage companies. More specifically, while the number of 
co-investors has no impact on their probability to invest, the characteristics (i.e. co-investor experience and 
origin) of the co-investors are more important when making the investment decision. 
In the same way as from the investor’s perspective, the results of the non-seed stage company subsample models 
(Models 12 and 16) from the company’s perspective are almost identical to the full sample models (Model 4 and 
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8). The results of the seed company subsample models (Model 11 and 15) however, again differ in several ways. 
Consequently, we will focus mainly on the differences with the full sample models. First, the negative (p < .10) 
and positive (p < .05) coefficients on patents are significant in the models comparing respectively focal cross-
border as opposed to focal branch VC firms and focal branch VC firms as opposed to focal domestic VC firms. 
Moreover, the coefficient on patents is no longer significant in the model comparing the relative probability to 
match of focal cross-border and focal domestic VC firms. Only the average marginal effect of focal branch VC 
firms on patents is significant (3.3%; p < .01). Model 11 further shows that while, compared to focal domestic 
VC firms, the relative probability that focal cross-border VC firms match with a seed stage company is no 
longer significantly impacted when only domestic VC firms co-invest, the relative probability that focal cross-
border VC firms match with a seed stage company decreases when only cross-border VC firms (p < .01) co-
invest. Moreover, compared to focal branch VC firms, the relative probability that focal cross-border VC firms 
match with a seed stage company also decreases (p < .01) if only cross-border VC firms co-invest. The average 
marginal effects in Model 15 imply that while a typical seed stage company has a 143.5% (p < .01) and 17.6% 
(p < .01) higher probability to match with respectively focal domestic and focal branch VC firms when only 
cross-border VC firms co-invest, they have a 161.0% (p < .01) lower probability to match with a focal cross-
border VC firm. Compared to the full sample, the syndication size is no longer significant in the seed stage 
subsample model comparing the relative probability to match of focal branch VC firms as opposed to focal 
domestic VC firms. Consequently, the average marginal effect of syndication size is no longer significant for 
focal domestic VC firms in Model 15. Similarly to the investor’s perspective, the results show that seed stage 
companies put more importance to which VC firms they target given their available resource base. More 




Table 3.6.: Post hoc analysis: multinomial models predicting the relative probability of companies to match with domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms or 
branch VC firms on a sample split by seed versus non-seed stage companies 
 






     First investment round (D) -0.704 -1.153 0.449 -0.137 0.138 -0.276 -1.604 ** -1.601 -0.003 -0.453 ** 0.019 -0.472
     Patents 0.466 -0.715 * 1.181 ** 0.012 0.107 -0.095 0.041 -0.864 * 0.906 ** 0.033 * 0.115 -0.082
Co-investor origin
     Synd_Domestic (D) 2.215 *** 1.256 0.959 0.669 ** 0.228 0.441
     Synd_Branch (D) 2.579 *** 0.867 1.713 0.526 ** 0.585 -0.059
     Synd_Cross-Border_only (D) -16.800 *** -18.550 *** 1.748 0.595 -0.572 1.167 -18.850 *** -19.780 *** 0.925 -0.029 -0.876 0.847
     Synd_Domestic_only (D) -0.347 0.364 -0.711 -0.413 * -0.225 -0.188
Co-investor resources
     Syndication size 0.053 0.099 -0.046 0.128 *** 0.053 0.075 0.263 * 0.144 0.119 0.188 *** 0.074 0.115 *
     Experience spillovers supply 0.271 ** 0.300 -0.029 0.134 *** 0.034 0.100
Control variables
     Experience spillovers demand 0.226 * -0.233 0.459 * 0.004 0.007 -0.003
     Focal VC’s experience 0.007 *** -0.001 0.008 ** 0.005 *** -0.002 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.004 *** -0.002 *** 0.006 ***
     # of VC investments (x10^3) -0.069 -0.044 -0.024 0.032 0.047 -0.015 0.001 -0.042 0.043 0.031 0.042 -0.012
     PC industry (D)
     First investment year (D)
     PC country (D)
Constant -3.757 * 0.963 -4.720 * -3.010 *** -0.377 -2.633 *** -2.145 3.567 -5.713 * -1.841 *** 0.167 -2.008 ***
Observations
Log likelihood
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.200.40 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.33 0.33
1,095 1,095 1,095
-96.8 -96.8 -96.8 -697.7 -697.7 -697.7 -107.2 -107.2 -107.2 -708.6 -708.6 -708.6
265 265 265 1,095 1,095 1,095 265 265 265
Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC Domestic VC Branch VC Domestic VC





















Seed stage companies Non-seed companies Seed stage companies Non-seed companies
Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
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Table 3.7.: Post hoc analysis: multinomial models predicting the average marginal effects on the probability of companies to match with respectively cross-
border VC firms, branch VC firms and domestic VC firms on a sample split by seed versus non-seed stage companies 
 
(D) marks the dummy variables; *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Average marginal effects (%)
PC information asymmetry
     First investment round (D) 3.4 -5.6 2.2 2.9 -1.3 -1.6 12.5 * -13.6 ** 1.2 7.7 ** -5.4 * -2.2
     Patents -6.7 2.6 4.0 ** 0.3 0.4 -0.7 -3.0 -0.3 3.3 *** 0.0 0.6 ** -0.6
Co-investor origin
     Synd_Domestic (D) -17.8 ** 15.9 *** 1.9 -10.0 ** 8.4 ** 1.6
     Synd_Branch (D) -22.5 *** 18.1 *** 4.5 -6.0 7.4 ** -1.5
     Synd_Cross-Border_only (D) 108.5 *** -127.2 *** 18.7 ** -12.5 5.9 6.6 143.5 *** -161.0 *** 17.6 *** -3.6 -2.1 5.7
     Synd_Domestic_only (D) 4.8 -2.4 -2.4 5.9 -5.4 * -0.4
Co-investor resources
     Syndication size -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -1.9 *** 1.6 *** 0.2 -2.4 2.1 * 0.2 -2.8 *** 2.4 *** 0.4
     Experience spillovers supply -1.7 2.0 ** -0.3 -2.1 *** 1.7 ** 0.4
Control variables
     Experience spillovers demand -3.1 ** 1.6 1.5 * 0.0 0.1 0.0
     Focal VC’s experience -0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 ** -0.1 *** 0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 *** 0.0 *** 0.0 ***
     # of VC investments (x10^3) 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.1
     PC industry (D)
     First investment year (D)




Seed stage companies Non-seed companies Seed stage companies Non-seed companies
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
-107.2 -107.2 -107.2 -708.6 -708.6 -708.6
265 265 1,095
-96.8 -96.8 -96.8 -697.7 -697.7 -697.7
265 265 265 1,095 1,095
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.200.40 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.21 0.21
1,095 265 1,095 1,095
Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Included Included Included Included Included








Included Included Included Included
Branch VC









3.4.3.4. Robustness analyses 
Additional models of Model 3 and 7 were fitted to test for the robustness of our findings and assess the strength 
of alternative explanations. Alternative co-investor spill over variables are incorporated, that could not be 
included in the main models due to high correlations with the experience spill overs supply variable. First, co-
investors’ general experience spill overs supply variable is substituted with respectively their country specific 
experience, stage specific experience and IPO experience spill overs from the supply perspective, together with 
the focal VC firm’s respective control variable focal VC’s country specific experience, focal VC’s stage specific 
experience and focal VC’s IPO experience instead of its focal VC’s (general) experience. Next, the total number 
of VC investments worldwide is replaced by the total amount of VC money raised worldwide in all models. All 
main results remained unchanged. 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion 
While VC firms increasingly invest across borders (Cumming and Dai, 2010), this geographic expansion 
impacts the mutual sorting process between VC firms (i.e. the supply side) and companies (i.e. the demand 
side). From a supply perspective, international expansion confronts VC investors with LOF (Wright et al., 
2005). From a demand perspective, it provides companies access to international VC firms’ specific resources. 
The goal of this paper is to study the differences in the drivers of the mutual matching process between 
companies - with specific characteristics - and respectively domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms. On the 
one hand, we argue that international VC firms use different investment strategies to mitigate LOF. They may 
focus on specific characteristics of the investment targets, leverage syndicate partners or use structural strategies 
such as investing from a local branch office. On the other hand, entrepreneurs adopt a life cycle approach to 
identify their company’s resource needs - given its development stage - and target specific VC firms who can 
provide access to the identified resource gaps. 
We show that, in the European VC market, cross-border VC firms have a lower probability of matching with 
informationally opaque firms, consistent with VC firms’ behaviour in emerging economies (Dai et al., 2012). 
This finding is non-trivial as, compared to emerging markets, LOF are expected to be much lower in developed 
markets such as Europe. Interestingly, including co-investor variables from the investor’s perspective shows that 
having local syndicate partners, more syndicate partners or more experienced co-investors allows cross-border 
VC firms to broaden their investment strategy and to invest in more informationally opaque firms. The 
probability of cross-border VC firm investment increases when local VC firms, larger investment syndicates and 
more experienced VC firms co-invest. In addition, no significant economic effects were found for branch VC 
firms. Including co-investor variables from the company’s perspective instead of from the investor’s perspective 
shows that less developed companies - holding fewer patents and being in their first investment round - have a 
higher likelihood to match with domestic VC firms as opposed to cross-border VC firms. This finding supports 
the resource-based view on the matching viewed from the entrepreneur’s side. Moreover, contradicting our 
hypothesis, companies in which only domestic VC firms co-invest have a higher probability to attract additional 
domestic VC firms as opposed to cross-border VC firms. We also found no significant impact of having only 
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cross-border VC co-investors on the probability to match with local VC firms. Both unexpected results however 
disappear when splitting the sample in seed and non-seed stage, thereby further underlining that entrepreneurs 
follow a life cycle approach when evaluating which VC to attract. Entrepreneurs assess their companies’ 
resource gaps at each stage of the companies’ life cycle and consequently target VC investors with specific 
geographic origins based upon the required resources. In the same way as the supply perspective, no significant 
average marginal effects were found for branch VC firms. 
Post hoc analyses on subsamples separating seed from non-seed companies further underline the life cycle 
nature of the matching process. First, syndication size is not a significant determinant in the matching of seed 
companies with VC firms of different origins. Second, a seed stage company in which only cross-border VC 
firms co-invest has a lower probability to match with other cross-border VC firms and a higher probability to 
match with a domestic or a branch VC firm. Having only cross-border co-investors does not impact the 
probability of matching with a specific type of VC investor in other companies, however. These results are in 
line with our hypothesis: given its early development stage, a seed stage company needs tighter monitoring and 
closer interaction with its investors to shape its opportunity and to develop early organizational resources and 
routines. Local investors, including both domestic and branch VC investors, perform better in this phase as their 
geographic, legal and cultural distance with their PC is smaller and their local institutional knowledge is higher. 
In contrast to later stage companies, seed stage companies put more importance to which VC firms they target 
given their available resource base. These findings strongly support life cycle approach we take on the resource-
based view. 
We extend previous literature by showing that local branches of VC firms are less prone to LOF and hence 
present an interesting strategy for international VC firms to overcome LOF. First, branch VC firms invest in the 
same type of companies as domestic VC firms, irrespective of potential syndicate partners, but they preferably 
target companies with more patents when investing in seed stage companies. Second, cross-border VC firms 
consider branch VC firms as equally appealing to overcome LOF, as the effects of syndicating with at least one 
domestic VC firm or branch VC firm are the equally positive. Having a local presence is hence an effective way 
to overcome LOF. Moreover, we further contribute to extant literature by displaying that the local knowledge 
and value adding capabilities of branch VC firms are acknowledged by PCs. More specifically, our results 
indicate that seed stage companies who have only cross-border VC firms have a higher probability to attract a 
branch VC firms or a domestic VC firm. 
As such, this study provides more fine grained insights in what the different drivers of the matching process 
between companies and respectively domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms are. From a supply 
perspective, cross-border VC firms mitigate their LOF and expand their investment options through syndicate 
partners. From a demand perspective, entrepreneurs aim to tailor their companies’ resource base given the 
resources at hand and the ones needed to facilitate future company development. Finally, we show how setting 
up a local branch allows to act as a domestic VC firm both from a supply as from a demand perspective.  
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As with all research, this study has limitations. First, although we estimate separate models for the supply and 
the demand perspective, the realization of a match is always the result of both the investor’s and the 
entrepreneur’s preferences. We are hence unable to fully disentangle both perspectives. In the same vein, we are 
unable to determine the relative importance of the agency theory and resource-based view as drivers of the 
results. Second, although we investigate the different strategies behind the matching process, we do not 
investigate the impact of these strategies on the investment outcome. We hence are unable to acknowledge 
whether these strategies are beneficial. Third, our sample is limited to the European VC market. This may limit 
the generalizability of our results as for instance LOF faced by cross-border VC firms may differ between 
developed and emerging VC markets (Chemmanur et al., 2012). Moreover, companies established in countries 
with large internal markets such as the U.S. may not need to internationalize and as a result foreign VC firms’ 
resources. Nevertheless, given that large-scale studies on the investment behaviour of international VC firms are 
limited to emerging markets (Chemmanur et al., 2012; Dai et al., 2012) and that the demand perspective has not 
yet been thoroughly investigated, our study provides an interesting contribution to extant literature. We show 
that from the investor’s perspective, PC information opacity is a lower concern in our setting compared to the 
emerging markets setting, but highlight that syndicate partners also play an important role in alleviating LOF. It 
would be interesting to understand whether being locally present through a branch VC firm in emerging markets 
allows to alleviate LOF to the same extent as in our more developed VC setting. Fourth, our large scale study 
prevents to provide a more fine grained insight in the matching processes used by VC firms to mitigate LOF or 
by entrepreneurs to obtain the required resources. For example, understanding how the PCs’ board activities are 
impacted when a cross-border VC firm enters – with or without local syndicate partner – or understanding the 
interaction between cross-border VC firms and their co-investors provide interesting avenues for future 
research. Fifth, extremely industry specialized VC investors could be especially interesting for entrepreneurial 
companies as they could have lower LOF. Unfortunately we do not have the data to control for the industry 
experience of the VC investors. Finally, a representative sample containing companies that have tried but failed 
to raise domestic, cross-border and branch VC, together with information on domestic, cross-border and branch 
VC firms that were interested in a company but failed to invest, would help to analyse more accurately the 
matching process. 
Despite these limitations, the present study provides valuable insights to VC investors and high-tech 
entrepreneurs. Our research contributes to the VC practitioners as it shows that different geographical focuses 
may have a significant impact on their investment strategy. Moreover, we provide further evidence that 
entrepreneurs in their search for finance should carefully evaluate the potential investors and target investors 
that match their own and the investors’ needs. Finally, entrepreneurs should realize that their company’s 
resource need evolves with the development stage of the company. Entrepreneurs should hence continuously 
reassess their company’s resource base and the resource need, and target specific VC investors if the current 
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This paper studies how the presence of cross-border as opposed to domestic venture capital (VC) investors is 
associated with the growth of portfolio companies (PCs). For this purpose, we use a longitudinal research 
design and track sales, total assets and payroll expenses in 761 European technology companies from the year 
of initial VC investment up to seven years thereafter. Findings demonstrate how companies initially backed by 
domestic VC investors exhibit higher growth in the short term compared to companies backed by cross-border 
investors. In the medium term, companies initially backed by cross-border VC investors exhibit higher growth 
compared to companies backed by domestic investors. Finally, companies that are initially funded by a 
syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border VC investors exhibit the highest growth. Overall, this 
study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the role that domestic and cross-border VC investors can 
play as their PCs grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time. 
4.1. Introduction 
The venture capital (VC) industry has long been a local industry (Cumming and Dai, 2010), with geographic 
proximity to investment targets deemed necessary to locate and evaluate them (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and 
to efficiently provide post-investment monitoring and value adding services (Sapienza et al., 1996; Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2006). Nevertheless, the last decade has witnessed a strong growth in the international flows of VC 
worldwide (Alhorr et al., 2008; Meuleman and Wright, 2011). Driven by increased competition in a maturing 
industry, VC investors have more intensively searched for investment opportunities outside their home regions. 
Moreover, broad-scale economic integration policies in the European Union have further contributed to 
increasing the speed of internationalization of the European VC industry (Alhorr et al., 2008).  
So far, scholars have primarily focused on the drivers of the VC internationalization process at the macro or 
industry level (e.g., Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Alhorr et al., 2008; Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009; Guler and 
Guillén, 2010a) and the strategies deployed by VC investors to overcome liabilities of distance and liabilities of 
foreignness (e.g., Cumming and Macintosh, 2001; Wright et al., 2002; Pruthi et al., 2003; Bruton et al., 2005; 
Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Pruthi et al., 2009; Guler and Guillén, 2010b; Lu and Hwang, 2010; Meuleman and 
Wright, 2011). Despite increasing interest in the VC internationalization process, research on the impact of 
cross-border VC investors on the growth of PCs is scarce. Cross-border VC investors are defined as investors 
that manage the investment from another country than the one in which the PC started its operations (Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2005). The research question we address in this paper is: How does the presence of cross-border, as 
opposed to domestic VC investors, relateto the growth of PCs? 
This question is non-trivial as, compared to domestic VC investors, cross-border VC investors might spur as 
well as constrain the growth of their PCs. Cross-border investors may contribute to the internationalization and 
hence to a stronger growth of their PCs by sharing their knowledge pertaining to internationalization and 
international markets (Fernhaber et al., 2009; Lutz and George, 2012) and by legitimizing the unknown 
company in their home market (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Hursti and Maula, 2007). Nevertheless, cross-border 
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VC investors may also constrain company growth. First, they may drive internationalization efforts of the 
company towards the investor’s home market, which is not always the company’s target market (Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2005). Second, they stop active contribution to their PCs much earlier than domestic VC investors when 
the prospects of companies have fallen (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). Prior studies show that while the probability 
of a successful exit is lower when VC investors invest across borders, it increases when distant VC investors 
syndicate with domestic VC investors (Chemmanur et al., 2012; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Moser, 2010). These 
studies, however, provide few insights into how different investors influence the growth of their PCs between 
investment and exit. Moreover, a successful exit from the perspective of VC investors is not necessarily 
successful from the perspective of entrepreneurs or their PCs (Gompers, 1996). 
This paper aims to compare the growth of young technology-based companies based on the location of their 
shareholders. Specifically, we distinguish between companies backed by domestic VC investors, by cross-
border VC investors, and by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border VC investors. We draw 
upon the resource-based view of the firm theory to build a life cycle model on the association between the 
geographic origin of VC investors and PC growth. We hereby address the call by Zahra and colleagues (2007) 
to develop a more complete understanding of the role played by different VC investors as their PCs develop.  
Given the liabilities of newness and the lack of resources that young technology companies face (Vohora et al., 
2004), a young company in the early phases of its technical and organizational development is more likely to 
require a higher level of involvement by a VC investor than a company at a later stage (Gupta and Sapienza, 
1992). We hence hypothesize that companies backed by domestic VC investors will initially exhibit higher 
growth compared to companies exclusively backed by cross-border VC investors, as value added from domestic 
investors will benefit them most in this early stage (Lockett et al., 2008). As companies age, the international 
knowledge, networks and reputation of cross-border VC investors will assist their internationalization, enabling 
a higher later stage growth. We further expect that companies raising VC from both domestic and cross-border 
VC investors will exhibit the highest growth rates, as they combine the complementary benefits of “localness” 
and of “foreignness”. 
We use a sample of 761 technology-based companies from seven European countries that received initial VC 
between 1994 and 2004, and track sales, total assets and payroll expenses in these companies from the year of 
initial VC investment up to seven years after the investment. Random coefficient modelling is used as an 
appropriate longitudinal technique to model the dynamic nature of growth over time (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002; 
Holcomb et al., 2010). We find broad support for our hypotheses.  
Our research contributes to the VC and entrepreneurship literature. We argue that the resource needs of 
companies change over time, and show that different types of VC investors may address different resource 
needs. Domestic VC investors are better at supporting a company in its early growth, while the resources of a 
cross-border VC investor are especially valuable in a later phase when international expansion becomes more 
important. Hence, we provide a life cycle perspective on the resources VC investors may provide to their PCs. 
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We furthermore show that bundling the diverse resources from different types of VC investors allows 
overcoming the shortcomings of one particular type of investor. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background and develops 
hypotheses on the role of domestic and cross-border VC investors in PC growth. Section 3 describes the 
research method. Section 4 presents the main research findings. Finally, section 5 concludes by discussing the 
results from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
4.2. Theory and Hypotheses  
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) defines a company as a collection of resources and states that the 
characteristics of the available resources affect the competitive advantage and thereby the growth of a company 
(Penrose, 1958; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Barney, 1991). Companies that possess more valuable, scarce, 
unique and imperfectly mobile resources are expected to outperform their resource-constrained peers and 
exhibit higher growth over time (Barney, 1991; Chandler and Hanks, 1994; Cooper et al., 1994). While high-
tech companies are often based upon proprietary technological know-how, essential resources such as physical 
capital, human capital, financial capital or organizational resources may be lacking (Heirman and Clarysse, 
2004; Clarysse et al., 2007; Lockett et al., 2008). A major challenge of a company is hence to identify and 
acquire a relevant initial resource base (Penrose, 1958). While early resource-based scholars deemed it 
important to acquire or develop essential resources within the boundaries of an organization, later researchers 
have shown that companies may strongly benefit from the resource base of partner organizations (Lee et al., 
2001; De Clercq and Dimov, 2008; Lockett et al., 2008; Bruneel et al., 2010).  
VC investors are important by providing not only well-needed financial resources, but also intangible resources 
such as knowledge, access to networks and legitimacy (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza, et al. 1996; Fernhaber, et al. 
2009). Through monitoring and governance activities, they actively foster the growth of their PCs (Carpenter et 
al., 2003; Vanaelst et al., 2006). Companies can hence spur their growth through access to valuable intangible 
resources and capabilities provided by VC investors. Not all VC investors provide comparable resources, 
however. Compared to domestic VC investors, cross-border VC investors provide their PCs with more specific 
resources to grow internationally (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005, 2006). Hence, getting VC from cross-border 
investors may impact PCs differently compared to getting VC from domestic investors only.  
In what follows we elaborate on the processes that explain why different configurations of initial VC investors 
will relate differently to company growth over time. We hereby take a life cycle point of view, acknowledging 
that the needs of high-tech companies may change as they develop (Vohora et al., 2004; Zahra et al., 2006; 
Lockett et al., 2008). We argue that PCs first have to refine their opportunities based on market feedback and 
put essential initial resources into place before they can enter a next phase in which they strive to achieve 
sustainable returns through market development. There are at least two reasons why we focus on the role of 
initial providers of VC in the subsequent growth of their PCs. First, it is difficult to separate the influence of 
later-round investors from first-round investors (Sorensen, 2007). For example, although later-round cross-
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border VC investors may influence subsequent PC growth, the ability of the PC to attract later-round cross-
border VC investors may also reflect the value adding of the initial domestic VC investor. Second, by focusing 
on the initial providers of VC we minimise selection issues. Indeed, Bertoni et al. (2011) show that value adding 
effects have a large economic impact immediately after the initial investment, while the economic impact of 
selection is more modest.  
4.2.1. The role of domestic VC investors in a company’s early growth phase  
Young high-tech companies face liabilities of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Baum and 
Silverman, 2004) driven by an incomplete resource base, including a lack of organizational routines, networks, 
legitimacy in the marketplace and managerial expertise (Stuart et al., 1999; Vohora et al., 2004). Identifying and 
shaping new opportunities and subsequently investing in the resource base needed to pursue these opportunities 
are considered to be the “hallmark of entrepreneurial capabilities” (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006: 199). Given 
their experience and involvement in multiple companies, VC investors are instrumental in advancing their PCs 
by assisting in shaping the opportunity, acquiring essential resources and developing organizational capabilities 
(Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). We argue that domestic VC investors will be more valuable in the initial growth 
phase than cross-border VC investors and hence that PCs backed by domestic VC investors will initially exhibit 
superior growth compared to companies backed by cross-border VC investors. 
The challenges of early stage high-tech companies are compounded by the fact that they often operate in 
complex and highly volatile environments (Stuart et al., 1999). This makes that the opportunities, initially 
identified in the prestart-up phase, have to be tested in the market and redefined depending on feedback received 
from different parties including potential customers (Vohora et al., 2004; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Based on 
newly acquired knowledge, early stage high-tech companies thus have to continuously re-assess their key 
strategies (Vohora et al., 2004; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). For example, early market feedback enables 
entrepreneurs to evaluate and reassess initial ideas, hereby addressing weaknesses and deficiencies in the initial 
offering of services and/or products to the market (Vohora et al., 2004). Consequently, the early growth phase is 
one of continuous experimentation with the opportunity including product specification, market framing and 
defining marketing strategies. This entails a continuous search for feedback, followed by a repackaging of 
opportunities, before attaining a sustainable return phase (Vohora et al., 2004).  
Next to clearly defining the opportunity and value creation model, the initial resource base has to be developed 
and organizational knowledge, capabilities and routines have to be shaped (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Arthurs 
and Busenitz, 2006; Zahra et al., 2006). Critical early resource acquisition activities include purchasing 
materials, buying or renting facilities and equipment and hiring employees (Newbert, 2005). These are 
necessary to pursue the opportunity and implement a value-creating strategy (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). 
Since the resources of young high-tech companies are limited at start-up, they continuously need to identify, 
acquire and integrate resources in their organization and subsequently re-configure those resources during the 
early start-up and initial growth phase (Vohora et al., 2004; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006).  
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VC investors influence the opportunity shaping and resource acquisition processes by providing contacts to 
relevant external parties for soliciting feedback and by critically reassessing initial ideas based on this feedback 
(Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). We expect that domestic VC investors are better positioned to assist their PCs in 
developing these early strategic processes than cross-border VC investors. Geographical distance and investing 
across boundaries creates an information disadvantage and makes it more difficult to monitor companies closely 
(Dai et al., 2012). Telecommunication technology does not substitute yet for local presence and face-to-face 
contacts (Frisch and Schilder, 2008). Moreover, cross-border VC investors have been found to devote less time 
to their PCs due to higher transaction costs (Frisch and Schilder, 2008). In addition they stop investing more 
promptly if their PCs fail to meet expectations (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). Distance hence makes that cross-
border VC investors are less closely involved with their PCs. This is especially detrimental in the early 
development stage where VC input is likely to be especially beneficial to shape the opportunity, acquire early 
resources and develop organizational routines. Worst case, cross-border VC investors stop the financial support 
prematurely, which impacts technology-based companies’ growth significantly as they typically require high 
upfront investments to develop their technology and products prior to sales generation.  
Furthermore, in contrast to domestic investors, who initially direct the PCs to domestic and nearby markets 
which may be easier and faster to conquer, cross-border VC investors may push PCs to pursue foreign markets 
which may be more difficult and slower to conquer (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005).  
Finally, domestic VC investors have a more fine-grained understanding of the legal and institutional 
environment in which the PC initially operates. As the interaction of new companies with the local environment 
is especially important to secure vital early resources, domestic VC investors are expected to be able to provide 
more valuable and relevant advice to their PCs in the early development phase. Altogether, young early stage 
high-tech companies will initially benefit more from domestic VC investors compared to cross-border VC 
investors, leading to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: PCs that raise initial finance from domestic VC investors initially exhibit higher growth 
compared to companies that raise initial finance exclusively from cross-border VC investors.  
4.2.2. The role of cross-border VC investors in a company’s later growth phase  
Once an entrepreneurial opportunity has been refined and initial resources have been put in place, high-tech 
companies enter a new phase in which they strive to attain sustainable returns through market development 
(Vohora et al., 2004). High-tech companies often have a narrow product scope based on a technology that may 
quickly become obsolete and for which the domestic market size is limited (Litvak, 1990; McDougall et al., 
1994; Coviello and Munro, 1995; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Sapienza et al., 2006; Lutz and George, 2012). 
This forces high-tech companies to internationalize, especially in the European context where domestic markets 
are typically too small to reach a minimum efficient scale (Litvak, 1990; McDougall et al., 1994; Coviello and 
Munro, 1995; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Bruneel et al., 2010). The use of resources and the sale of outputs in 
multiple countries is hence critical for their further growth (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994).  
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Compared to operating in domestic markets, expanding internationally entails costs that result from 
unfamiliarity with the foreign markets and from political, cultural and economic differences between foreign 
markets and the home market, causing liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995; Dai et al., 2012). These liabilities 
of foreignness are especially difficult to overcome for young technology-based companies, as they often miss 
the resources and capabilities to deal with international expansion (Clarysse et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2007). 
Both internal employees and external board members with varied skills and experiences in international markets 
may provide useful connections to existing institutions, companies and networks in target foreign markets 
(Fernhaber et al., 2009).  
Cross-border VC investors may facilitate the growth of their PCs (Dai et al., 2012; Lutz and George, 2012) by 
limiting their liabilities of foreignness. First, cross-border VC investors may provide access to complementary 
knowledge-based resources in their country of origin; these would typically be unavailable to companies that 
raise finance exclusively from domestic VC investors. For instance, cross-border VC investors may be 
particularly able to provide their PCs with knowledge and information about foreign legal and business issues 
(Mäkelä and Maula, 2005).  
Second, cross-border VC investors may provide access to their international network, allowing companies to 
make contact with relevant foreign suppliers, customers, financiers, key executives and other potential 
stakeholders (Sapienza et al., 1996; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). These relationships are likely to foster the growth 
of PCs (Yli-Renko et al., 2002). Networks in foreign markets may also increase the ability of PCs to identify 
new opportunities, which is expected to further enhance company growth (McDougall et al., 1994; Mäkelä and 
Maula, 2005).  
Finally, the mere fact of having a cross-border VC investor may provide endorsement benefits (Stuart et al., 
1999; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). More specifically, cross-border VC investors are likely to legitimate their PCs 
in foreign markets, which is expected to benefit them when they need to mobilize resources from these markets 
(Hursti and Maula, 2007). The arguments above lead to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: PCs that raise initial finance from at least one cross-border VC investor exhibit higher growth in 
a later stage compared to companies that raise initial finance exclusively from domestic VC investors.  
4.2.3. Combining domestic and cross-border VC investors 
We further claim that combining domestic with cross-border VC investors will be most beneficial for PC 
growth. We expect that PCs financed through a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border VC 
investors will exhibit higher growth rates than PCs that are financed only by cross-border or by domestic VC 
investors.  
Partnerships between cross-border and domestic VC investors provide PCs access to a broader and 
complementary knowledge and resource base (Brander et al., 2002; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008; Dai et al., 2012). 
Domestic VC investors may have a better knowledge of local market conditions and provide better access to 
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local resources. As they are confronted with lower transaction costs, they may allocate more time to monitoring 
their local PCs (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). Conversely, cross-border VC investors provide knowledge, 
networks and legitimacy that are particularly relevant in foreign markets. They may provide knowledge about 
foreign and legal issues (Dai et al., 2012), help in opening doors to foreign customers, suppliers, business 
partners and financiers (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Lutz and George, 2012), endorse the PC in an international 
context (Stuart et al., 1999; Mäkelä and Maula, 2005) and hence help to reduce the liabilities of foreignness 
(Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). Cross-border and domestic VC investors thus offer complementary resources, 
increasing the resources, skills and information available for the monitoring and decision making of the PCs 
(Jääskeläinen, 2012). 
We therefore expect that PCs in which cross-border and domestic VC investors form a syndicate will 
outperform those in which only domestic or only cross-border VC investors invest. This leads to the final 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: PCs initially backed by a syndicate of domestic and cross-border VC investors exhibit higher 
growth rates than PCs backed exclusively by either domestic or cross-border VC investors. 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Sample and Data 
Data were collected through the VICO project
14
 (See chapter 2 for the description of the VICO sample), which 
is a multi-country project on the financing of entrepreneurial companies in Europe. Table 4.1. (Panel A) 
provides an overview of the 761 VC-backed companies in the sample by company founding period, first 
investment year, country and industry. The most important industry is the software industry (34%), followed by 
the biotech (18%) and the ICT industry (17%). Over 23% of the sample companies come from the U.K., 18% 
from Germany, 15% from France and 13% from Italy. Belgian companies represent 12% of the sample and 
Spanish and Finnish companies approximately 10%.  
  
                                                          
14
 The initial database VICO 1.0 including 761 VC-backed companies was used in this study. 
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Table 4.1.: Description of the sample 
    Panel A Panel B 








    Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Foundation period 
1984-1989 22 2.9 20 4.2 1 0.6 0 0.0 1 1.3 
1990-1994 95 12.5 68 14.2 16 9.4 4 11.4 7 9.1 
1995-1999 340 44.7 210 43.9 79 46.2 15 42.9 36 46.8 
2000-2004 304 39.9 180 37.7 75 43.9 16 45.7 33 42.9 
Year first investment  
1994 11 1.4 10 2.1 0 0.0 1 2.9 0 0.0 
1995 17 2.2 16 3.3 1 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1996 31 4.1 24 5.0 2 1.2 2 5.7 3 3.9 
1997 51 6.7 44 9.2 4 2.3 3 8.6 0 0.0 
1998 52 6.8 36 7.5 10 5.8 2 5.7 4 5.2 
1999 79 10.4 46 9.6 24 14.0 3 8.6 6 7.8 
2000 184 24.2 105 22.0 42 24.6 9 25.7 28 36.4 
2001 127 16.7 74 15.5 28 16.4 9 25.7 16 20.8 
2002 75 9.9 45 9.4 19 11.1 4 11.4 7 9.1 
2003 66 8.7 42 8.8 19 11.1 0 0.0 5 6.5 
2004 68 8.9 36 7.5 22 12.9 2 5.7 8 10.4 
Country 
Finland 69 9.1 60 12.6 4 2.3 0 0.0 5 6.5 
Spain 82 10.8 72 15.1 9 5.3 0 0.0 1 1.3 
Belgium 90 11.8 55 11.5 24 14.0 1 2.9 10 13.0 
Italy 98 12.9 72 15.1 10 5.8 11 31.4 5 6.5 
France 112 14.7 40 8.4 63 36.8 0 0.0 9 11.7 
Germany 134 17.6 81 16.9 18 10.5 14 40.0 21 27.3 
U.K. 176 23.1 98 20.5 43 25.1 9 25.7 26 33.8 
Industry 
Energy 3 0.4 1 0.2 2 1.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Robotics 16 2.1 14 2.9 2 1.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other R&D 23 3.0 18 3.8 4 2.3 0 0.0 1 1.3 
Pharmaceutical 26 3.4 17 3.6 6 3.5 1 2.9 2 2.6 
Web publishing 36 4.7 25 5.2 6 3.5 0 0.0 5 6.5 
TLC 44 5.8 24 5.0 12 7.0 4 11.4 4 5.2 
Internet 98 12.9 63 13.2 12 7.0 10 28.6 13 16.9 
ICT manufacturing 126 16.6 77 16.1 35 20.5 3 8.6 11 14.3 
Biotech 133 17.5 80 16.7 31 18.1 5 14.3 17 22.1 
Software 256 33.6 159 33.3 61 35.7 12 34.3 24 31.2 
                        





4.3.2. Variable definitions 
4.3.2.1. Dependent variables 
Prior growth studies are often criticized because they do not take into account the multidimensional nature of 
growth (Weinzimmer et al., 1998; Delmar et al., 2003). The classification of a company as a growing company 
largely depends on the growth concept used (Delmar et al., 2003). This study takes into account the 
multidimensional nature of growth by using multiple growth concepts. We track changes in sales, total assets 
and payroll expenses (all measured in thousands of Euros) from the year of initial VC investment up to seven 
years after the investment (whenever data is available).
15
 We refrain from using accounting-based indicators of 
profitability, which are inappropriate for young technology-based companies since most of these companies do 
not generate any profit during their first years of operations (Shane and Stuart, 2002).  
Sales, total assets and payroll expenses are the dependent variables as they are most commonly used growth 
concepts in empirical growth research (Delmar et al., 2003). Sales is often viewed as the most appropriate 
measure of company growth, since it applies to most companies and it is rather insensitive to capital intensity 
(Delmar et al., 2003). Sales is, however, not always a perfect indicator of growth. Especially in high-tech start-
ups, the accumulation of assets and employment rather than sales, lead the growth process (Delmar et al., 2003). 
We use payroll expenses instead of the number of employees as the former measure is highly correlated with the 
number of employees and has less missing data. 
4.3.2.2. Independent variables 
Independent variables capture the origin of the VC investors in the initial VC financing round. Companies 
backed by a single domestic investor serve as the base category against which all other companies are 
compared. In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, a dummy variable CBVC is constructed which takes the value of 
1 if a company raised VC from at least one cross-border VC investor. In order to test hypothesis 3, a second 
dummy variable, MIXED, takes the value of 1 if a syndicate of domestic and cross-border VC investors 
invested. If the results would indicate a stronger growth of companies backed by a mixed syndicate, however, 
this might either be explained by the difference in origin of the syndicate partners (as hypothesized) or merely 
by the broader resource base available through the VC syndicate (Manigart et al., 2006; Jääskeläinen, 2012). 
Therefore, a third dummy variable is added in order to disentangle the effects of the origin of VC investors from 
the effects of syndication. The dummy variable SYND takes the value of 1 if a company is backed by a syndicate 
comprising at least one domestic VC investor. Including this dummy allows comparing the growth of companies 




                                                          
15
 The timeframe of our study (seven years) covers the typical lifespan of VC investments which is between three and seven 
years. 
16
 We also developed count variables measuring the number of VC investors, rather than dummy variables. Results 
remained robust. As the use of dummy variables fits better with the theoretical arguments, we focus on the analyses with 
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4.3.2.3. Control variables 
We control for VC investor characteristics, industry effects, year effects, country effects and PC characteristics. 
For VC investor characteristics, we include VC investor age, measured as the difference between the investment 
year and founding year of the lead VC investor providing initial financing. This measure partially controls for 
the fact that older VC investors may have more experience and may have established a broader network in the 
VC community (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). We further control for the type of VC investor. VC investors are 
often affiliated with other organizations. These affiliations shape their strategies and objectives, which may 
influence the growth of their PCs. For instance, bank-related VC investors may invest in companies, for which 
they can then provide further financial services, including debt finance (Hellmann et al., 2008). We include four 
non-mutually exclusive dummy variables, which are equal to one when at least one VC investor that provides 
initial financing is respectively a bank-related investor, corporate investor, university-related investor, 
government-related investor, and zero otherwise. Independent VC investors serve as the reference category. 
The industries in which companies operate may significantly influence their growth patterns. We therefore 
include industry dummies in our models to control for potential industry effects. Industry classifications are 
based on 4 digit NACE codes retrieved from the Amadeus database. We also include year dummies for the wide 
variety of investment periods included in our sample. Such controls are important since companies may exhibit 
different growth patterns depending upon the investment period when they received their initial VC investment. 
We further include country dummies to control for potential country effects.  
For PC characteristics, we include PC age, measured as the difference between the year of the initial VC 
investment and company founding year, since it is well-established in the growth literature that age effects cause 
differences in growth patterns. We also control for the initial amount of finance raised by the PCs. This is 
important since companies that raise more finance are able to mobilize more strategic resources early-on, and as 
such these companies are likely to develop a competitive advantage over their resource-constrained peers (Lee 
et al., 2001). In order to control for the number of subsequent investments in the PC, we included a dynamic 
variable that captures the number of rounds the company has received. To control for possible differences in 
growth potential between companies, we include the intangible assets ratio, measured as the ratio of intangible 
assets to tangible assets. Prior research demonstrates that the ratio of intangible assets to tangible assets, as 
opposed to the absolute level of intangible assets, is a better predictor of growth potential (Villalonga, 2004). As 
an additional control for possible differences in growth potential between the PCs we included the number of 
patents applied for prior the initial investment and which were eventually granted. Companies use patents to 
signal their value and commercial potential to outside stakeholders, including VC investors (Hsu and Ziedonis, 
2008). Hence, the patent stock is likely to represent one important factor on which VC investors select. The 
patent stock at the year of first investment is computed with a 15% yearly decay rate for each company. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
the dummy variables in the remainder of the paper. For instance, it may be sufficient to have one domestic VC investor 
investing together with one cross-border VC investor to diminish the information asymmetries experienced by the latter. 
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There is obviously natural heterogeneity among companies in many extraneous variables besides our controls. 
Although these extraneous variables are not of any substantive interest, they might have an impact on the 
growth curve of companies. The strength of the longitudinal research design adopted in this paper is that any 
extraneous factors (regardless of whether they have been measured or not) that influence the growth of 
companies but whose influence is constant over time, are eliminated or blocked out as the size of companies is 
compared at several occasions (Fitzmaurice et al., 2004). 
4.3.3. Econometric approach  
Random Coefficient Modelling (RCM), also referred to as mixed modelling or growth modelling, is used as an 
appropriate longitudinal technique to study changes in sales, total assets and payroll expenses over time. Many 
of the standard statistical techniques, including Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, are not appropriate 
when data consist of repeated measures that are correlated within companies as it invalidates the basic 
assumption of independence (Fitzmaurice et al., 2004). In order to deal with longitudinal data, scholars have 
often used general multivariate regression models that require longitudinal data where all companies have the 
same number of repeated measures, taken at time points, which are also the same for all companies (Fitzmaurice 
et al., 2004). These strict assumptions are rarely fulfilled in longitudinal studies and are not required when using 
a RCM framework (Fitzmaurice et al., 2004). Recent applications of the RCM framework in the management 
and entrepreneurship literature are available (e.g., Bliese and Ployhart, 2002; Holcomb et al., 2010). 
It is conceptually convenient to depict RCM as multilevel models (Fitzmaurice et al., 2004). The multilevel 
perspective is most useful if one assumes that companies randomly vary in terms of their initial size and growth 
trajectory. We discuss two levels of equations. 
The first level in the hierarchy is the individual-level model, which specifies the nature of change for each 
individual company. The simplest model of individual company change is the straight-line (linear) growth 
model: 
DVij = β1i + β2i tij + eij (1) 
where DVij is the ith company’s sales, total assets or payroll expenses, at the jth time point. tij is a simple count 
measure representing the successive years after the initial VC investment (0, 1, 2, ..., 7) which is used to fit a 
linear trend to the ith company’s data across time. β1i and β2i are the company specific intercept and linear 
coefficient respectively. The values of the βs can vary among companies. The eij are the residuals. Equation (1) 
illustrates the flexibility of the RCM framework. Each company can have a different number of time points, data 
of each company may be measured at different times and each company can have a different growth trajectory 
(Fitzmaurice et al., 2004). RCM can also accommodate non-linear change. The simplest non-linear model is a 
quadratic model, which is specified by adding β3i tij² to equation (1): 
DVij = β1i + β2i tij + β3i tij² + eij (2) 
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Group-level models constitute the second level in the hierarchy. Though the above individual regression 
equations are informative, researchers are usually interested in group effects. Conceptually, the random change 
parameters from the individual-level model (e.g., β1i, β2i and β3i or company specific intercept, linear coefficient 
and quadratic coefficient respectively) are treated as response variables in a second set of models. Considering 
the quadratic individual change model (equation (2)), the group level equations are: 
β1i = β1 + b1i   (3) 
β2i = β2 + b2i  (4) 
β3i = β3 + b3i  (5) 
where β1, β2 and β3 are the fixed intercepts in the level 2 equations and thus the averages of the individual-level 
parameters. β1, β2 and β3 indicate the nature of change for the group as a whole, where β1 is the group mean 
intercept or mean initial sales, total assets or payroll expenses; β2 is the group mean linear change and β3 is the 
group mean quadratic change or curvature. The β’s are fixed effects, because they do not vary among 
companies. b1i, b2i and b3i are the level 2 residual terms reflecting individual company differences from the fixed 
effects. 
The unconditional RCM discussed above can be extended by incorporating predictors of change. The key 
predictors of change in this paper are the cross-border VC variable, the mixed syndication variable and the 
domestic syndication variable. These variables are all measured at the time of the initial investment. We 
examine whether the individual change parameters (β1i, β2i and β3i) vary as a function of cross-border VC 
involvement, mixed or domestic syndication. These predictors of change are static covariates which are 
incorporated in the group-level equations. Considering the individual-level quadratic change model (2) above, 
the group level equations studying change conditional on cross-border VC involvement and mixed or domestic 
syndication then become:  
β1i = β1 + β4 CBVCi + β5 MIXEDi + β6 SYNDi + b1i   (6) 
β2i = β2 + β7 CBVCi + β8 MIXEDi + β9 SYNDi + b2i  (7) 
β3i = β3 + β10 CBVCi + β11 MIXEDi + β12 SYNDi + b3i  (8) 
where CBVCi indicates whether cross-border VC was raised, MIXEDi if the first investment was syndicated 
with at least one cross-border and one domestic investor, and SYNDi indicates whether the first investment was 
syndicated with at least one domestic investor measured at the time of the initial VC investment for the i-th 
company. β4 represents the cross-border VC by intercept interaction and shows how the mean initial sales, total 
assets or payroll expenses of companies is dependent upon having cross-border VC. β7 is the cross-border VC 
by linear trend interaction and indicates how the mean linear trend in sales, total assets or payroll expenses is 
dependent upon the receipt of cross-border VC. β10 is the cross-border VC by quadratic trend interaction and 
indicates how curvature in sales, total assets or payroll expenses is dependent upon the receipt of cross-border 
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VC. Similar interpretations hold for coefficients relating to the mixed syndication dummy and the domestic 
syndication dummy.  
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1. (Panel B) provides an overview of our sample, distinguishing between companies that raise financing 
from a standalone domestic investor, a cross-border investor (or multiple cross-border investors), a syndicate of 
domestic investors and a syndicate with at least one cross-border and one domestic investor. Two particular 
observations are worth noting. First, cross-border VC investors have been active over the entire timeframe of 
our study, although most cross-border investments are concentrated during the dot-com bubble and subsequent 
years. Second, while previous studies have stressed the importance of domestic investors in order for PCs to 
raise cross-border VC (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008), 5% of the PCs in our sample receive first round VC from 
cross-border investors only.  
Table 4.2. gives an overview of the mean values of the control variables. The lead VC investor is on average 
(median) 13.9 years (5.0 years) old when investing in a PC. PCs are on average 2.2 years (1.0 year) old, obtain 
€3,150,000 (€860,000) of initial VC finance, have 24% (8%) of intangible assets to total assets and hold 0.28 
(0.00) patents when receiving the first VC investment. In 62.9% of PCs at least one of the VC investors 
providing initial finance is an independent investor. In contrast, only 24.4% of PCs received initial finance from 
government-related investors, 17.2% from bank-related investors, 14.1% from corporate investor and 6.7% from 
university-related investors. 
Table 4.2.: Descriptive statistics of control variables
 
  Mean Median SD 
VC investor age (years) 13.86   5.00   47.87   
PC age (years) 2.24   1.00   2.66   
Initial amount of finance (x €1.000) 3150.09   860.00   8415.53   
Intangible asset ratio (%) 23.66   8.30   132.83   
Number of patents 0.28   0.00   1.51   
 
Table 4.3. shows the origin of the cross-border investors in our sample. Most cross-border investors (43%) come 
from a Continental European country and a similar percentage come from the U.K. and Ireland (25%) and the 
U.S. (28%). Very few cross-border investors originate from other countries. U.K. and Irish cross-border VC 
investors invest relatively more frequently without local investors compared to U.S. and Continental European 








Table 4.3.: Origin of cross-border VC (CBVC) investors 
 
  Total sample Cross-border Mixed syndicate 
  Number % Number % Number % 
CBVC from other countries  5  3.85 2  5.26  3  3.26 
CBVC from U.K. and Ireland 33 25.38 13 34.21 20 21.74 
CBVC from North America 36 27.69 8 21.05 28 30.43 
CBVC from Continental E.U. 56 43.08 15 39.47 41 44.57 
Total 130 100 38 100 92 100 
 
Table 4.4. reports descriptive statistics on sales, total assets and payroll expenses from the year of investment up 
to seven years after the initial VC investment. It confirms that the average VC backed company in our sample 
demonstrates significant growth over time. The large difference between mean and median indicates the 
distribution of sales, total assets and payroll expenses is skewed towards the higher values. We use the natural 
logarithm of sales, total assets and payroll expenses in all subsequent analyses, which has the advantage that it 
functions as a normalizing transformation and decreases the probability that extreme observations will drive our 
findings (Hand, 2005). 
Table 4.4. further indicates the varying sample size for the dependent variables at various points in time. Sample 
size changes as companies may fail or cease to operate over the timeframe of the study. We did not completely 
eliminate these companies from the sample, as this would introduce survivorship bias (Cassar, 2004). Rather, 
we used as much of the data that is available on the failed companies and hence include observations for the 
years these companies operated. A second source of missing data is due to the recent time when companies 
received initial VC. For instance, when a company received initial VC in 2004, data are simply unavailable for 




Table 4.4.: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables (in 000 EUR)
a 
A. Sales 
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                  
Mean 2161.15 2685.91 3314.47 4680.29 5695.20 7440.91 9629.89 11746.97 
Median 421.00 699.49 875.50 1123.63 1597.50 1853.16 2297.50 2513.00 
Std. Deviation 8094.23 7457.81 8248.71 12628.74 14282.56 18719.66 30794.00 42455.75 
N 429 505 524 482 448 365 312 226 
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 Traditional longitudinal techniques require either complete data or assume data are missing completely at random 
(MCAR), implying that an unconditional random process is responsible for the missing data. A major advantage of the 
RCM framework is that, missing data can be accommodated under the assumption of missing at random (MAR) (Long et 
al. 2009). MAR is less strict than MCAR and implies that a conditional random process was responsible for the missing 
data. The conditioning is assumed to be on another variable. In this study, the bulk of missing sales data at the end of the 
timeframe are due to the recent time when companies received initial VC. For instance, when a company received initial 
VC in 2004, data is simply unavailable for seven years after the initial investment. MAR still yields unbiased estimates 
when using the RCM framework as long as the proper conditioning variables are included in the analysis, which is the case 




B. Total assets 
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                  
Mean 3841.74 4546.80 5236.35 10291.33 11586.54 12788.96 15574.59 18923.61 
Median 1024.00 1164.00 1465.00 1579.34 1737.36 1829.00 2079.90 2295.00 
Std. Deviation 11554.63 12210.30 14943.00 106998.94 110608.27 121286.61 127689.63 123888.73 
N 459 557 565 532 476 409 346 261 
                  
C. Payroll expenses 
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                  
Mean 863.98 1312.38 1595.97 1659.62 2013.30 2227.11 2571.62 2963.22 
Median 256.97 430.50 626.00 667.00 841.50 928.00 1092.98 1117.00 
Std. Deviation 2262.30 2697.08 2870.92 2652.05 3311.03 3363.71 3976.40 5148.30 
N 393 470 475 449 406 337 285 215 
                 a Time is a simple count measure representing successive years where zero equals the year of the initial VC investment. 
4.4.2. Model Development 
Any longitudinal study should start with fitting unconditional models, which do not incorporate predictors of 
change (Singer and Willet, 2003). These models provide insights into the pattern of change in the entire sample 
of VC backed companies, which is critical in order to be able to answer questions about the effects of particular 
covariates on this growth pattern. The results of the unconditional analyses for sales, total assets and payroll 
expenses are shown in Table 4.5. Model 1 reports the means model or no change model, which will serve as the 
baseline model in order to determine whether more complex growth models are needed. Model 2 reports the 
linear growth model, in which a linear time predictor is introduced to the means model. Model 3 reports the 
quadratic growth model, in which the quadratic time predictor is added to the linear model. 
Successively more complex growth models were evaluated for improvement in model fit over the baseline 
model by using the -2 log-likelihood (-2LL) statistic (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002). The difference in -2LL is 
tested for statistical significance using a chi-square test. When comparing more complex models with more 
parsimonious models, the quadratic growth models for sales, total asset and payroll expenses (Model 3) have a 
significantly better fit than their respective linear growth models (Model 2) and the no growth models (Model 
1). We discuss the quadratic growth model in more detail below. We focus on the sales models, but modelling 
total assets or payroll expenses yields similar results. 
The quadratic growth model specifies a curvilinear change in sales, estimating initial sales, instantaneous rate of 
change in sales and curvature (which is a parameter that describes a changing growth rate of sales over time). 
Model 3 indicates that the average PC has positive non-zero sales (5.537; p < .001) in the year of the initial VC 
investment. Because the instantaneous rate of change is positive, sales grow by .591 (p < .001) in the first year 
after VC investment. But the negative curvature (-.053; p < .001) indicates that this growth does not persist: 
with each passing year, the magnitude of the growth in sales diminishes. In the next section further complexity 
to the unconditional quadratic growth models is introduced by including the controlled effect of the presence of 
at least one cross-border investor, syndication with both domestic and cross-border investors and syndication 
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with domestic investors on sales, total assets and payroll expenses growth in VC-backed companies. This allows 
testing the hypotheses. 
Table 4.5.: Unconditional RCM 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 A. Sales       
Initial Size 6.607 *** 5.857 *** 5.537 *** 
Instantaneous growth rate      0.265 *** 0.591 *** 
Curvature         -0.053 *** 
-2LL 12348 11230 11065 
Number of observations 3291 3291 3291 
              
 B. Total assets       
Initial Size 6.137 *** 5.650 *** 5.308 *** 
Instantaneous growth rate      0.176 *** 0.527 *** 
Curvature         -0.058 *** 
-2LL 10682 9501 9213 
Number of observations 3030 3030 3030 
              
 C. Payroll expenses       
Initial Size 7.242 *** 6.941 *** 6.786 *** 
Instantaneous growth rate      0.104 *** 0.261 *** 
Curvature         -0.025 *** 
-2LL 11223 10136 10054 
Number of observations 3605 3605 3605 
              
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 and *** p < .001 (Conservative two-tailed tests). 
 
4.4.3. Hypotheses Tests 
Table 4.6. models the controlled effect of receiving first round VC financing from domestic VC investors, cross-
border VC investors or syndicates with a mix of domestic and cross-border investors on the growth of VC-
backed companies. We control for the age of the lead VC investor at the time of investment, VC investor types 
involved in the initial investment, PC age, country effects, year effects, industry effects, the number of 
investment rounds in the company, the pre-investment number of patents, the first round investment amount and 
the relative amount of intangible assets at time of the first investment.  
The growth pattern of the dependent variable is summarized in three parameters: the initial size, instantaneous 
rate of change (linear growth) and curvature (quadratic growth). We fail to find an effect of cross-border VC, 
either exclusively or in combination with domestic VC, on the initial level of sales, assets or payroll expenses. 
This suggests that the initial size of the PC is not related to the probability of being funded by either cross-
border or domestic investors (or a combination of both). 
However, receiving initial finance from at least one cross-border VC investor significantly affects the growth of 
sales, assets and payroll expenses. Specifically, companies backed exclusively by cross-border VC investors 
exhibit a significantly lower instantaneous growth rate in sales (-.496; p < .01), in total assets (-.297; p < .05) 
and in payroll expenses (-.321; p < .05) compared to PCs backed by domestic VC investors. This provides 
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support for our first hypothesis: companies backed by domestic VC investors initially exhibit higher growth 
compared to companies that raise initial finance exclusively from cross-border VC investors. 
Companies backed exclusively by cross-border VC investors have a lower instantaneous growth rate, but 
curvature is significantly higher and positive for sales (.076; p < .01) and assets (.032; p < .05). Although the 
coefficient of payroll expenses curvature has the expected sign, it is not significant. This indicates that although 
sales and total assets initially increase at a higher rate in companies backed by domestic investors, their sales 
and total assets growth level off more quickly over time compared to companies backed by cross-border 
investors. This implies that, as time proceeds, the growth rate of companies backed by cross-border investors 
will eventually exceed the growth rate of companies backed by domestic investors. This provides support for 
our second hypothesis: companies backed exclusively by cross-border VC investors exhibit higher growth in 
later stages compared to companies that raise initial finance exclusively from domestic VC investors. Figure 4.1. 
shows that sales of the mean company, backed exclusively by cross-border VC investors, initially grows more 
slowly after investment than the mean company, backed exclusively by domestic VC investors. After six years, 
sales of companies backed by cross-border VC investors fully catch up with those of companies backed by 
domestic VC investors and their growth rates are higher.
18
 This suggests that cross-border investors may be 
more beneficial in the long run compared to domestic investors, even if the initial growth of their PCs is slower 
in the early years after the investment. 
                                                          
18
 The predicted growth curves for total assets and payroll expenses are not included due to space considerations, but are 
available from the authors upon simple request. 
114 | 
 
Figure 4.1.: Predicted growth curves for PC sales (in 000 EUR) 
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PCs initially backed by a mixed syndicate including both cross-border and domestic VC investors show a 
significantly higher instantaneous rate of change in sales (.505; p < .05), total assets (.329; p < .05) and payroll 
expenses (.325; p < .10) than companies backed exclusively by domestic VC companies. Heterogeneous 
syndicates hence benefit the growth of PCs. Nevertheless, in contrast to total assets and payroll expenses, the 
curvature for the change in sales of companies backed by mixed syndicates is negative and significant (-.069; p 
< .05), implying that their steep growth rates level off. Figure 4.1. shows that, although companies backed by a 
mixed syndicate have similar first year sales compared to other VC backed companies, they develop into the 
biggest sales generators after seven years. Our findings thus provide strong support for hypothesis 3: a syndicate 
comprising domestic and cross-border VC investors positively moderates the relationship between the presence 
of cross-border VC investors and sales, total assets and payroll expenses growth. Sales, total assets and payroll 
expenses of companies, backed by a mixed syndicate comprised of domestic and cross-border VC investors are 
higher than those of all other companies during the whole observation period.  
Table 4.6.: Conditional RCM with the natural logarithm of sales, total assets and payroll expenses as 
dependent variables 
    A. Sales B. Total assets 
C. Payroll 
expenses 
                
Initial Size Intercept 1.409 * 2.910 *** 2.215 *** 
  Cross-Border -0.312   -0.053   0.093   
  Mixed syndicate 0.278   0.220   -0.085   
  Syndication -0.216   -0.017   0.134   
                
Instantaneous growth rate  Intercept 1.107 *** 0.332 ** 0.644 *** 
  Cross-Border -0.496 ** -0.297 * -0.321 * 
  Mixed syndicate 0.506 * 0.329 * 0.325 † 
  Syndication -0.089   0.054   0.021   
                
Curvature Intercept -0.082 ** -0.016   -0.049 * 
  Cross-Border 0.076 ** 0.032 * 0.031   
  Mixed syndicate -0.069 * -0.029   -0.023   
  Syndication 0.025 † -0.002   -0.003   
                
Control variables 
a
   Included  Included  Included  
                
-2 LL   7658.3   6601.7   7346.6   
Number of observations   2379   2960   2676   
 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 and *** p < .001 (Conservative two-tailed tests)  
a
 Included control variables: Lead VC investor age, VC investor type dummies, PC age, country dummies, year dummies, 
industry dummies, number of investment rounds, number of patents, investment size and intangible assets ratio 
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4.4.4. Robustness Tests 
We fitted several additional models to test for the robustness of our findings and assess the strength of 
alternative explanations. We focus on three potential concerns. First, as the results may be attributed to 
matching on the basis of unobservable characteristics, endogeneity is a concern (Shaver, 1998). More 
specifically, cross-border (domestic) VC investors may select companies with different growth potential, or 
alternatively companies with different growth potential may select cross-border (domestic) VC investors 
(Eckhardt et al., 2006). Therefore, we carefully assess this concern. Second, although we focus on the initial 
providers of VC financing, the timing of entry of the cross-border VC investor may impact the results. A further 
robustness check hence estimates the effect of the timing of investment of a cross-border VC investor on sales 
growth. Finally, the observed dynamics might be stronger for more distant cross-border VC investors, in line 
with our theory development. We thus additionally estimate the impact of distance between a cross-border 
investor and the PC.
19
 
We performed two tests in an effort to assess potential endogeneity concerns empirically (besides controlling for 
a company’s growth potential in our main analyses). First, we analysed a subsample of companies for which 
data were available from two to one year before the initial VC investment was made. Pre-investment growth 
rates do not differ between companies exclusively backed by domestic investors, by cross-border investors, or 
by a mix of cross-border and domestic investors. This implies that, compared to domestic VC investors, cross-
border VC investors do not select companies with higher pre-investment growth rates.  
Second, we analysed failures in greater detail. The proportion of failures in each group is relatively similar, with 
failure rates somewhat higher for companies backed exclusively by cross-border VC investors. This suggests 
that cross-border VC investors (whether they invest alone or in a syndicate with a domestic investor) do not 
necessarily have access to the highest or lowest quality companies. Additionally, we reran the RCM models, 
first including the failed companies with zero sales for each year in which they could have had sales if they had 
lived (following Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990); thereafter we excluded the companies that eventually 
failed from the sample. The results remain robust in these modified samples.. The results remain robust in these 
modified samples. Overall, these additional tests indicate that it is unlikely that selection is entirely driving our 
results. 
In order to assess the impact of the timing of entry of the cross-border VC investor on company growth we 
estimated three additional models. In a first model, we only considered companies that were exclusively backed 
by domestic VC investors in the first round. Within this subsample, the growth pattern of PCs with only 
domestic VC investors in later rounds are compared to companies that raise VC from cross-border investors in a 
later round. Unreported results indicate that attracting cross-border VC in a later round significantly increases 
company growth, consistent with our main analysis which showed that initial cross-border VC investors are 
associated with a positive effect on growth.  
                                                          
19
 The additional models are not reported in detail due to space considerations, but they are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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In a second model, the growth of companies initially backed by a mixed syndicate is compared to the growth of 
companies initially backed by domestic investors that attract cross-border investors in a later round. There are 
no significant differences in the growth pattern between the two groups of companies. Hence, starting with a 
domestic VC investor and adding a cross-border VC investor in a later round leads to a comparable growth of 
the PC as starting with a mix of domestic and cross-border investors in the initial investment round.
20
 
Finally, a third model compares the growth of companies which are initially exclusively backed by cross-border 
VC investors to that of companies initially exclusively backed by domestic investors that attract cross-border 
investors in a later round. The latter exhibit a higher initial growth and show a lower curvature compared to the 
former, confirming that initial domestic VC investors are associated with a stronger initial growth of their PCs. 
In all, these additional analyses strongly suggest that, conditional on raising domestic VC in the first investment 
round, the growth of a PC is similar when a cross-border investor is added to the syndicate in the first or in a 
subsequent investment round. 
As a final robustness check, the distance between the cross-border VC investor and its PC is analysed. We reran 
the RCM models substituting the cross-border VC dummy with a dummy that captures whether the cross-border 
investor originated from an Anglo-Saxon country. In order to fully observe the impact of the geographical, 
cultural and legal distance between investors and PCs, we excluded the U.K. PCs from this analysis.
21
 The 
results are broadly consistent with those of the main models and the dynamics are often even stronger. This is in 
line with our theory as we focus in this analysis on Continental European PCs and Anglo-Saxon investors, for 
whom the geographical, cultural and legal distance are higher than between PCs and investors operating in 
different countries within Continental Europe (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006).  
4.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
While it is widely acknowledged that VC investors have on average a positive contribution on the growth of 
their PCs (Puri and Zarutskie, 2011), evidence is increasing that not all VC is the same. In this paper we 
investigate how the presence of cross-border, as opposed to domestic VC investors, relate to the growth of PC. 
This research question is non-trivial as compared to domestic VC investors, cross-border VC investors might 
spur as well as constrain the growth of their PCs. This paper hence contributes to management literature by 
investigating the differential impact of domestic and cross-border VC investors on PC growth. While previous 
studies indicate that cross-border VC is an increasingly important phenomenon, especially for high-tech 
companies with high growth potential (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008), there is little evidence on the relationship 
between raising VC from cross-border investors and the growth of PCs. Based upon a sample of 761 young 
high-tech companies from seven European countries and using a longitudinal research strategy, we have shown 
that companies backed by domestic VC investors grow initially at a higher rate than companies backed by cross-
border VC investors. In later years, however, companies backed by cross-border VC investors exhibit higher 
                                                          
20
 There is one exception: companies getting cross-border VC in a later round exhibit a subsequent larger increase in total 
assets. This is not surprising as this larger increase in total assets is likely to reflect the investment by the cross-border VC 
investor.  
21
 Inclusion of the U.K. portfolio companies rendered similar results. 
 118 | 
 
growth rates. Companies backed by a mixed syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border VC investors 
grow more strongly, both in the short and in the long run, than other VC backed companies. We further showed 
that it generally does not matter for PC growth when a cross-border VC investor invests, conditional on starting 
with a domestic VC investor. 
Our findings suggest that proximity and knowledge of the local institutional and legal environment are 
important for VC investors investing in young companies. Domestic VC investors are better equipped than 
cross-border VC investors to overcome information asymmetries and to provide the resources relevant in the 
early growth phase. Refining the opportunity and building the early resource base is important in this phase, and 
domestic VC investors are better equipped to provide support in these matters. Cross-border VC investors, on 
the other hand, have a better knowledge of external markets and are able to provide legitimacy to PCs in their 
home markets. These resources are especially beneficial for more developed companies. Our findings hence 
provide further support for the view that external parties may provide important resources to support the growth 
of entrepreneurial companies, but not all parties provide the same resources. PCs exhibit the strongest growth 
when combining local knowledge and support provided by domestic investors with international knowledge and 
legitimization provided by cross-border investors. We hence provide further evidence of the complimentary 
valuable resources that investors may bring to a heterogeneous VC syndicate (Dai et al., 2012).  
A life cycle model emerges from our results: a young PC benefits from tight monitoring and close interaction 
with its investors to shape its opportunity and to develop early organizational resources and routines. Domestic 
VC investors perform better in this phase as their geographic, legal and cultural distance with their PC is smaller 
and their local institutional knowledge is higher. Alternatively, young companies backed exclusively by cross-
border investors might be pushed to internationalize too early, while their resources are not yet into place. PCs 
benefit from cross-border investors in a later phase (whether they invest in the first or a later investment round), 
by facilitating entry in international markets through their knowledge and legitimacy. Combining the 
complementary resources of domestic and cross-border investors is hence relevant for company growth. 
These findings are important, as few studies have disentangled the effects of domestic and cross-border VC 
investors on the growth of their PCs. Most studies on the effects of VC have studied performance at the VC 
investor or fund level, focusing on PC exit and/or survival, or focusing on post-IPO performance (limiting these 
studies to the most successful PCs). This study, in contrast, is one of the first to focus on the growth of the PC 
from the initial VC investment throughout the typical lifespan of a VC investment. This is important for 
entrepreneurs, as the goals of investors and entrepreneurs are not always aligned. Understanding how PCs grow 
after having received VC, and how different types of investors contribute differently to company growth, is 
hence relevant.  
In contrast to most studies on PC growth we use a longitudinal approach. Moreover the specific analysis in this 
study offers an important methodological contribution to growth research, which typically measures growth as 
the difference in size between two points in time, thereby ignoring growth in-between these two points 
(Weinzimmer et al., 1998; Delmar et al., 2003). Our study demonstrates how different conclusions may be 
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drawn when using different timeframes. For instance, if we would have focused on the short term, our analyses 
would have indicated that first round cross-border VC involvement is associated with lower growth as the 
instantaneous growth rate in sales is lower in companies backed exclusively by cross-border investors. Yet, if 
we would have focused on the long term, our analyses would have indicated that cross-border VC is associated 
with higher growth as the growth rates of companies backed by at least one cross-border investor increases more 
strongly over time. Our dynamic approach hence allowed a more fine-grained understanding of the relationship 
between different VC investors and the growth of their PCs. Taking advantage of recent developments in 
longitudinal data analysis to study the dynamic nature of growth over time is hence a fruitful avenue for future 
research. The results on the impact of the timing of entry of the cross-border VC investors suggest that there is 
no significant difference in growth between PCs that obtain cross-border VC in the first round (together with a 
domestic VC investors) or in a later round. This surprising finding calls for future research. As the timing of the 
entry of a cross-border VC investor does not seem to impact PC growth, an interesting avenue for future 
research could be to investigate why some cross-border VC investors invest from the first round when they 
could wait, thereby reducing uncertainty, and invest later-on? What are the benefits of investing in the first 
round? Further, why do some cross-border VC investors invest alone, without syndicating with a domestic VC 
investor in the first round, as this seems to be a suboptimal strategy? We leave these questions for future 
research. 
Our study contributes to management literature by showing that PCs’ resource need follow a life cycle model. 
While it is clear that young entrepreneurial companies need resources in order to grow, we show that the timing 
of these resources have a significant impact. High-tech early stage companies need local resources to set up the 
initial business, in a later stage however, these companies’ growth benefits more from international resources. 
Entrepreneurs should hence continuously evaluate in which specific phase of the life cycle their company is, and 
accordingly target investors’ resources which benefits the company most.  
As with all research, this study also has some limitations. First, cross-border investors may differ from domestic 
investors in both their selection behaviour and their involvement in PCs after the investment. While we have 
provided descriptive evidence that neither cross-border nor domestic investors have a tendency to select 
companies that exhibit significant growth before the investment, different types of investors may still select PCs 
on the basis of unobservable characteristics (Dai et al., 2012). However, the main purpose of this study was to 
gain an insight into how the presence of a cross-border investor is associated with the growth of PCs. Whether 
these differences are due to selection or value adding is another question which warrants further study. Second, 
we acknowledge that understanding how cross-border investors influence internationalization of their PCs, for 
instance by analysing exports, would be interesting. Such data is however not available in the current database. 
Despite its limitations, the study provides valuable insights to high-tech entrepreneurs. Given the difficulty to 
raise finance from outside investors, high-tech entrepreneurs are under pressure to accept finance when and 
where they can find it. Yet, as we have demonstrated, early finance decisions may have a long-lasting impact on 
subsequent company growth. While PCs of domestic investors are more likely to exhibit high growth early-on, 
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companies backed by cross-border VC investors have more sustainable growth rates in the long run. Especially 
when domestic VC investors co-invest with cross-border VC investors. Overall, our findings suggest that it 
might be worthwhile for entrepreneurs to extend their search for finance and target a broad and diverse investor 
base. Our study also has important implications for public policy makers. Public policy programs that aim to 
develop a strong local VC industry in order to foster the growth of local entrepreneurial companies should 
recognize that stimulating cross-border investments is beneficial. This not only increases the pool of financial 
capital available for entrepreneurial companies, but also provides them with complementary resources that help 
them to develop and grow more strongly. 
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Abstract 
Drawing upon an escalation of commitment framework, this study investigates how differences between cross-
border and domestic venture capital investors in access to information, social and structural factors affect their 
decision to terminate an unsuccessful investment. We track the exit outcome of 1060 venture capital investments 
in 684 European technology companies. Results show that domestic investors have a high tendency to escalate 
their commitment to a failing course of action. In contrast, cross-border investors terminate their investments 
efficiently, even when investing through a local branch. This is explained by cross-border investors having more 
limited access to soft information, a lower social involvement with the project and a lower embeddedness in the 
local economic and social environment, which are all factors that contribute to lower escalation of commitment. 
Local branches of cross-border investors are further shielded from escalation of commitment through structural 
safeguards. Domestic investors may hence benefit from mimicking the behaviour of cross-border investors. 
5.1. Introduction  
Terminating an investment project is one of the most difficult and painful decisions for organizations to make 
(Boddewyn, 1983). Such divestments are nevertheless a fundamental aspect of business and are the outcome of 
ever-changing processes that keep companies and whole economies rejuvenated (Benito, 2005). When 
investments fail to meet initial expectations, decision makers face a “liquidation dilemma”: they may favour to 
continue financing the project to retain the option of improvement or they may decide to terminate, which 
results in the crystallization of certain losses. Persisting to invest in a poorly performing project that eventually 
fails, however, not only wastes financial and temporal resources but alternative and more promising investment 
opportunities are foregone. Pursuing a project despite information suggesting that the marginal costs of 
continuing the project outweigh its marginal benefits is irrational behaviour labelled escalation of commitment.  
Venture capital (VC) firms are professional investors who take equity stakes in young, growth-oriented 
companies. They are particularly prone to face “liquidation dilemmas” and thus at risk to escalate their 
commitment, as 32 percent of their investments eventually fail (Puri and Zarutski, 2012). They therefore put 
several mechanisms into place to prevent this irrational behaviour. Notwithstanding these mechanisms, VC 
firms are still prone to escalation of commitment (Birmingham et al., 2003; Guler, 2007). Not all VC firms are 
the same, however (Elango et al., 1995) and different types of VC firms may exhibit different probabilities to 
escalate commitment. One source of VC firm heterogeneity is its geographical origin, i.e. VC firms may invest 
domestically or across borders.  
The VC industry has long been viewed as a purely domestic industry (Cumming and Dai, 2010), with 
geographic proximity to investment targets regarded as essential for efficient deal flow generation, post-
investment monitoring and value adding services (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). Driven by increased competition 
in their home countries, VC firms have nevertheless started searching more intensively for investment 
opportunities in foreign markets (Madhavan and Iriyama, 2009). This shift in geographical focus merits more 
research attention (Wright et al., 2005). 
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Our first goal is to investigate the propensity of cross-border VC firms as opposed to domestic VC firms to 
escalate commitment when PCs do not meet expectations. We argue that increased cultural and geographical 
distance and associated information issues faced by cross-border VC firms reduces decision biases. Moreover, 
establishment of a local branch office is a widely-used strategy to mitigate the frictions associated with 
geographic and cultural distance (Dai et al., 2012). A second goal of our research is to explore how the 
probability to escalate commitment to a failing course of action differs when investing from abroad or investing 
from a local branch.  
To address our research questions, we use a unique hand collected sample of technology based companies from 
seven European countries that received initial VC between 1994 and 2004. The sample contains longitudinal 
data on 1618 unique rounds of VC investments by 1060 VC firms in 684 ventures. We model the effect of 
investor origin on the hazards of successful and unsuccessful exits in a competing risks model. We show that 
while domestic VC firms escalate their commitment towards a failing course of action, cross-border VC firms 
exit unsuccessful ventures in a rational way. Further, domestic VC firms have a significantly higher probability 
to escalate commitment compared to cross-border VC firms investing from a local branch (hereafter: branch VC 
firms). We fail to find differences in the probability to escalate commitment between cross-border VC firms 
investing from their headquarters or from a local branch, which suggests that the risk of escalation behaviour 
can be reduced through structural safeguards such as the use of a firm-level investment committee that includes 
distant members. 
Our study makes specific and general contributions. Specifically, we first contribute to understanding 
behavioural differences between domestic and cross-border VC firms, as previous studies have mainly focused 
on either the rationale for international investments or on explaining successful investments (Mäkelä and Maula, 
2006; Wright et al., 2005). We also add to the few studies that examine unsuccessful exits by VC firms 
(Cumming and Dai, 2010). More generally, we contribute to the international management literature by 
enhancing understanding of how international firms behave when cross-border activities fail to meet 
expectations (Benito, 2005). Finally, we contribute to the escalation of commitment literature by showing how 
structural safeguards may prevent escalation behaviour. This aspect has largely been neglected (Sleesman et al., 
2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first briefly describe the VC research setting. Thereafter, 
hypotheses are developed on the impact of VC firm origin and its investment structure on the probability to 
escalate commitment in unsuccessful investments. Next, we outline our research method, including the sample, 
the measurement of escalation of commitment, variables and method of analysis. This is followed by a 
presentation of the main findings, including robustness tests. Finally, a discussion of the results from both a 
theoretical and a practical perspective concludes this paper. 
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5.2. Research setting 
The VC industry is an attractive setting to study decisions to exit from unsuccessful projects in an international 
setting for several reasons. First, VC firms are expert and experienced decision makers used to uncertainty as 
they typically invest in high-risk investments, such as nascent, high-technology companies with unproven 
products (Wright and Robbie, 1998). Second, VC investment managers are incentivized to make the best 
possible investment decisions, as the investment outcomes determine the VC firms’ return and survival but also 
the reward of individual VC investment managers (Sahlman, 1990). Third, exiting is a fundamental part of 
business for VC firms as they are not interested in taking permanent equity positions in their PCs. VC 
investment managers are hence experienced in making exit decisions as they liquidate their investments after an 
investment holding period of typically five to seven years (Wright and Robbie, 1998). VC firms are frequently 
confronted with exit decisions of underperforming PCs, which should make them experts in dealing with these 
adverse situations (Sahlman, 1990). Finally, most VC firms are aware of the possibility of individual decision 
biases, such as escalation of commitment to a failing course of action, and have put several structural safeguards 
in place to protect against them such as investment staging, taking investment and exit decisions in committees 
and syndication with other VC firms (Guler, 2007). VC firms stage the infusion of capital which grants the 
opportunity to gather information and monitor the progress of their PCs, which provides the flexibility to 
discontinue funding projects of which the prospects have fallen (Gompers, 1995). Individual VC executive 
decision-making biases are minimized as investment decisions typically require recommendations to be 
approved by one or more investment committees (Wright and Robbie, 1998). Finally, VC firms frequently co-
invest or syndicate investments with other VC firms which provides a “second opinion” from their peers.  
Despite these organizational and structural safeguards, U.S. VC firms nevertheless escalate their commitment 
due to political and institutional influences (Guler, 2007). Investment norms of the VC industry may dissuade 
investment termination, and nonconformity to the commonly accepted norms may be punished by the 
syndication network. Our research advances this research stream by differentiating between cross-border and 
domestic VC firms. 
Our hypotheses are tested on a sample of VC investments in PCs located in Europe. Europe offers an interesting 
environment for our research questions for two reasons. First, European VC investments have more 
international VC participation than U.S. VC investments (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Second, Europe is the 
second largest VC market in the world, after the U.S. (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). The European VC industry 
therefore provides an attractive context in which to examine whether being a cross-border VC as opposed to a 
domestic VC investor impacts the probability of escalation of commitment. 
5.3. Development of hypotheses 
Prior research suggests that investors do not always behave rationally and tend to escalate commitment based 
upon their past actions, instead of terminating the investment when new information shows it does not meet 
expectations (Guler, 2007). An early stream of research focused on individuals as decision makers to explain 
 131 | 
 
escalation of commitment (Staw, 1997). Yet, investment decisions are usually not made by individuals in 
isolation but are multi party events where choices are made in an organizational context and have to be 
answered to the firm’s internal and external stakeholders. Therefore, escalation of commitment has been 
considered a multidetermined outcome, influenced by more than one level of analysis. Following Staw and Ross 
(1987) and Sleesman and colleagues (2012), information, social and structural antecedents of escalation of 
commitment in terminating investments are considered.  
We first theorize on how differences between cross-border and domestic investors in access to information and 
in social determinants influence their tendency to escalate commitment to a failing course of action. Thereafter, 
we theorize on how investing from a local branch may affect escalation of commitment driven by structural 
determinants. 
5.3.1. Domestic versus cross-border VC firms 
Compared to domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms face challenges of larger geographic distance but also 
of larger cultural and legal differences. These lead to differences in access to information and in social 
embeddedness, which is expected to impact escalation of commitment. We expand on both hereafter. 
5.3.1.1. Access to information 
Access to information is an important driver of escalation of commitment (Bragger et al., 1998). Information on 
PCs are not objective facts neutrally processed by decision makers (Staw, 1997). Instead, decision makers 
process information cognitively and affectively (Sleesman et al., 2012). One of the most pertinent individual 
biases to investment situations is overconfidence (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Overconfident decision 
makers discount negative information and believe they can overcome the negative aspects of a situation, thereby 
increasing decision persistence. We argue that compared to cross-border VC firms, domestic VC firms’ access 
to more soft information may impact their probability to escalate commitment directly by increasing project 
equivocality and indirectly by enhancing their overconfidence. First, the importance of access to reliable 
information and of objective assessment of relative project performance in a decision context is explained. Next, 
we show how differences in access to information may lead to equivocality and increased overconfidence which 
increases a domestic VC firm’s probability to escalate commitment.  
As VC firms typically invest in young, high-tech entrepreneurial companies, assessment of future prospects is 
difficult. To evaluate PCs’ future prospects and make rational investment decisions, VC investors need to 
identify relevant information and benchmark it objectively. Such information enables VC firms to evaluate PC 
progress, and provides flexibility to discontinue projects whose prospects have fallen (Gompers, 1995).  
When VC investors have insufficient, unreliable information or are unable to identify the relevant information, 
they face equivocality which implies that both positive and negative conclusions on the company’s performance 
can be drawn (Bragger et al., 1998). Under equivocality, termination decisions are delayed to offer VC investors 
the opportunity to collect more reliable information (Bragger et al., 1998). However, the world is clouded with 
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imperfect information confounding a decision maker’s judgment and increasing equivocality. Moreover, 
decision makers’ sense-making urge in equivocal situations may cause them to form predictions about PC 
prospects based upon causal information embedded in useless or random information, even though they may 
know that the information is non-credible and other more reliable (non-causal) information is available (Difonzo 
and Bordia, 1997). Thus investors’ predictions and subsequent investment decisions may be less rational than if 
they have no information at all.  
While cross-border VC firms have mainly access to hard information, domestic VC firms have additionally 
access to soft information. Soft information relates to qualitative private information and entrepreneurs’ or 
decision makers’ own assessments, which is not easily observed, verified or transmitted to others (Berger and 
Udell, 2002). In contrast, hard information refers to quantitative information such as that found in financial 
statements. While hard information has a meaning upon which everyone agrees, soft information - even when 
perfectly observed – is subjective in nature as it may have different meanings for different people (Berger and 
Udell, 2002). 
Domestic VC firms are geographically closer to their PCs than cross-border VC firms which impacts the 
amount, the type and the ease in accessing information on PCs. Moreover, proximity enables high frequency 
social interaction between VC firms and the entrepreneur and exposes the VC firm to a broad and deep set of 
soft information not otherwise readily available (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006). More distant cross-border VC 
firms rely more on hard information which is largely numerical, making it easier to collect, store and transmit 
(Stein, 2002).  
Decision makers typically put more effort into soft information acquisition when hard information shows PCs 
are not meeting expectations (Campbell and Loumioti, 2012). VC firms turn to entrepreneurs for more informed 
explanations about the technological or economic underperformance. But the context specificity and non-
numerical nature makes interpretation of this soft information difficult to verify. As a result, equivocality of the 
decision is increased which may result in undesired continuation of the investment. Cross-border VC firms, in 
contrast, mainly have access to hard information and are hence not confounded by soft information. This will 
make it easier to terminate underperforming companies. 
Once reliable information is obtained, VC investors need to objectively benchmark PC performance. Decision 
makers may however, be subjective in benchmarking due to overconfidence, that is their subjective confidence 
in judgments is greater than their objective accuracy. Overconfidence may increase decision stubbornness, as 
overconfident decision makers disregard negative feedback and strongly believe they can overcome the negative 
aspects of a situation (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Greater amounts of information draw the VC firm’s 
attention to the more striking information at cost of other factors that are more pertinent to the decision. As a 
result, more information does not yield improved decision accuracy, but increases VC firm’s confidence 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). When information is structured in a case specific way decision makers need to 
decipher what each piece of information means and how it impacts their decision accuracy. This makes the VC 
firms deviate from their intuitive style and forces them out of their comfort zone which increases 
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overconfidence as it has a greater negative impact on their decision accuracy than on their confidence 
(Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). 
Cross-border VC firms, in contrast to domestic VC firms, mainly have access to hard information which is 
standardized and can be processed automatically, which will make them less overconfident. This, in turn, is 
expected to result in a less biased view on PC performance. Cross-border VC firms are thus expected to be less 
prone to view their actions as successful, and will therefore focus more on avoiding failure (Zhang and 
Baumeister, 2006). We therefore expect domestic VC firms to have a higher probability to escalate commitment 
to a failing course of action compared to cross-border VC firms. 
5.3.1.2. Social determinants  
Another category of drivers of escalation behaviour are social determinants. Stakeholders of decision makers 
can give rise to escalation of commitment as they may get emotionally involved with the stakeholders or may 
want to strategically manage the impressions others have of them (Sleesman et al., 2012). The level of 
escalation of commitment that decision makers face may thus be contingent upon the extent that doing so will 
portray them in a more favourable light towards external stakeholders. Escalation of commitment is therefore 
more likely to occur when signals indicate that continuing is more socially appropriate than quitting.  
A first direct key stakeholder for VC firms is the entrepreneur in whom they invest. Domestic VC firms have 
more frequent social interaction with entrepreneurs, creating positive feelings (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006) 
and emotional attachment, increasing the pressure to safeguard the PC and in the end leading to a higher 
probability to escalate commitment (Wong et al., 2006). The greater geographical and social distance cross-
border VC firms face will make it more difficult for them to have frequent informal contacts and thus to build 
and maintain high quality social and emotional relationships. Moreover, cross-border VC firms generally face a 
greater cultural distance to the entrepreneur compared to domestic VC firms. This may cause difficulties in 
effective communication and lead to lower mutual levels of trust and emotional attachment (Guiso et al., 2008). 
This leads cross-border VC firms to adopt a more transactional approach, as evidenced by the use of high–
powered contracts with well-defined and strict benchmarks (Dai et al. 2012). The transactional approach makes 
it easier for a cross-border VC firm to exit compared to domestic VC firms (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006).  
Other local community stakeholders have a strong interest in the survival of the PC. VC firms may escalate their 
commitment in order to manage the impression of these stakeholders. As domestic investment managers are 
geographically and culturally more proximate to the PC they are more embedded in the local community and 
likely have a higher nationalistic bond (Guler, 2007). The social pressures associated with terminating a PC in 
their home market may hence impact a domestic VC firm more strongly compared to cross-border VC firms 
terminating an investment in a foreign country, as it is more distant from their local ecosystem. The higher 
embeddedness and nationalistic bond may cause domestic VC firms to face higher social pressures from the 
local stakeholders and hence to enrol in impression management by continuing to invest. In contrast, cross-
border VC investment managers decide more easily to divest, as they are less personally involved or 
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emotionally attached to the PC’s community (Boddewyn, 1983). We thus expect domestic VC firms to be more 
prone to escalate commitment compared with the cross-border VC firms. 
Based on the differences between domestic and cross-border VC firms in their access to information, 
overconfidence, social and emotional pressures we propose: 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of escalation of commitment towards investing in unsuccessful PCs will be higher 
for domestic VC firms compared to cross-border VC firms. 
5.3.2. Cross-border investments from headquarters versus from a local branch 
To mitigate liabilities of foreignness, VC firms pursuing an internationalization strategy may establish a local 
branch, thereby sharing characteristics of both domestic and cross-border VC investors.  
5.3.2.1. Access to information 
Cross-border VC firms investing through a local branch are expected to have access to similar amounts and 
types of information as domestic VC firms and are thus presumed to rely more on soft information compared to 
cross-border VC firms investing from head office (Berger and Udell, 2002). We expect branches to face similar 
levels of equivocality and overconfidence as domestic VC firms and as a result to have a higher probability to 
escalate commitment as opposed to cross-border VC firms investing from a head office. 
5.3.2.2. Project determinants 
The nature of the sunk costs is different when investing from a branch compared to when investing from 
headquarters. The establishment of a local branch necessitates predominantly a financial investment, while 
investing across borders from headquarters requires higher temporal investments. Temporal investments have, 
however, a much smaller mental impact than financial investments, leading to lower sunk cost effects (Soman, 
2001). Branches are therefore associated with larger sunk costs creating a “zone of inaction” above and below 
the point where profits are equal to costs in which decision makers do not exit the investment situation until 
sunk costs have been accounted for (Bragger et al., 1998). We therefore expect branches to have a wider zone of 
inaction and as a result to have a higher probability to escalate commitment as opposed to cross-border VC 
firms investing from head office. 
5.3.2.3. Social determinants 
The establishment of a local branch is the most far-reaching form of local embeddedness a cross-border VC firm 
can display in the focal country. A VC firm will only be willing to bear the high investment if it envisages 
expanding its activities in that region. Branches will therefore want to build and maintain a strong local 
reputation and avoid the exit cost of negative publicity surrounding the failure of a PCs, as a strong reputation is 
essential to attract high quality deal flow (Hsu, 2004) and syndication partners (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). As a 
result of the stronger local embeddedness and the strategic importance of the focal country for future 
investments, cross-border VC firms investing through a local branch may, as opposed to investing from head 
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office, be more susceptible to normative pressure from the local investment network and from the local 
community. We thus expect that the probability to escalate commitment of branches will be higher compared to 
cross-border VC firms investing from head office. 
Given the similarities between domestic and branch VC firms in access to information, social and emotional 
pressures, and the difference in sunk costs faced as opposed to cross-border VC firms, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of escalation of commitment towards investing in unsuccessful PCs will be higher 
for cross-border VC firms investing through a local branch as opposed to cross-border VC firms investing from 
headquarters. 
5.3.3. Investing from a local branch versus from a domestic VC firm 
Local branches of foreign VC firms are structurally different from domestic VC firms. Structural determinants 
include the constitutional features of an organization and its interaction patterns (Staw and Ross, 1987). In a VC 
context, each PC is followed by an investment manager, but all investments have to be approved by an 
investment committee. Investment committees are specifically designed to mitigate individual biases of the VC 
investment managers. The additional layer of organizational hierarchy which branches have impacts their 
decision making process. More specifically, local branch decision making differs as it is primarily made by 
investment committees that combine the expertise and experience of branch executives and head office 
executives (Pruthi et al., 2009). Head office executives have a lower nationalistic bond and an increased 
geographical and cultural distance to the PC or its country of origin. They are therefore less emotionally 
attached to local PCs and as a result have a more unbiased view on their performance. The influence of head 
office executives in the investment committee should therefore at least partially mitigate the probability of 
escalating commitment, compared to decision making in investment committees of domestic VC firms. We 
hence expect branch VC firms to have a lower probability to escalate commitment as opposed to the domestic 
VC firms. 
Based upon the difference in organizational structure between domestic VC firms and branch VC firms, we 
propose our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The probability of escalation of commitment towards investing in unsuccessful PCs will be lower 
for international VC firms investing through a local branch as opposed to domestic VC firms 
5.4. Method 
5.4.1. Sample and data 
Our sample is drawn from a novel dataset on European technology companies built by the pan-European VICO 
project (See chapter 2 for the description of the VICO sample).
22
 The sample used in this study contains 
                                                          
22
 As government VC firms exhibit an investment pattern that differs from all other VC investor types, we exclude the 
portfolio companies that received only government VC financing in order to test the hypotheses. 
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longitudinal data on 1618 unique rounds of VC investments by 1060 VC firms in 684 VC-backed PCs. Each PC 
received an average of 2.37 VC rounds. PCs that exit unsuccessfully have on average 2.88 investment rounds 
while PCs that successfully exit have on average 2.63 investment rounds. The dataset includes 2136 unique VC 
firm-PC pairs, representing a total of 3445 investment decisions of which 2399 by domestic VC firms, 568 by 
cross-border VC firms and 255 by branch VC firms. Table 5.1. provides the descriptive statistics on the average 
number of investment rounds in which VC firms participate, split by VC firm origin and exit type. Each VC 
firm takes part in an average of 1.62 financing rounds. This is higher for domestic VC firms (1.68) and branch 
VC firms (1.96) and lower for cross-border VC firms investing from a head office (1.57). Successful PCs have 
more investment rounds compared to unsuccessful (1.78 versus 1.43) for all VC firm origins. Unsuccessful PCs 
backed by cross-border VC firms go through the lowest number of rounds (1.35), while successful PCs backed 
by branch VC firms have the highest number of rounds (2.38).  
Table 5.1.: Average number of investment rounds by VC firm origin and exit success 
 
All VC firms Domestic VC firm Cross-border VC firm Branch VC firm 
Full sample 1.62 1.68 1.57 1.96 
Successful exit 1.78 1.78 1.78 2.38 
Unsuccessful exit 1.43 1.51 1.35 1.70 
 
Table 5.2. provides an overview of the distribution of PCs and financing rounds by company founding period 
and industry. The majority of PCs (44%) were founded between 1998 and 2000, 35% were founded between 
1986 and 1997 and 21% between 2001 and 2004. The most important industry is software (34%), followed by 
biotechnology (18%) and ICT manufacturing (16%). The average number of investment rounds a PC receives is 
relatively constant over time and industries.  
Table 5.2.: PCs by founding year and industry group 
  PCs Financing Rounds 
Average number of rounds 
Founding year Number % Number % 
1986-1997 240 35.09 534 33.00 2.23 
1998-2000 302 44.15 748 46.23 2.48 
2001-2004 142 20.76 336 20.77 2.37 
Total 684 100.00 1618 100.00 2.37 
Industry           
Software 234 34.21 559 34.55 2.39 
Biotech 122 17.84 314 19.41 2.57 
ICT manufacturing 113 16.52 275 17.00 2.43 
Internet 90 13.16 177 10.94 1.97 
TLC 39 5.70 90 5.56 2.31 
Web publishing 33 4.82 77 4.76 2.33 
Other R&D 29 4.24 69 4.26 2.38 
Pharmaceutical 24 3.51 57 3.52 2.38 
Total 684 100.00 1618 100.00 2.37 
* Other R&D includes companies active in the aerospace, energy, nanotech and robotics industry 
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5.4.2. Measuring escalation of commitment 
Following Guler (2007), a two-stage analysis was implemented in order to investigate VC firms’ behaviour 
in sequential investment decisions. Controlling for PC characteristics, VC firm characteristics, deal 
characteristics and market conditions, industry, year and country effects, the hazard of a successful exit is 
estimated as a function of the number of financing rounds invested in the PC by the focal VC firm, 
differentiating between domestic VC firms, cross-border VC firms and branch VC firms. A similar equation is 
estimated for unsuccessful exits. In the second stage, the impact of the number of financing rounds on the 
hazard of successful exits and unsuccessful exits are compared. If VC firms are rational they should increasingly 
terminate investments that have a decreasing probability of success over financing rounds. In contrast, if the 
updated information on the PC is favourable at each new financing round, the likelihood of a successful exit - 
conditional on this new information - increases over time and the probability of an unsuccessful exit (i.e. 
investment termination) should decrease over financing rounds. If the updated information is on the contrary 
negative, the probability of a successful exit given this updated information declines over financing rounds and 
the likelihood of an unsuccessful exit should therefore increase. To conclude, if VC firms behave rationally, the 
probability of an unsuccessful exit should be inversely proportional to the conditional likelihood of a successful 
exit (Guler, 2007).  
5.4.3. Variable definitions 
5.4.3.1. Dependent variables  
As financial return data on individual investments are not available in the European VC industry, the exit route 
is used as a proxy to evaluate the performance of VC investments (Guler, 2007). The first dependent variable 
embodies the hazard of an unsuccessful exit for a PC at time t. The second dependent variable represents the 
hazard of successful exit for a PC at time t. Exits hence need to be classified as successful or unsuccessful 
(Birmingham et al., 2003; Guler, 2007). In line with the VC literature, IPOs are categorized as successful exits 
(Gompers, 1995). Liquidations, bankruptcies and buy-backs by entrepreneurs are classified as unsuccessful 
exits.  
Finally, exits through a trade sale or a buy-out are commonly considered as a successful exit (Guler, 2007). 
However, unsuccessful PCs may also be sold for a nominal value to a trade or financial acquirer in a fire sale. 
Consequently we performed bankruptcy-prediction type analyses to classify trade sales and buy-outs as 
successful or unsuccessful exits. This procedure is explained in more detail in Appendix 5.1. Finally, following 
Guler (2007, p264) we coded a “VC firm-investment relationship as terminated if the VC firm did not appear in 
any of the subsequent investment rounds or if the focal round was also the final round of financing for the 
venture.” In the former, VC investors are washed out by dilution when they are not participating in subsequent 
rounds. In this case we assumed that the termination event occurred at the earliest round date at which the VC 
firm no longer appeared as an investor. In the latter, we assumed that it occurred within 1888 days after the final 
round of financing, with 1888 days being the 75 percentile time to exit of the sample.  
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Table 5.3. shows that 634 (29.68%) unique VC-PC pairs are successful exits, while 998 (46.72%) VC-PC pairs 
are unsuccessful exits. The ratio of successful versus unsuccessful exits is 0.64 for the full sample, but higher 
for cross-border VC investments (0.76) and branch VC investments (0.86).  
The dependent variable measures the time in months from a VC firm’s first investment date in a specific PC 
until exit. Investments of VC firms in PCs for which no exit information is available are treated as right 
censored.  
Table 5.3.: VC firm - PC pairs by investment outcome and VC firm origin  
  
All VC firms Domestic VC firms Cross-border VC firms Branch VC firms 
Full Sample 2136 1432 360 131 
Successful exit 634 409 130 48 
Unsuccessful exit 998 645 170 56 
Missing exit 504 378 60 27 
Ratio* 0.64 0.63 0.76 0.86 
* Ratio is defined as the number of successful exits divided by the number of unsuccessful exits 
5.4.3.2. Independent variables  
The key independent variables measure VC firm origin and the number of financing rounds invested by each 
VC firm. VC firm origin is captured by three mutually exclusive dummy variables that equal one if the focal VC 
firm satisfies the origin condition of the respective dummies and zero otherwise: domestic VC firm, cross-border 
VC firm, branch VC firm. The ROUNDS (R) variable captures the investment round number since the initial 
investment of the focal VC firm. Cash investments occurring within a 6 months period are aggregated and 
treated as a single round. To circumvent potential multicollinearity issues, the ROUNDS variable is centred by 
subtracting the mean. The interaction terms between the origin dummies and the ROUNDS variable test our 
hypotheses. 
5.4.3.3. Control variables  
We control for PC characteristics, VC firm characteristics, deal characteristics, market conditions, industry, year 
and country effects. Since the relative efficacy of de-escalation strategies may vary based on the level project 
completion (Sleesman et al., 2012), PC characteristics variables at time of investment or exit are included: PC 
age, number of patents, the natural logarithm of a PC’s sales and the development stage of the PC at the time of 
VC firm entry. Table 5.4. gives an overview of the PC development stage at entry of the different VC firms. 
While the majority of investments are made in PCs in the start-up and expansion stage, domestic VC firms 
(22%) make approximately twice as much seed investments compared to cross-border VC firms (12%) and 
branch VC firms (13%). Branch VC firms invest in a lower proportion of PCs in the start-up stage and a higher 
proportion in the expansion stage (56%) compared to domestic (39%) and cross-border VC firms (46%). Table 
5.5. shows the description of the sample at first investment of the focal VC firm; Panel A records the PC 
characteristics. Compared to the median PC backed by a domestic VC firm, the median PC backed by a cross-
border or a branch VC firm is one year older at time of entry of the focal VC firm (three years versus two). The 
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median PC holds no patents (mean 0.44) and generates sales of respectively €171,000, €504,000 and €114,000 
at time of entry of a domestic VC firm, a cross-border VC firm and a branch VC firm.  
Table 5.4.: VC firm stage of entry 
Investor Entry Stage 










Seed 397 20.01 307 21.77 43 11.98 17 13.18 
Start-up 764 38.51 546 38.72 145 40.39 34 26.36 
Expansion 796 40.12 538 38.16 168 46.80 72 55.81 
Later Stage 27 1.36 19 1.35 3 0.84 4 3.10 
Total 1984 100.00 1410 100.00 359 100.00 129 100.00 
Missing 152 NA 22 NA 1 NA 2 NA 
 
Table 5.5.: Descriptive statistics at first investment of the focal VC firm 
Panel A: Company characteristics Full Sample Domestic VC firm Cross-border VC firm Branch VC firm 
PC age Mean  3.42 3.15 3.74 3.65 
  Median  3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 
  S.D. 3.02 2.94 2.98 3.19 
  N 2133 1430 361 130 
Patents Mean  0.44 0.33 0.88 0.30 
  Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  S.D. 2.23 1.72 3.59 1.00 
  N 2133 1430 361 130 
Sales Mean  1762.92 1551.44 1973.87 2046.12 
(in €1,000) Median  225.00 171.00 504.00 114.00 
  S.D. 5985.25 6113.82 3204.87 4149.39 
  N 1727 1161 290 99 
Panel B: VC firm characteristics Full Sample Domestic VC firm Cross-border VC firm Branch VC firm 
VC firm age Mean  13.50 13.27 15.13 12.33 
  Median  6.00 5.00 8.00 7.50 
  S.D. 42.58 46.81 22.59 22.66 
  N 1522 1180 245 96 
VC firm total experience Mean  52.15 25.95 96.73 207.06 
  Median  6.00 4.00 17.00 78.00 
  S.D. 146.87 90.17 194.76 285.44 
  N 1591 1183 281 121 
VC firm country  Mean  14.67 17.13 4.95 13.88 
experience Median  2.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 
  S.D. 46.21 51.74 19.32 27.73 
  N 1591 1183 281 121 
VC firm IPO track record Mean  3.69 0.76 8.51 21.28 
  Median  0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 
  S.D. 15.22 4.48 18.78 39.95 
  N 1591 1183 281 121 
Lead investor  Mean  0.56 0.62 0.40 0.56 
(dummy) N 1782 1189 309 116 
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Panel C: Deal characteristics Full Sample Domestic VC firm Cross-border VC firm Branch VC firm 
Distance to PC Mean  794.05 164.19 3385.86 565.19 
(in kilometers) Median  164.00 75.00 1091.00 81.00 
  S.D. 2041.79 217.01 3553.97 1806.87 
  N 1919 1430 359 130 
VC firm investment  Mean  2.23 1.77 3.15 5.06 
amount  Median  1.20 1.00 2.40 2.53 
(in millions of €) S.D. 3.50 2.50 2.94 8.86 
  N 1421 894 277 98 
VC firm entry round Mean  1.89 1.65 2.34 1.88 
  Median  1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 
  S.D. 1.27 1.02 1.50 1.24 
  N 2131 1430 361 129 
Syndication  Mean  0.79 0.74 0.92 0.77 
(dummy) N 2133 1430 361 130 
Syndication size Mean  3.20 2.53 4.95 3.10 
  Median  2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 
  S.D. 3.35 2.76 4.03 3.58 
  N 2133 1430 361 130 
Mixed syndicate  Mean  0.34 0.22 0.84 0.33 
(dummy) N 2133 1430 361 130 
 
Table 5.5. Panel B displays the descriptive statistics of the VC firm characteristics. VC firm age is included, as 
older VC firms are more likely to stage their investments (Chemmanur et al., 2012). Compared to the median 
cross-border and branch VC firm, a median domestic VC is three years younger at time of first investment in the 
PC. As a VC firm’s experience may impact the probability of a successful exit, the number of prior PCs the VC 
firm invested in is measured (Dai et al. 2012). Both a VC firm’s general experience and its country specific 
experience are included. The median domestic VC firm has the lowest general experience (4 investments) but 
the highest country specific experience (3). The median cross-border VC firm has no country specific 
experience, but has invested in 17 PCs worldwide. While the median branch VC firm has the highest general 
experience (78 investments), its country specific experience is in between that of domestic and of cross-border 
VC firms (2 investments). Since VC firms’ reputational concerns may impact exit timing, their reputation is 
included and measured as the number of IPO exits (Cumming and Dai, 2010). While the median domestic VC 
firm has no IPO experience, the median cross-border VC firm and branch VC firm have brought respectively 
one and three PCs to the stock market before investing in the focal PC. Finally, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the VC firm is the lead investor in the round is included. Domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms 
act as lead investor in respectively 62, 40 and 56 percent of the investments.  
Following deal characteristics are included (see Table 5.5., Panel C): geographic distance, cumulative amount 
invested, VC firm entry round, syndication size and mixed syndicate. As geographical proximity impacts a VC 
firm’s information gathering, monitoring and advising functions, the geographical distance is included and 
measured by computing the natural logarithm of the physical distance in kilometres between the focal VC firm 
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and the PC’s headquarter. The median distance between a VC firm and its PC is respectively 75, 1091 and 81 
kilometres for domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms. The cumulative amount of investments made in the 
PC by a VC firm prior to the focal round is a proxy of its sunk costs, which may influence escalation of 
commitment. This measure is computed as the sum of euro amount (in millions of euro) that the VC firm 
invested in the PC in all rounds prior to the focal round. Domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms invest a 
median amount of respectively 1.00, 2.40 and 2.53 million euro in the entry round. The VC firm entry round is 
defined as the round in which the VC firm first appears as an investor in the PC, because the likelihood of 
termination may be different for VC firms that join the syndicate earlier rather than later (Guler, 2007). While a 
median domestic and branch VC firm enters the PC in the first investment round, a median cross-border VC 
firm enters in the second investment round. Syndication size, measured as the time-varying cumulative count of 
VC investors that participated in prior financing rounds or in the focal round, controls for a possible effect of co-
investor pressure (Guler, 2007). Respectively 74, 92 and 77 percent of the first round investments of domestic, 
cross-border and branch VC firms are syndicated. A median cross-border VC firm has twice as many co-
investors (4) compared to a median domestic and branch VC firm (2). Finally, a dynamic variable that captures 
whether there was a syndicate comprised of both domestic and cross-border VC firms is added to control for a 
possible effect of the syndicate composition (Chemmanur et al., 2012). Domestic, cross-border and branch VC 
firms enter in a mixed syndicate at first investment in respectively 22, 84 and 33 percent of the investments. 
To control for general market conditions, the yearly total number of VC backed IPOs is added. This can affect a 
PC’s probability to go public, as well as VC investment practices (Guler, 2007). Finally, companies may exhibit 
different development patterns depending upon the time when they received their first VC investment. Both the 
time frame of our study and our focus on high-tech sectors require us to control for the year of first VC 
investment. Companies in different industries may differ in terms of the milestones they need to meet, the 
number of rounds they typically receive, and the time they take before exiting (Guler, 2007). To control for 
potential industry and country effects, industry and country dummies are added.  
5.4.4. Method of Analysis 
Event-history analysis (also known as hazards or survival analysis) is used to dynamically estimate the 
investment process by comparing the distributions of the hazards of successful and unsuccessful exits (Guler, 
2007). Survival models can be viewed as consisting of two parts: the underlying hazard function, often denoted 
λ0(t), describing how the hazard (risk) changes over time at baseline levels of covariates; and the effect 
parameters, describing how the hazard varies in response to explanatory covariates. The hazards of successful 
and unsuccessful exits are estimated using the semi-parametric competing risks Cox proportional hazard model, 
which does not require the distribution of time dependence of the hazard to be specified (Guler, 2007). 
Coefficients are estimated using partial likelihood estimation. In the estimation of the parameters (β) the 
baseline hazard function does not need to be explicitly estimated. This flexibility is perhaps the strongest feature 
of the Cox model. Moreover, in a proportional hazards model, the unique effect of a unit increase in a covariate 
is multiplicative with respect to the hazard rate. The Cox regression model quantifies the relative hazard of an 
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event (in this case successful exit and unsuccessful exit), at varying times after the initiation of treatment (in this 
case the entry time of the focal VC firm). The data consist of survival times, some of which are censored if the 
study ended before an exit event was observed. The data is hence set up so that every individual VC investment 
round is a spell, leading to 3445 spells. A spell is treated as right censored if it does not result in a successful or 
an unsuccessful exit. Following Guler (2007), unsuccessful (successful) exits are treated as right censored in the 
model estimating the hazards of successful (unsuccessful) exits. Analyses are clustered on VC firms, as multiple 
observations for the same VC firm investing in several PCs could lead to correlations between the error 
structure and the independent variables and thus lead to underestimation of the standard errors.  
Potential selection effects are controlled for by using a two-stage model (Rao et al, 2001). First, a probit model 
for cross-border investor choice is estimated. The inverse Mill’s ratios are then included as an instrument in the 
second stage event-history analyses. 
5.5. Results 
5.5.1. Main analyses  
Table 5.6. presents the correlation matrix. All variables have variance inflation factors well below the usual 
warning level of 10 except for the inverse mills ratio (16.75) and the syndication size variable (10.12). The 
mean variance inflation factor is 2.52. This indicates that problems due to multicollinearity issues are limited. 
Table 5.7. reports the results for the hazard of successful and unsuccessful exits. Model 1a models the hazard of 
a successful exit, while model 1b models the hazard of an unsuccessful exit. Taken together, models 1a and 1b 
allow to assess whether there is escalation of commitment by domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms. 
Models 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b test if there are significant differences in the probability to escalate commitment 
between the different categories of VC firm origin, allowing to test the hypotheses. The coefficients of the 
inverse mills ratios are statistically significant in all models indicating that there is a selection bias.  
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Table 5.6.: Correlations (N=1552) 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Independent variables                                 
1 ROUNDS (centred)                                 
2 Domestic VC firm x R 0.78                               
3 Cross-border VC firm x R 0.47 0.00                             
4 Branch VC firm x R 0.41 -0.01 -0.01                           
Selection variable                                 
5 Inverse Mills Ratio -0.34 -0.28 -0.15 -0.11                         
PC characteristics                                 
6 PC age 0.42 0.36 0.19 0.12 -0.22                       
7 Patents 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 0.06                     
8 Sales (LN) 0.28 0.25 0.10 0.09 -0.25 0.61 0.09                   
VC firm characteristics                                 
9 VC firm age 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02                 
10 VC firm country experience 0.12 0.16 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.00               
11 VC firm IPO track record 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.10 -0.22 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.06             
12 Lead investor -0.11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 0.40 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.10           
Deal characteristics                                 
13 Distance (LN) -0.01 -0.06 0.12 -0.07 -0.21 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.03 -0.06 0.13 -0.10         
14 Cumulative amount invested by VC 0.66 0.44 0.48 0.21 -0.32 0.40 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.16 0.19 -0.06 0.11       
15 Syndication size 0.37 0.31 0.14 0.13 -0.79 0.38 0.14 0.29 0.09 0.01 0.18 -0.43 0.21 0.33     
16 Mixed syndicate 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.01 -0.62 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.20 -0.37 0.23 0.20 0.57   
Market conditions                                 
17 IPO market conditions -0.28 -0.25 -0.11 -0.09 0.18 -0.31 -0.05 -0.21 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.22 -0.26 -0.09 
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Table 5.7.: Results of Cox models predicting the hazard of exit 
    Main Models Comparison of VC Firm Origins 
    Success No Success Success No Success Success No Success 
    1a 1b 2a 2b   3a 3b 
Independent variables                         
  ROUNDS (centred)         0.118   -0.100   -0.257 * -0.282 * 
  Domestic VC firm         0.022   -0.154           
  Cross-border VC firm -0.022   0.154           -0.022   0.154   
  Branch VC firm -0.363   0.223   -0.341   0.069   -0.363   0.223   
  Domestic VC firm * R -0.257 * -0.282 * -0.375 ** -0.181           
  Cross-border VC firm * R 0.118   -0.100           0.375 ** 0.181   
  Branch VC firm * R 0.074   -0.200   -0.045   -0.100   0.331 * 0.082   
Selection variable                         
  Inverse Mills Ratio -0.653 † -0.805 ** -0.653 † -0.805 ** -0.653 † -0.805 ** 
PC characteristics                        
  PC age -0.023   0.039   -0.023   0.039   -0.023   0.039   
  Patents 0.070 * 0.071 *** 0.070 * 0.071 *** 0.070 * 0.071 *** 
  Sales (LN) 0.126 *** -0.015   0.126 *** -0.015   0.126 *** -0.015   
VC firm characteristics                         
  VC firm age -0.002   0.003 ** -0.002   0.003 ** -0.002   0.003 ** 
  VC firm country experience 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 
  VC firm IPO track record -0.002   -0.007   -0.002   -0.007   -0.002   -0.007   
  Lead investor -0.115   -0.156   -0.115   -0.156   -0.115   -0.156   
Deal characteristics                          
  Distance (LN) 0.078 * -0.001   0.078 * -0.001   0.078 * -0.001   
  Cumulative amount invested 0.010   -0.005   0.010   -0.005   0.010   0.005   
  VC firm entry round 0.304 *** 0.107   0.304 *** 0.107   0.304 *** 0.107   
  Syndication size -0.004   -0.133 ** -0.004   -0.133 ** -0.004   -0.133 ** 
  Mixed syndicate 0.208   0.506 ** 0.208   0.506 ** 0.208   0.506 ** 
Market conditions                         
  IPO market conditions 0.002 * 0.003 *** 0.002 * 0.003 *** 0.002 * 0.003 *** 
Other                          
  Investor entry stage x x x x X X 
  First investment year x x x x X x 
  PC industry x x x x X x 
  PC country x x x x X x 
                            
  Observations 1,382 1,382 1,382 1,382   1,382 1,382 
  Log likelihood -1,516 -1,716 -1,516 -1,716   -1,516 -1,716 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (conservative two-tailed tests) 
The coefficients of the following dummy variables are not reported due to space considerations: investor entry stage; first 
investment year; PC industry; PC country 
x: variables are included in the models 
 
Control variables are largely in line with prior findings. A PC’s number of patents, VC firm country experience 
and IPO market conditions have a significant positive impact on the probability of both a successful and an 
unsuccessful exit. PCs that generate higher sales, that are located further away from the VC firm (consistent 
with Dai et al., 2012) and entering a PC in a later round are associated with a higher probability to have a 
successful exit, although these variables do not impact the probability to have an unsuccessful exit. While VC 
firm age has no impact on the hazard to have a successful exit, older VC firms have a higher probability to have 
an unsuccessful exit. While larger syndicates have lower probability of an unsuccessful exit, mixed syndicates 
have a higher probability of unsuccessful exit. Finally, first investment year, industry and PC country dummies 
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are significant in all models. Other control variables, including the age of the PC, a VC firm’s IPO track record, 
investing as the lead investor, the cumulative amount invested and the entry stage have neither a significant 
impact on the probability to have a successful exit, nor to have an unsuccessful exit.  
Comparing the distribution of successful and unsuccessful exits over rounds allows to assess whether VC firms 
show escalation of commitment (Guler, 2007). Interaction terms between domestic, cross-border and branch VC 
firm dummies, and the ROUNDS variable are therefore included in Models 1a and 1b. The ROUNDS variable is 
excluded from these analyses to avoid perfect multicollinearity between the independent variables. Models 1a 
and 1b estimate the relationship between the hazard of a successful (respectively unsuccessful) exit and the 
number of investment rounds of domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms. The coefficient of the interaction 
term between domestic VC firm and ROUNDS is negative and significant (p < .05) in both models. The negative 
coefficient implies that domestic VC firm’s probability to have both a successful and an unsuccessful exit 
decreases with each additional investment round. As the probability to successfully exit goes down over rounds, 
if domestic VC firms behave rationally and maximize profits, the probability of termination and thus of an 
unsuccessful exit should increase over rounds. In contrast, the coefficients of the interaction terms between 
ROUNDS and cross-border and branch VC firm are not significant in neither model. The insignificant 
coefficient indicates that the number of investment rounds does not impact the probability to have either a 
successful or an unsuccessful exit for cross-border and branch VC firms. Our results hence suggest that 
domestic VC firms’ likelihood to unsuccessfully exit a PC deviates from the conditional probability of having a 
successful exit, but not that of cross-border VC firms and branch VC firms. This strongly suggests that domestic 
VC firms escalate their commitment as they do not behave to maximize profits in sequential investment 
decisions. Cross-border and branch VC firms, in contrast, show no escalation of commitment. These results are 
in line with our hypotheses. 
To test our first and second hypotheses, the escalation of commitment of domestic and branch VC firms is 
directly compared with the escalation of commitment of cross-border VC firms. Therefore, the interaction 
variable between cross-border VC firms and ROUNDS is dropped and the ROUNDS variable is included in 
models 2a and 2b. Cross-border VC firm is hence the reference category. Model 2a estimates the hazard of a 
successful exit. The results show that while the probability of having a successful exit declines significantly 
more over rounds for domestic VC firms compared to cross-border VC firms (p < .01), there are no significant 
differences in the probability to have a successful exit over rounds between branch VC firms and cross-border 
VC firms. Model 2b estimates the hazard of an unsuccessful exit. None of the coefficients of the interaction 
terms are significant, indicating that the distribution of unsuccessful exit events over rounds of both domestic 
and branch VC firms are not significantly different from those of cross-border VC firms. The results of both 
analyses together hence provide strong support for hypothesis 1: domestic VC firms have a significantly higher 
probability to escalate commitment to a failing course of action compared to cross-border VC firms. In contrast, 
we fail to find support for hypothesis 2 as no significant difference was found between branch VC firms and 
cross-border VC firms in their probability to escalate commitment. 
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The third hypothesis is tested in models 3a and 3b by including interaction terms between the ROUNDS variable 
and both the cross-border and branch VC firm dummies, and excluding the interaction term with the domestic 
VC firm dummy, making domestic VC firms the reference category. Compared to domestic VC firms, the 
probability of having a successful exit declines significantly less over rounds for branch VC firms (p < .05, 
model 3a), but there is no significant difference in the probability of termination over rounds between branch 
VC firms and domestic VC firms (model 3b). Combining these results with the earlier finding that branch VC 
firms do not escalate their commitment while domestic VC firms do, this provides strong support for hypothesis 
3: branch VC firms are less prone to escalate commitment compared to domestic VC firms. In addition, models 
3a and 3b again support the first hypothesis that domestic VC firms have a higher tendency to escalate their 
commitment than cross-border VC firms (p < .01). 
Figure 5.1. graphically shows the impact of an additional round of finance on the baseline hazard of a successful 
and of an unsuccessful exit and this for each VC firm category. The figure clearly shows that, in contrast to 
cross-border VC firms, domestic VC firms’ probability to both terminate and successfully exit investments 
declines as they participate in more financing rounds. Cross-border and branch VC firms also have a declining 
probability to terminate investments as they participate in more rounds, but, in contrast, their probability to have 
a successful exit increases over rounds.  
 147 | 
 
Figure 5.1.: Impact of ROUNDS on the baseline hazard of exit 
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5.5.2. Robustness of results 
Additional models were fitted to test for the robustness of our findings and assess the strength of alternative 
explanations. We focus on two potential concerns. First, alternative control variables are incorporated, that 
could not be included in the main models as they are highly correlated to other variables. Second, the potential 
multicollinearity issue is investigated in more detail. 
Additional models were estimated using alternative control variables. First, VC firm’s general experience is 
included instead of its country specific experience. A high correlation between both variables prevents us from 
including both variables in the same model. Second IPO market condition variable is replaced by respectively 
the total number of VC-financed ventures worldwide, the total amount of VC money raised worldwide and the 
number of M&As in West Europe. Third, because access to capital may affect the likelihood of success and 
failure, a control for the cumulative total amount invested in the PC by all the VC firms prior to the focal round 
instead of the cumulative amount invested by the focal VC firm is included (Guler, 2007). Finally, PC sales is 
replaced by the number of people employed. The main results remained unchanged.  
Another potential problem is the presence of highly correlated explanatory variables. Multicollinearity makes 
the parameter estimates unreliable and inflates the standard errors (Van den Poel and Larivière, 2004). An 
additional difficulty is caused by the time-varying nature of multiple variables in our study. The 
intercorrelations should therefore be analysed dynamically. In an effort to assess potential multicollinearity 
concerns empirically, variables were added sequentially to the main models to assess the stability of the 
parameters and to ensure that multicollinearity has no harmful impact on the results (Van den Poel and 
Larivière, 2004). New models were estimated with a correlation cut-off of 0.6 and new control variables were 
sequentially introduced, based upon a less restrictive cut-off point. The results reveal that the coefficients and 
significance of the control variables and of the main independent variables remain highly stable in all models. It 
is hence unlikely that the results are impacted by potential multicollinearity problems. 
5.6. Discussion and conclusion 
Organizational decision makers have been shown to escalate their commitment towards a failing course of 
action (Guler, 2007). Research on the escalation of commitment behaviour has however, neglected the 
differential impact which organizations’ origin may have on the probability to exhibit this decision bias. This 
paper contributes by differentiating between domestic and cross-border investors. Additionally, we investigate 
how the probability to escalate commitment differs for cross-border VC firms when investing through a local 
branch or from abroad. Therefore we scrutinized how cross-border, domestic and branch VC firms respectively 
differ in the antecedents of escalation of commitment.  
The VC industry provides an attractive setting to investigate our research question as VC firms are expert 
decision makers, experienced in making exit decisions in a high-risk environment and have several structural 
safeguards in place to prevent irrational behaviour such as escalation of commitment. Despite these safeguards, 
extant literature has shown that VC firms escalate commitment when facing underperforming PCs but literature 
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has neglected the effects of VC firm origin. Our unique data enables us to fill this gap. Our findings show a 
robust and significant higher probability to escalate commitment for domestic VC firms as opposed to cross-
border VC firms and branch VC firms. These results are consistent with our central theoretical prediction.  
Multiple determinants lower cross-border VC firms’ probability to escalate commitment as opposed to domestic 
VC firms. First, cross-border VC firms’ access to lower amounts and mainly hard information decreases their 
overconfidence and decision’s equivocality. Second, the larger geographical, cultural and legal distance they 
face combined with the lower strategic importance of the focal country makes cross-border VC firms less prone 
to social and emotional pressures from stakeholders surrounding the PC.  
Although the employment of local investment managers and proximity to their PCs is expected to make branch 
VC firms behave similarly to domestic VC firms, investment committees including both local and head office 
executives prevents escalation of commitment. Results indeed show that branch VC firms behave as cross-
border VC firms as their probability to escalate commitment is lower than domestic VC firms. Moreover, we 
find no significant difference in escalation probability between cross-border VC firms investing from head 
office or through a local branch. Geographical distance between the focal VC firm and its PC is hence not the 
only driver of the results, but cultural distance and legal differences faced by cross-border VC firms (head 
office) may play an important role.  
5.7. Implications for research 
Our findings contribute to research in several ways. First, by investigating organizations rather than individuals 
in a longitudinal escalation of commitment research setting, we answer a call from Sleesman and colleagues 
(2012) for more field research on organizations using longitudinal data. Second, extant literature on escalation 
of commitment mainly focused on the psychological and project determinants of escalation determinants, 
thereby disregarding largely the social and structural determinants. (Sleesman et al., 2012). We hence make a 
strong contribution to research on escalation of commitment by answering recent calls to study the impact of 
structural determinants on escalation behaviour (Sleesman et al., 2012). Controlling for sunk costs, we directly 
assess if organizational structural safeguards prevent escalation of commitment and show that these safeguards 
are powerful factors inhibiting the risk of escalation behaviour. This result has important implications as it 
demonstrates that structural safeguards can be employed as an effective tool to mitigate the risk to escalate 
commitment. Third, extant literature does not consider VC firms’ heterogeneity and studies the impact of intra-
organizational politics and investment norms on the probability of escalation (Birmingham et al., 2003; Guler, 
2007). This study, in contrast, differentiates between domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms and 
acknowledges that escalation behaviour is determined by project, psychological, social and structural factors 
(Sleesman et al., 2012). The findings are of direct relevance for future research on escalation behaviour as 
organizations investing domestically or across-borders exhibit different probabilities to escalate commitment. 
Organizational origin should hence be included in future research on decision making behaviour and more 
specifically in escalation of commitment research. 
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Fourth, multiple studies underline that liabilities of foreignness only has detrimental effects on the foreign 
investor and increases the probability of divestment. These studies however, do not consider escalation of 
commitment in investments that fail to meet expectations and their results may as we show hence be driven by 
this decision bias. Our findings suggest that liabilities of foreignness may not always have a negative impact but 
can induce more rational decision making and as a result maximize value creation. This is important for foreign 
investors as they may be reluctant to invest abroad due to liabilities of foreignness while these liabilities may 
increase their rational behaviour. Understanding how foreign investors as opposed to domestic investors behave 
when facing underperforming investments is hence important. 
Moreover, this study contributes to the organizational decision making literature. Extant literature mainly 
focused on one-time, non-profit and highly publicly visible projects (Guler, 2007). This study, adds to the few 
studies (see e.g. Guler, 2007) that empirically provides evidence for systematic errors in decision making by 
professional, competitive, experienced investors strongly incentivised to maximize profit. Moreover, we show 
that not all investors are the same. Investing from across borders and structural safeguards mitigate the 
probability to escalate commitment. 
Finally, the logit analysis in this study to classify the trade sales and buy-outs as successful or unsuccessful exits 
offers an important methodological contribution to this stream of research, which typically views these exit 
types as successful, thereby ignoring fire sales (Guler, 2007). Our study hence provides a more fine grained 
classification and demonstrates that multiple trade sales and buy-outs should be classified as unsuccessful exits.  
5.8. Implications for practitioners  
Liabilities of foreignness may make foreign investors reluctant to invest across borders. We show that being 
foreign may also have positive effects as it reduces the probability to escalate commitment. Domestic VC firms 
on the other hand should be careful when evaluating PCs. They are prone to escalate commitment and should 
hence further improve their decision making process in order to avoid this irrational behaviour. Moreover, the 
finding that branch VC firms do not escalate commitment - despite the employment of local investment 
managers and the geographical proximity to the PCs - indicates that their structural safeguard provided by 
investment committees consisting of both local and head office executives prevents them to escalate 
commitment to a failing course of action. Domestic VC firms may hence implement this organizational 
safeguard by including distant executives in their investment committees.  
Our study also has important implications for high-tech entrepreneurs. Given the difficulty to raise finance from 
outside investors, high-tech entrepreneurs are under pressure to accept finance when and where they can find it. 
Yet, as we have demonstrated, not all VC firms have the same commitment to PCs that do not meet 
expectations. While attracting cross-border VC or branch VC may be beneficial for PCs when they perform 
well, they terminate investments more easily when PCs do not meet expectations. Entrepreneurs should 
therefore carefully evaluate if they target domestic or cross-border VC investors. We hence provide further 
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evidence that entrepreneurs in their search for finance should carefully evaluate potential investors and target 
investors that match their needs. 
5.9. Limitations and directions for future research 
As with all research, this study also has some limitations. First, although we provide clear evidence that 
domestic VC firms are more prone to escalate commitment as opposed to cross-border VC firms and branch VC 
firms and discuss the multiple determinants theoretically, we are unable to assess the relative impact of each 
determinant separately. The relative importance of each determinant is another research question which warrants 
further more qualitative study. Second, we acknowledge that a classification of the exits based upon the actual 
returns of the VC firm would provide an even better categorization. Such data is however unavailable in the 
current database. Third, an interesting avenue for future research is the assessment of the impact of specific 
institutional distance measures on the probability to escalate commitment. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether there are positive spill over effects when domestic VC firms syndicate with cross-border 
firms. More specifically, does syndication with a cross-border VC firm impact domestic VC firms’ probability 
to escalate commitment? Another, related research question is what is the impact on syndicate partners when a 
co-investor stops investing in a specific portfolio company; is there a different impact if a domestic or a cross-
border co-investors stops investing?  
5.10. Appendix 5.1.: Logit failing prediction analysis 
While the VICO database provides full exit information for some PCs, it lacks information on others. Therefore, 
based upon the characteristics of the companies for which it is known whether the exit was successful or not, we 
developed a model to predict whether an exit was successful, based upon pre-exit accounting data and company 
characteristics. This approach is comparable with failure prediction models (see e.g. Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 
1980; Hol, 2007; Altman and Sabato, 2007).  
The prediction model used the exit information of the known exits in the full VICO dataset (759 PCs). We 
classified an exit as successful if it was an IPO (54 PCs), a buy-out (5 PCs) or trade sale (35 PCs). For the latter 
two exit categories, the exit value had to exceed the total amount invested to be classified as successful. In 
similar vein, unsuccessful exits comprise liquidations (147 PCs), buy-backs (31 companies) and buy-out or trade 
sale exits with a transaction value below the total amount invested (11 PCs). 
The 94 successful exits and 189 unsuccessful exits were used as the learning sample in our logit models 
(Ohlson, 1980; Hol, 2007; Altman and Sabato, 2007). The two different logit models were estimated in order to 
test the robustness of our classification (see output Table 5.8.). The dependent variable in both models is a 
dummy variable, taking the value of one if the exit was successful. Both models have a high predictive power, 
with adjusted R² values of 0.63 (model 1) and 0.60 (model 2). The characteristics were included based on their 
significance and their predictive power (Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Hol, 2007; Altman and Sabato, 2007). 
The contribution of the entire set of variables to the prediction model is assessed in order to obtain the 
combination that has the highest classification performance among the alternatives. Table 5.9. provides the 
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descriptive statistics of the variables included in the logit models and estimates whether there are significant 
differences between the mean values of the variables for successful as opposed to unsuccessful exits. Both logit 
models include PC characteristics: the first round investment amount, the pre-exit cash flow, assets and the ratio 
of value adding over payroll expenses. While the first round investment amount measures the initial belief of the 
VC firms in the company’s business plan, the pre-exit cash flow determines the cash generation capacity of - 
and the quality of income generated by - the company and captures whether there are liquidity problems. Higher 
first round investment amounts and pre-exit cash flows are therefore expected to result in a higher probability of 
a successful exit. The descriptive statistics (Table 5.9.) show that, on average, PCs that are successfully exited 
receive a significantly (p < .05) higher amount of financing in the first investment round but there is on average 
no significant difference between the pre-exit cash flow generation. The total asset variable measures the size of 
the company which is generally expected to be positively related to safer cash flows, and thus to a lower 
probability of an unsuccessful exit (Hol, 2007). PCs that are successfully exited are on average significantly (p < 
.001) larger in total assets (Table 5.9.). The value adding over payroll expenses ratio measures the efficiency of 
a company to create value relative to its personnel costs. Higher efficiencies are expected to increase the 
probability of a successful exit. The descriptive statistics show, however, no significant differences between the 
means.  
Table 5.8.: Logit learning models 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
          
First round investment amount (million €) -0.314 ** -0.180 ** 
Holding period -0.537 ** / 
Cash flow (million €) 0.437 * 0.240   
Total assets (LN) 5.180 *** 3.216 *** 
Value adding / Payroll expenses -0.379 * -0.529 ** 
Long term debt / Total assets -3.340 ** / 
Sales (million €) -0.092 * / 
Sales / Total assets 1.551   / 
Value adding (million €) / -0.472 ** 
Value adding / Total assets / 2.883 *** 
Cash (million €) / 0.363   
First investment year x x 
PC industry x x 
PC Country x x 
Constant -30.480 *** -22.170 *** 
          
N 105 131 
Adj R² 0.63 0.60 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (conservative two-tailed tests) 
The coefficients of the following dummy variables are not reported due to space considerations: PC industry; first 
investment year; PC country 
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Table 5.9.: Descriptive statistics 
  Successful Exits Unsuccessful Exits  Student 
  N Mean  N Mean  T test 
First round investment amount (million €) 75 5.067 137 2.728 * 
Holding period 94 5.194 189 5.487   
Cash flow (million €) 73 -1.161 108 -1.128   
Total assets (million €) 78 13.144 128 3.332 *** 
Value adding / Payroll expenses 72 0.208 96 0.115   
Long term debt / Total assets 72 0.083 109 1.789   
Sales (million €) 77 13.023 138 3.136 *** 
Sales / Total assets 73 0.712 101 0.723   
Value adding (million €) 73 2.474 102 0.855 * 
Value adding / Total assets 73 0.123 102 -0.604   
Cash (million €) 76 3.684 125 0.497 ** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (conservative two-tailed tests) 
 
Further, not only internal factors but also external factors may influence the probability of exit success, e.g. the 
state of the economic cycle, industry characteristics and characteristic of the country in which the company 
operates (Hol, 2007; Chava and Jarrow, 2004). We therefore include dummy variables to control for the first 
investment year and for the PC’s industry and country characteristics.  
Model 1 further includes the time between first investment and exit, the pre-exit sales, the long term debt over 
total assets ratio and the sales over total assets ratio. Longer holding periods are expected to result in a higher 
probability of an unsuccessful exit, although no statistical differences are found between the averages. Long 
term debt over total assets ratio measures the financial leverage of the PC, an important determinant of company 
failure and by extension of the probability of an unsuccessful exit (Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Ohlson, 1980). 
The descriptive statistics display no statistical differences between the means in the ratio of value adding over 
payroll expenses of both exit ways (Table 5.9.). While the sales variable captures the company’s commercial 
success, the sales over total assets ratio measures the sales generating ability of the company’s assets. Higher 
sales and sales generating abilities of the assets are expected to increase the probability of a successful exit 
(Altman, 1968). While PCs that are exited successfully on average generate higher sales (p < .001), they do not 
differ in terms of sales over total asset ratio (Table 5.9.).  
Value adding and the value adding over total assets ratio are used as alternatives respectively for the sales 
variable and the sales to total assets ratio as the sales data are missing for a number of companies. Model 2 
includes the PC’s pre-exit value adding, amount of cash holdings and its value adding over total assets ratio. We 
expect higher value adding and value adding generation abilities of the assets to increase the probability of a 
successful exit. Similarly to the sales variables, PCs that are exited successfully on average have higher value 
adding (p < .05) but they on average do not differ in terms of value adding over total asset ratio (Table 5.9.). 
Finally, higher amounts of cash, a measure of the company’s liquidity, decreases the probability of failure and 
unsuccessful exit (Chen and Shimerda, 1981). Companies which are successfully exited have on average higher 
amounts of cash holdings (p < .01). The variables used to evaluate a company’s failure probability may be 
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correlated and cause multicolliniarity issues (Altman, 1968). The highest variance inflation factor was 3.72 for 
the sales over total assets ratio in model 1, and 2.96 for the pre exit value adding variable in model 2, which are 
well below the usual threshold level of 10 (Rao et al., 2001). 
The outcome of the learning models serves as input to classify PCs for which insufficient information is 
available to classify their exit as successful or not. There are three types of missing information. First, we were 
unable to find any exit information for 151 companies. Second, we know that an exit took place, but the exit 
year is unknown for 146 companies. Third, we know that an exit took place and we know the exit year for 179 
companies. We first estimate the exit year for those companies for which the exact exit time was lacking. 
Thereafter, we estimated the likelihood of the exit being successful based upon pre-exit accounting data and 
company characteristics. 
For the 151 companies for which we have no exit information, we first estimated whether the last know round 
was the final investment round. For this purpose, the expected date of a new round was calculated by adding 
822 days to the last round date, which corresponds with the 75 percentile time between two consecutive rounds 
in our sample (Guler, 2007). Companies were treated as right censored if the date on which a new round was 
expected occurred after the end of the data collection period August 2011 (18 companies or 2.37%). For the 
remaining companies without exit info and for the 146 companies for which the exit year was lacking, we 
assumed that the exit occurred within 1888 days after the final round of financing. This corresponds to the 75 
percentile time to exit of the sample and is consistent with the approach of Guler (2007).  
Finally, we calculated the logit scores predicted by the two classification prediction models based upon pre-exit 
accounting data and company characteristics. Companies with logit scores for both models below 0.25 were 
classified as having been unsuccessfully exited (74 companies or 9.75%) and companies with logit scores for 
both models above 0.75 as having been successfully exited (155 companies or 20.42%). Companies with a logit 
score between 0.25 and 0.75, with contradicting scores on both models or without pre-exit accounting data were 
not classified and treated as right censored data in our main analyses (229 companies or 30.17%).  
The results of the full procedure are shown in Table 5.10. While a total of 249 companies were categorized as 
having experienced a successful exit, 263 PCs were categorized as having experienced unsuccessful exits. The 
remaining 247 companies were treated as censored, the majority because accounting data was lacking (200 
companies) or because the logit scores of the two models were contradicting or inconclusive (29 companies).  
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Table 5.10.: Classification of full sample after logit failure prediction model  
    Total No exit data Buy out Inactive Liquidated M&A IPO Buy Back 
Successful 
Learning sample 94 0 5 0 0 35 54 0 
Exit year known 78 13 5 0 0 60 0 0 
Exit year imputed 77 74 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Unsuccessful 
Learning sample 189 0 0 0 147 11 0 31 
Exit year known 30 8 4 0 1 17 0 0 
Exit year imputed 44 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 
Missing accounting 200 137 4 4 0 55 0 0 
Censored 18 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Contradicting logit 29 18 1 0 0 10 0 0 
TOTAL   759 312 19 4 148 191 54 31 
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General conclusions, implications & 
 avenues for future research 
 
In this section I aim to provide some more detailed insights into the key conclusions of this dissertation. 
Therefore, the contributions of the different studies to literature are examined. I also discuss the limitations and 
avenues for future research. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of this dissertation are evaluated. 
6.1. Introduction  
The three empirical studies in this dissertation each investigate a different aspect of the relation between 
international venture capital (VC) firms and their portfolio companies (PCs) in a European context. The unique, 
hand-collected database of VC backed companies allowed to empirically study some of the unanswered research 
questions in the field of VC internationalization. The first study looks at the differences in the determinants of 
the matching process between entrepreneurial companies and respectively domestic, cross-border and branch 
VC firms. The second study focusses on how cross-border as opposed to domestic VC investors are associated 
with the growth of PCs. Finally, the third study investigates how cross-border, branch and domestic VC firms 
behave when their PCs do not meet initial expectations.  
As such, these studies provide important insights in the process of international VC funding and the effects 
thereof on PCs, and thereby contribute to the fields of VC internationalization, international business and 
entrepreneurial finance. In the remainder of this chapter, I first summarize the most important findings of the 
studies and draw some conclusions. Next, I discuss the contributions to academic literature and the practical 
implications. Finally, I conclude with the limitations and some promising avenues for future research. 
6.2. Main findings and contributions 
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the differences between international and domestic VC firms in 
three main aspects of the VC investment cycle: the initial matching with investment targets, the post-investment 
development of PCs and the exit from poorly performing PCs. In the next paragraphs I will list the main 
findings of the studies. 
The first study of this dissertation examines the impact of VC firm’s geographic and structural heterogeneity on 
the mutual matching process between investors and companies. Although several previous studies examined the 
strategies used by the VC investors (i.e. the supply side) to mitigate liabilities of foreignness (LOF), so far few 
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have taken into account the impact of VC firm’s origin on the companies (i.e. the demand side) of this matching 
process (see Chapter 1 section 1.3.2. for a review of extant literature). Further, to the best of my knowledge, no 
study to date has examined how the matching is different for international VC firms investing from a local 
branch office. As such, this study addresses the call to examine how international VC firms use a mix of 
strategies in order to deal with information asymmetry problems linked to foreign investing (Fritsch and 
Schilder, 2008; Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Pruthi et al., 2003). Our hypotheses are 
tested on a sample of 1770 VC investments in young technology based companies, of which 20% by cross-
border VC firms and 7% by local branches. Multinomial logistic regressions are used to examine the drivers of 
the mutual matching process between companies and respectively domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms.  
From the supply perspective, the LOF theory is used to explain different investment strategies used by the 
geographically diverse VC investors (Wright et al., 2005). Consistent with VC firms’ behaviour in emerging 
economies (Dai et al., 2012), our results show that cross-border VC firms have a lower probability of matching 
with informationally opaque companies in the Europe, despite the fact that the European economies are more 
integrated than emerging economies and hence lower LOF are expected. Interestingly, this effect disappears 
when controlling for co-investor characteristics. We hereby show that VC investors rely on their network 
partners to mitigate their own LOF. While previous research took a PC perspective to highlight how local 
investors may help to raise foreign VC (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Vanacker et al., 2013), our research shows 
how the network of investors present in a PC impacts the investment decisions from an investor’s perspective. 
We thereby contribute to the recently recognized role of networks in financial markets for overcoming problems 
created by distance (Jääskeläinen and Maula, 2013). 
More specifically, cross-border VC firms have a higher probability to invest with local investors, with larger 
investment syndicates and with more experienced investors. We further demonstrate that cross-border VC firms 
are more strict when assessing their co-investors when evaluating seed stage companies compared to non-seed 
stage companies. While the size of the investment syndicate does not impact the cross-border VC firm’s 
probability to match with seed stage companies, the potential contribution of co-investors to the company - 
measured as their experience and local presence increases the probability of a cross-border VC firm to match 
with seed stage companies. Finally, investing through a local branch as opposed to from a foreign head office 
allows foreign VC firms to exhibit the same investment behaviour as domestic VC firms.  
From a demand perspective, we draw upon the resource-based view of the firm to build a life cycle model on 
the association between PCs’ resource needs and VC investors’ geographic origin. Less developed companies 
with higher resource needs have a higher probability to match with domestic VC firms or branches of foreign 
VC firms, as opposed to cross-border VC firms. In particular, seed stage companies in which only cross-border 
VC firms co-invest have a higher probability to attract a local VC firm (either a domestic VC firm or a local 
branch). Hence, seed stage companies put more importance to which VC they target given their available 
resource base. Refining the opportunity and building the early resource base is important in this phase, and local 
VC investors are better equipped to provide support in these matters.  
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In the second and third study, I explore the impact of VC investor’s heterogeneity on the investment outcome. 
As a successful outcome for the VC firm is not by definition a successful outcome for the entrepreneur, I 
investigated both perspectives. The second study examines the differential impact of cross-border and domestic 
VC, on the growth of PCs across time. While previous studies indicate that cross-border VC is an increasingly 
important phenomenon, especially for high-tech companies with high growth potential (Mäkelä and Maula, 
2008), there is little evidence on the relationship between raising VC from cross-border investors and the growth 
of PCs. This question is non-trivial as, compared to domestic VC investors, cross-border VC investors might 
spur as well as constrain the growth of their PCs. I draw upon the resource-based view of the firm to build a life 
cycle model on the association between the geographic origin of VC investors and PC growth. I argue that the 
resource needs of companies change over time, and show that different types of VC investors may address 
different resource needs. A longitudinal research design is used; and sales, total assets and payroll expenses are 
tracked in 761 European technology companies from the year of initial VC investment up to seven years 
thereafter. The findings demonstrate that companies initially backed by domestic VC investors exhibit higher 
growth in the short term compared to companies backed by cross-border investors. In the medium term, 
companies initially backed by cross-border VC investors exhibit higher growth compared to companies backed 
by domestic investors. Finally, companies that are initially funded by a syndicate comprising both domestic and 
cross-border VC investors exhibit the highest growth. Cross-border and domestic VC investors offer 
complementary resources which are relevant both in the early development stages as in the later stage 
internationalisation. 
Finally, in the third study I draw upon an escalation of commitment framework to investigate how differences 
between domestic, cross-border and branch VC investors in access to information, social and structural factors 
affect their decision to terminate unsuccessful investments. Previous studies have mainly focused on either the 
rationale for international investments or on explaining successful investments. In contrast, this study 
contributes to the understanding of behavioural differences between domestic and cross-border VC firms 
(Mäkelä and Maula, 2006; Wright et al., 2005). The exit outcome of 1060 VC investments in 684 European 
technology companies is tracked and event-history analysis is used to dynamically estimate the investment and 
exit process through the distributions of the hazards of successful and unsuccessful exits (Guler, 2007). The 
results show that domestic investors have a high tendency to escalate their commitment to a failing course of 
action. In contrast, cross-border investors terminate their investments efficiently, even when investing through a 
local branch. This is explained by multiple determinants which lower cross-border VC firms’ probability to 
escalate commitment as opposed to domestic VC firms. First, cross-border VC firms’ access to lower amounts 
and mainly hard information decreases their overconfidence and decision’s equivocality. Second, a lower social 
involvement with the project and a lower embeddedness in the local economic and social environment due to 
the large geographical and cultural distance faced, makes cross-border VC firms less prone to social and 
emotional pressures from stakeholders surrounding the PC. Local branches of cross-border investors are further 
shielded from escalation of commitment through structural safeguards. This is one of the few studies that shows 
how structural safeguards may mitigate escalation of commitment. 
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6.3. Academic contributions 
This dissertation contributes to academic literature in multiple ways. In the next paragraphs, I will elaborate on 
the main implications for the resource-based view, escalation of commitment theory, international VC literature, 
international business literature and entrepreneurial finance literature. 
6.3.1. Implications for the resource-based view 
The first two studies contribute to the resource-based view, more specifically to the dynamic resource-based 
view. While the resource-based view of the firm defines a company as a collection of resources and states that 
the characteristics of the available resources affect the competitive advantage of a company, the dynamic 
resource-based view introduces the idea that the type of resources and capabilities needed by a company 
changes over time. The dynamic resource-based view hence takes into account the adaptation and change of a 
company’s resources and capabilities through building, integrating, or reconfiguring internal and external 
resources and capabilities in order to address rapidly changing environments (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). In order 
to explain competitive advantage, the resource based view must hence take into account the evolution over time 
of the resources and capabilities that form the basis of competitive advantage. Given the substantial 
development which young, entrepreneurial companies undergo and the significant differences in the resources 
and capabilities international and domestic VC firms can provide, our research setting is highly relevant to 
examine the dynamic nature of resources and their impact on the company’s growth. 
One of the central research questions in this dissertation is “when do companies benefit from local as opposed to 
international investors”. There are currently contradicting arguments on the benefits of international as opposed 
to local investors. Compared to domestic investors, international investors might spur as well as constrain the 
growth of their PCs. International investors may contribute to the internationalization and hence to a stronger 
growth of their PCs by sharing their knowledge pertaining to internationalization and international markets 
(Fernhaber et al., 2009; Lutz and George, 2012) and by legitimizing the unknown company in their home 
market (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005; Hursti and Maula, 2007). Nevertheless, international investors may also 
constrain company growth. First, they may drive internationalization efforts of the company towards the 
investor’s home market, which is not always the company’s target market (Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). Second, 
as we show in our third study, they stop active contribution to their PCs much earlier than domestic investors 
when the prospects of companies have fallen. 
Based on a setting of international VC investing, the studies in this dissertation provide strong support for the 
argumentation of the dynamic resource-based view. A life cycle model emerges as companies’ resource needs 
change over time and different types of investors may address different resource needs. More specifically, we 
show that while early stage companies require local resources from local investors, later stage companies benefit 
more from foreign investor’s resources in order to exhibit sustainable growth. Local investors are important for 
early stage companies as they are able to provide local contacts and to set up the initial resource base. Once the 
company reaches a more developed stage, the local investors are important to attract international investors 
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through their network and by signalling their PC’s quality. Additionally, we show that foreign investor’s 
resources and capabilities which are beneficial for later stage companies can be detrimental for companies in 
earlier stages of the company’s life cycle as international investors may terminate investments which do not 
meet initial expectation much earlier than domestic investors. This dissertation hence provides a more fine-
grained view of the dynamic resource-based view in entrepreneurial companies. 
6.3.2. Implications for the escalation of commitment theory 
The third paper contributes to the escalation of commitment theory. While most studies of escalation have 
focused on individual decision makers, organizations as a whole can also escalate commitment. The third study 
in this dissertation contributes to research on escalation of commitment by answering recent calls to study the 
impact of structural determinants on escalation behaviour (Sleesman et al., 2012). This study is one of the first 
to show structural characteristics reduce escalation of commitment. First, operating across borders decreases the 
risk of escalation of commitment through having more limited access to soft information, a lower social 
involvement with the project and a lower embeddedness in the local economic and social environment. Second, 
when investing close by, escalation of commitment can be mitigated by involving professionals that are located 
farther away in the decision making process. This is not only relevant in a VC context, but also in any 
professional environment at risk of escalation of commitment in its decision making. 
6.3.3. Implications for the international venture capital literature 
The three studies primarily contribute to the international VC literature. The first study shows that cross-border 
VC firms adapt their investment strategies driven by LOF. This finding is non-trivial as, compared to emerging 
markets, LOF are expected to be much lower in developed and more economically integrated markets such as 
Europe. Moreover, by demonstrating that cross-border VC firm’s lower probability to invest in informationally 
opaque firms disappears when controlling for co-investor characteristics, we show that cross-border VC firms 
can mitigate their LOF and expand investment options through their syndicate partners. More specifically, 
cross-border VC investment is facilitated by local, more or more resourceful co-investors. Local syndication 
mitigates information and value adding problems as it allows the cross-border VC firm to outsource the 
monitoring and value adding functions to local co-investors (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Chemmanur et al., 
2012), which are not hindered by geographical, cultural or institutional distance. Additionally, by co-investing 
with more or more resourceful partners, international VC firms may generate additional value through the 
combination of skill sets, experience and networks of a diversity of VC firms. Finally, these co-investors may 
endorse the PC and signal its quality to the cross-border VC investors. This dissertation hence advances 
international VC literature by providing a more fine grained understanding on the antecedents and the 
investment strategies to mitigate LOF in a developed market and on the role of network partners in mitigating 
LOF.  
The second study contributes by showing that the companies follow a life cycle model, the resource needs of 
companies change over time and different types of VC investors may address different resource needs. More 
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specifically, while domestic VC firms are essential for early growth, international VC firms’ resources help to 
achieve sustainable growth.  
Although organizational decision makers have been shown to escalate their commitment towards a failing 
course of action (Guler, 2007), extant research has neglected the differential impact which VC firms’ origin may 
have on the probability to exhibit this decision bias (Birmingham et al., 2003; Guler, 2007). The third study, in 
contrast, differentiates between domestic, cross-border and branch VC firms and acknowledges that escalation 
behaviour is determined by project, psychological, social and structural factors (Sleesman et al., 2012). The 
findings are of direct relevance for future research on escalation behaviour as organizations investing 
domestically or across borders exhibit different probabilities to escalate commitment. Organizational origin 
should hence be included in future research on decision making behaviour and more specifically in escalation of 
commitment research. Moreover, the study also adds to the few studies that examine unsuccessful exits by VC 
firms (Cumming and Dai, 2010). 
By investigating the impact of the VC firms' modes of internationalization (i.e. setting up a local branch versus 
investing from headquarters) on the VC firm’s investment strategy and investment commitment, respectively the 
first and third study of this dissertation answer a call made by multiple recent studies (Guler and Guillén, 2010a; 
Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2002). More specifically, the first study contributes to literature by showing 
that the establishment of a local branch allows VC firms to expand internationally while limiting LOF. A local 
branch combines the benefits of both domestic and cross-border VC firms. While from a supply point of view, 
investing through a local branch efficiently lowers LOF, from a demand point of view, branches are able to 
provide both local resources through their proximity and employment of local investment managers and 
international resources by leveraging their head office resource base. Moreover, cross-border VC firms consider 
branch VC firms as equally appealing to overcome LOF, as the effects of syndicating with at least one domestic 
VC firm or branch VC firm are the equally positive. The third study adds to literature by showing that 
organizational structural safeguards, such as the establishment of a local branch, are powerful factors inhibiting 
the risk of escalation behaviour. Although the employment of local investment managers and proximity to their 
PCs is expected to make branch VC firms behave similarly to domestic VC firm, branch VC firms’ investment 
committees including both local and head office executives prevents escalation of commitment.  
6.3.4. Implications for the international business literature 
This dissertation also advances international business literature by providing a richer understanding of the 
benefits of international investors both for the investors as for the investees. The latter has typically been 
neglected in the international business literature. 
Multiple studies underline that LOF only has detrimental effects on the foreign investor and increases their 
probability of an unsuccessful exit. These studies, however, do not consider escalation of commitment in 
investments that fail to meet expectations and their results may, as we show in the third study, hence be driven 
by this decision bias. Our findings suggest that operating in an international environment does not only entail 
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LOF, but can induce more rational decision making and as a result maximize value creation. This is important 
for foreign investors as they may be reluctant to invest abroad due to LOF while these liabilities may increase 
their rational behaviour. Understanding how foreign investors as opposed to domestic investors behave when 
facing underperforming investments is hence important. As a result, we contribute to the international business 
literature by enhancing understanding of how international firms behave when cross-border activities fail to 
meet expectations (Benito, 2005). 
Moreover, the second study shows that foreign investors may positively impact their company’s growth. While 
companies invested by local investors are more likely to exhibit high growth early-on, companies backed by 
foreign investors have more sustainable growth rates in the long run. This is especially the case when local 
investors co-invest with foreign investors.  
6.3.5. Implications for the entrepreneurial finance literature 
In addition, this dissertation advances the entrepreneurial finance literature. By considering the demand 
perspective in the first study, we address the call by Pruthi and colleagues (2003) to investigate what factors 
influence the PCs decision to obtain finance from an international rather than a domestic VC firm. Thereby, we 
contribute to the knowledge on the paradox of the increasing internationalization in the VC market. The 
increasing number of international VC investments contrasts with the benefits of geographical proximity of 
domestic VC firms to add value and monitor PCs. The results from the first study contribute by displaying that 
entrepreneurs dynamically assess their companies’ resource gaps and consequently target VC investors with 
specific geographic origins based upon the required resources. Moreover, the second study shows that PCs 
benefit from international VC firm’s resources to achieve long term growth. A life cycle model emerges from 
these results: a young PC benefits from tight monitoring and close interaction with its investors to shape its 
opportunity and to develop early organizational resources and routines. This study hence contributes to the 
entrepreneurial finance literature by showing that domestic VC investors are better at supporting a company in 
its early growth, while the resources of a cross-border VC investor are especially valuable in a later phase when 
international expansion becomes more important. The study thus provides a life cycle perspective on the 
resources VC investors may offer to their PCs. The study further shows that bundling the diverse resources from 
different types of VC investors allows overcoming the shortcomings of one particular type of investor. Overall, 
this study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the role that domestic and cross-border VC investors 
can play as their PCs grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time. 
These findings are important, as few studies have disentangled the effects of domestic and cross-border VC 
investors on the growth of their PCs. Most studies on the effects of VC have studied performance at the VC 
investor or fund level, focusing on PC exit and/or survival, or focusing on post-IPO performance (limiting these 
studies to the most successful PCs). This study, in contrast, is one of the first to focus on the growth of the PC 
from the initial VC investment throughout the typical lifespan of a VC investment. This is important for 
entrepreneurs, as the goals of investors and entrepreneurs are not always aligned. Understanding how PCs grow 
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after having received VC, and how different types of investors contribute differently to company growth, is 
hence relevant.  
6.4. Limitations and avenues for future research 
In this dissertation I have examined different aspects of the relation between international VC firms and their 
PCs in a European context. While the results of the empirical studies provide new insights to resource-based 
view and escalation of commitment theory and new insights in the fields of VC internationalization, 
international business and entrepreneurial finance, the studies are not without limitations. In the next 
paragraphs, I will elaborate on main limitations of the dissertation and discuss some avenues for future research. 
6.4.1. Methodological limitations: Sample, variables and method of analysis 
6.4.1.1. Sample: discussion of internal validity and external validity  
Although the studies in this dissertation use a unique and very valuable dataset, there are some inherent 
limitations associated with it.  
A first potential limitation relates to the internal validity of the studies, i.e. the degree in which confounding 
variables are successfully eliminated within the study. The internal validity of the studies potentially suffers 
from the presence of various countries and industries in the sample and from year effects. This heterogeneity 
may impact some of the central themes in the different studies: the PC’s growth potential and growth pattern, 
the probability of both successful and unsuccessful exits, the level of information asymmetry and LOF. In the 
next paragraph, I will hence examine the potential limitations relating to the internal validity.  
In the first study, the internal validity may suffer from various levels of LOF due to differences in the PC 
country’s culture and institutional setting, information costs and difficulties to monitor or add value. This 
potentially affects the investment strategy used by the cross-border VC. In order to address this issue, we 
included PC country dummies in the main models. Moreover, as these drivers of LOF may change over time 
and over industries, time and industry dummies were also included in the main models. With respect to the 
second study, the growth potential and growth pattern may vary given the size of the PCs’ and the VC firms’ 
home markets, the PCs’ industry and the specific year under investigation. In order to address these issues, we 
included several control variables in the main models. Moreover, robustness analyses were ran substituting the 
cross-border VC dummy with a dummy that captures whether the cross-border investor originated from an 
Anglo-Saxon country. The results are broadly consistent with those of the main models and the dynamics are 
often even stronger. This is in line with our theory as in this analysis we focus on Continental European PCs and 
Anglo-Saxon investors, for whom the geographical, cultural and legal distance are higher than between PCs and 
investors operating in different countries within Continental Europe (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). In the third 
study, the inclusion of different first investment years, PC countries and industries may affect the probabilities 
of a successful or an unsuccessful exit. This is addressed by inclusion of several control variables. 
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A second potential limitation related to the use of a specific sample is the external validity, i.e. the extent to 
which the results of a study can be generalized to the population or to other situations. More specifically, the 
geographical, industry and time period coverage of the studies may reduce the generalization of the findings. I 
will hence discuss the potential limitations relating to the external validity in the next paragraph.  
The focus on European PCs in the sample may limit the generalizability of the results. LOF faced by cross-
border VC firms may differ between developed and emerging VC markets (Chemmanur et al., 2012). Moreover, 
companies established in countries with large internal markets such as the U.S. may not need to internationalize 
in order to grow. This may seriously reduce the PCs’ need for international VC’s resources. Although we cannot 
control for these issues, there are several reasons to assume that the findings of our studies are generalizable 
towards companies outside of Europe. First, investing in developed markets is expected to involve less LOF. As 
a result, the fact that we are able to find an impact of LOF on the investment strategies of international VC firms 
in these circumstances makes us confident that the results will hold in less developed markets. Second, high-
tech companies often have a narrow product scope based on a technology that may quickly become obsolete and 
for which the domestic market size is limited (Litvak, 1990; McDougall et al., 1994; Coviello and Munro, 1995; 
Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Sapienza et al., 2006; Lutz and George, 2012). This forces high-tech companies to 
internationalize as soon as possible. Moreover, although larger domestic markets may enable the PCs to delay 
their internationalization, we expect that high-tech companies will want to internationalize as soon as possible in 
order to exploit the first mover advantage.  
A second threat to external validity concerns the generalization to other industries. We acknowledge the 
potential limitations in the generalizability towards non-high-tech industries. This is due to the particularities of 
high-tech as opposed to non-high-tech industries. First, LOF are particularly severe when investing in high-tech 
companies as these are based upon company specific proprietary technological know-how which is especially 
difficult to assess for distant “outside investors”. Second, thin markets for information arise both because high-
tech companies are secretive in order to protect their competitive position, and because there may be few trusted 
third parties for information dissemination (Hsu, 2004). Moreover, the challenges of high-tech companies are 
further compounded by the fact that they often operate in complex and highly volatile environments (Stuart et 
al., 1999). A third and final potential thread to the external validity is the specific timeframe of the sample. 
Although there might be a generalization problem due to the timeframe of our studies, the study accounts for 
different macro-economic climates by the inclusion of a pre-bubble, bubble and post-bubble period.  
6.4.1.2. Variables 
There are some limitations related to the variables available in our sample and to measurement of the variables 
used in the studies. 
First, our large scale study prevents to provide a more fine grained insight in the matching processes used by VC 
firms to mitigate LOF or by entrepreneurs to obtain the required resources. For example, understanding the 
interaction between cross-border VC firms and their co-investors provides an interesting avenue for future 
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research. Additionally, analysing a representative sample containing companies that have tried but failed to raise 
domestic, cross-border or branch VC would help to more accurately understand the matching process. 
Second, we acknowledge that understanding how cross-border investors influence internationalization of their 
PCs, for instance by analysing exports or international acquisitions, would be interesting. Such data is however 
not available in the current database. 
Finally, although we provide clear evidence that domestic VC firms are more prone to escalate commitment 
compared to cross-border VC firms and branch VC firms and discuss the multiple determinants theoretically, we 
are unable to assess the relative impact of each determinant separately. The relative importance of each 
determinant is another research question which warrants further more qualitative study. Moreover, we 
acknowledge that a classification of the exits based upon the actual returns of the VC firm would provide an 
even better categorization. Such data is however unavailable in the current database. 
6.4.1.3 Method of analysis  
Although we estimate separate models for the supply and the demand perspective in the first study, the 
realization of a match is always the result of both the investor’s and the entrepreneur’s preferences. We are 
hence unable to fully disentangle the divers of both perspectives.  
6.5. Practical implications 
6.5.1. Implications for entrepreneurs 
Given the difficulty to raise finance from outside investors, high-tech entrepreneurs are under pressure to accept 
finance when and where they can find it. We provide evidence that entrepreneurs in their search for finance 
should carefully evaluate the potential investors and target investors that match their own and the investors’ 
needs.  
First, having highly experienced, well networked and reputable local investors is crucial for PCs that need to 
obtain cross-border VC as the local investors can play a particularly important brokerage role. They may help 
the PC to become investment ready for the cross-border VC firms by providing essential early resources, 
signalling the PC’s quality to cross-border VC firms and lower the LOF of more distant cross-border VC firms. 
As a result, local investors have a major impact on the probability to attract foreign investments thereby 
expanding the resource base of the PC. PCs should hence target well established, professional and highly 
reputed local investors (either domestic or branch VC investors) with a broad international network who are able 
to endorse them by providing a trustworthy signal.  
Second, early finance decisions may have a long-lasting impact on subsequent company growth. While PCs of 
local investors are more likely to exhibit high growth early-on, companies backed by cross-border VC investors 
have higher growth rates in the long run, especially when local VC investors co-invest with cross-border VC 
investors.  
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However, entrepreneurs should also understand that having cross-border or branch VC firms as investors may 
lead to a lower commitment of the investors, especially if the PCs do not meet initial expectations. While cross-
border VC or branch VC may be especially beneficial for PCs when they perform well, they also terminate 
investments more easily when PCs do not meet expectations. Entrepreneurs should therefore carefully evaluate 
if and when to target domestic or cross-border VC investors. 
Overall, our findings suggest that it might be worthwhile for entrepreneurs to extend their search for finance and 
target a broad and diverse investor base, or local investors with a strong international network and reputation. 
6.5.2. Implications for international venture capital investors 
Our research is relevant for VC practitioners as it shows that different geographical focuses may have a 
significant impact on investment strategy. Cross-border VC firms should recognize the important role which 
local VC investors can play and know in which situations they are most valuable. Moreover, cross-border VC 
firms need to build and maintain solid relationships with local VC firms as this will increase their deal-flow. If 
the focal country is a part of the long term strategy of an international VC, they should consider establishing a 
local branch. A local branch’s geographical proximity and local embeddedness allows international VC firms to 
limit their LOF and to invest without domestic VC firms. 
When investing without local syndicate partners, cross-border VC firms should carefully assess the development 
stage of their PCs prior to investing. Given the liabilities of newness and the lack of resources that young 
technology companies face (Vohora et al., 2004), a young company in the early phases of its technical and 
organizational development is more likely to require a higher level of involvement by a VC investor than a 
company at a later stage (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). As companies age, the international knowledge, networks 
and reputation of cross-border VC investors can assist their internationalization, enabling a higher later stage 
growth. It is hence recommended that cross-border VC firms only target companies which they perceive as 
mature enough to start internationalizing unless local VC investors co-invest as PCs will then benefit from the 
complementary benefits of “localness” and of “foreignness”. 
We further show that while LOF may make foreign investors reluctant to invest across borders, being foreign 
may also have positive effects as it reduces the probability to escalate commitment. As domestic VC firms are 
more prone to escalation of commitment, international VC firms should be careful not to be peer pressured by 
domestic VC firms into re-investing in PCs that do not meet their expectations.  
6.5.3. Implications for local venture capital investors  
Local VC firms play a crucial role within the international VC setting. They facilitate cross-border investing by 
lowering the LOF of more distant cross-border VC firms. From the viewpoint of the PC, local VC firms are 
better equipped to provide support in refining a company’s opportunities and building the early resource base. 
Local investors are particularly valuable in helping their PCs to make contacts in their local environment, 
including customers, law firms, suppliers and key employees (Newbert, 2005). These are necessary to pursue 
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the opportunity and implement a value-creating strategy (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Once a PC is ready to 
expand internationally, local VC firms can signal the PC’s quality and thereby endorse the PCs to cross-border 
VC firms.  
Local investors should thus recognize that although their investment targets need a good local investor, most 
will benefit from having a cross-border investor in order to help them achieve higher growth in the middle and 
long term. Local VC firms should hence carefully assess the development of their PCs and attract cross-border 
VC firms when their PCs are ready for it. As a result, local VC investors need to maintain a well-developed 
network of potential international VC investors. 
Domestic VC firms on the other hand should be careful when evaluating follow-on investment rounds in their 
PCs. They are prone to escalate commitment to a failing course of action and should hence further improve their 
decision making process in order to avoid this irrational behaviour. Moreover, the finding that branch VC firms 
do not escalate commitment - despite the employment of local investment managers and the geographical 
proximity to the PCs - indicates that their structural safeguards provided by investment committees consisting of 
both local and head office executives prevents them to escalate commitment to a failing course of action. 
Domestic VC firms may hence implement this organizational safeguard by including distant executives in their 
investment committees. Further, when international co-investors stop investing in a PC, domestic VC investors 
should carefully consider whether to continue to invest. As international VC investors are less prone to escalate 
their commitment to a failing course of action, the signal provided by international VC investors may be 
valuable to domestic VC investors to terminate the investment, despite potential local pressures. 
6.5.4. Implications for policy makers 
This study also has important implications for public policy makers. Public policy programs that aim to develop 
a strong local VC industry in order to foster the growth of local entrepreneurial companies should recognize that 
stimulating cross-border investments and the establishment of local branches by foreign VC firms is beneficial. 
Stimulating international VC investments not only increases the financial capital available to entrepreneurial 
companies, but also provides them with complementary resources that help them to develop and grow more 
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“This is not the end, this is not even the beginning of the end, this is just perhaps the end 
of the beginning.”  
 
Sir Winston S. Churchill 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
